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**Shatalin Doubts Authorities' Ability To Resolve
Social, Economic Crisis**

91UN0732A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 16 Jan 91 p 2

[Article by Academician S. Shatalin: "I Would Like To
Defend Myself Before the People..."]

[Text] The congresses of the Communist Party of the RSFSR and the 28th CPSU Congress and their subsequent plenums experimentally confirmed, generally speaking, the obvious theoretical hypothesis that radically altering the CPSU is impossible. Created originally as a "party of a particular type" for the "revolutionary" seizure of power (the Bolshevik wing) and command, monopoly control of the country, it is not reformable in depth. But it is precisely this—by definition, as the mathematicians say—which is needed.

Nor, to be frank, is much optimism inspired either by the congresses of people's deputies, the last one particularly, which was wholly akin to a "turbulent" CPSU Central Committee plenum.

As is known, Christ—in the wilderness, what is more—thrice resisted temptation. This is his greatness. We, however, our entire rag bag, "civil" society, live in a world of temptations and sacrilege, deception, and distorting mirrors. And for this reason—and there should be no illusions here—not only do we not wish to but, in my opinion, we cannot understand who we are, where we live, what we want, and whose interests we represent. The philosophy of plunder, social parasitism, dividing up and crude redistribution, parvenus, and plebeians—this has become the alpha and omega of our existence. We are living in a world of the disintegrating personality, unbridled passions, scorn for one another and an incomprehension of fundamental problems of the development of civilization and culture, outside of culture, essentially. We have flouted faith and we blaspheme, naively hoping that history may be fooled and rewritten in accordance with our wishes. It was about us that Christ, on the cross, spoke his heart-rending words: "Forgive them, Lord, for they know not what they do."

The most profound crisis in which our society finds itself now began, of course, not in April 1985 and not in the "stagnation" period. Persuading ourselves of this, we are once again being subjected to temptation and losing the real ground beneath our feet, attempting to ascertain how we came to be in such a pit and how to climb out of it, naively supposing that this is altogether possible within the framework of the existing social and political system. It should be firmly understood, for this is axiomatic, that the crisis began in October 1917. Without understanding this, we are doomed. Today we can still have second thoughts, tomorrow—no. People may take issue with me here, saying that, following Berdyayev, we need to look for the sources of the crisis in Belinskiy even. Perhaps so, although I really do not want such historical depth.

In evaluating October the worst thing is to find oneself captive to political and ideological banality and pagan attempts, as irresponsible as they are ignorant, to demand a roll-call vote in the search for culprits. This is an ostensibly objective path, but is, in fact, an absolutely superficial, destructive, and pagan path, a path of general vendetta. It is wholly devoid of historical method and is another temptation. It is irrational and nonoperational regarding it in the following terms: Was October a mistake or a crime. It is better to calmly recognize that it would have been better had it not occurred and to overcome it constructively. Evil may be conquered only by good. "Democrats," do not forget this.

I shall be giving away no secret, I believe, if I say that what in our country is called the Great October Socialist Revolution historians of the world called the "October coup" or the "October adventure of Lenin and Trotskiy." It is not, of course, a question of names. But it is difficult even without this to make a more or less objective evaluation of an event whose accomplishment brought us to a historical impasse by no means on account of the moral level or narrowly selfish motivations of its leaders. You may disagree with this assertion, whistle, hoot, stamp your feet, and throw stones at the person who said these things, but this is the simple truth, which, if you believe the saying, is dearer than Plato.

And the truth is that had the Bolsheviks headed by Lenin not believed in permanent world revolution—and this was for them the Old and New Testament both—there would have been no October either. This was one of the tightest knots of the divergence between "revolutionary" and "opportunist" social democracy and of the personal tragedy of not its worst representatives. Lenin saw the historical mission of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party in, having accomplished the October revolution, "pushing" world revolution also. But it was this which was the tragic mistake. And if we believe Talleyrand, a crime is not a mistake, but a mistake is a crime. The world proletariat was wholly unprepared for world revolution, of which Plekhanov, Martov, and all of Western social democracy were more than convincing in their attempts to persuade the Bolsheviks. Most unprepared for this revolution was the Russian proletariat. Remember the tragic meeting of Kropotkin and Plekhanov following their return to Russia in 1917.

And there should be no taboo placed on a truly scientific analysis of this problem. Without a clear recognition thereof the socialist movement in our country will be forever condemned to total bankruptcy. We need to understand that if we want the people or sufficiently substantial numbers thereof at least to retain some vestige of faith in the socialist choice, we need to evaluate October 1917 honestly and comprehensively, not make signs of the cross before it. Let us cease creating idol for ourselves. The truth is that instead of permanent revolution, our country acquired a permanent general crisis of "deformed" socialism to whose camp were also annexed our former "fraternal" countries, which

have already been anathematized, particularly at Russian Communist Party congresses and plenums, by their elder brothers.

M.S. Gorbachev, at the 28th CPSU Congress, made, I believe, a final attempt to consolidate the CPSU. Alas, he incurred fiasco on this path. A broken vase, like a broken love, cannot be stuck together again.

Although I realize the whole naivete of this, it is extremely surprising to me, as before, that we declare ourselves to be a party of socialist choice and communist outlook and declare our aspiration to build humane, democratic socialism without having made a precise definition of a single one of these concepts. We are simply reluctant, most likely, for it is politically more comfortable living thus.

I recall in this connection the widely known words of K. Marx: The label of a system differs from that of a commodity in that it frequently deceives not only the customer, but the seller as well. Although it needs to be said for fairness' sake that many sellers have tried, and often successfully, also to sell their merchandise slightly rotten, and certain customers have understood that they were getting it at a price. But how to tally what a brutal price was paid by our society for social hare-brained scheming.

I consider myself, as before, a socialist. But for me socialism means:

- real political democracy based on a multiparty system, the interconnection of public institutions forming a civil society, and an effective parliamentary opposition;
- an economic system based on the real pluralism of property relations, including, of course, private property, and free enterprise;
- a progressive income tax (for our destitute country it should not be as "steep" as it is now) and an efficient system of the social protection of the working people;
- an effective system of environmental protection.

Socialism for me means a cult of the "individual," a cult of the "ego". Unless we understand this, we will perish conclusively. As for the epithets "humane," "democratic"—these are simply an oddity, a truism, and the salvation of Stalin's "super-deformed" "socialism".

As far as the "communist outlook" is concerned, I shall make so "bold" as to maintain that "communism" has never been, is not now, and never will in the history of mankind be a society. It is unnatural. Although the propensity of the Russian people (forgive me, I do not wish to insult any people) for eschatological thinking and belief in chiliasm compels me to wonder whether there might not be communism a thousand years hence. Perhaps. Perhaps by this time someone will have solved the problem of theodicy also. Therefore let us leave at least some work to the generations to come after us. Let them,

more intelligent than us, build, rebuild, and complete the building of communism. Otherwise, you see, they will become carried away with distribution according to need, and, as we already know full well, there will be nothing to distribute. And there will be no capabilities left either. Can it be that they also, under communism, will have to choose between the introduction of a ration card or coupon system? What would this be: farce or tragedy?

In 1939 Fedor Raskolnikov wrote his celebrated open letter to Stalin. Angrily condemning Stalin for his mass punitive measures and the genocide, virtually, which he was perpetrating against his own people, F. Raskolnikov hurled at Stalin also the accusation that the latter had corrupted and befouled Soviet people's souls. Even F. Raskolnikov, I believe, did not suspect how accurately, comprehensively and profoundly he had evaluated the essence of what was happening and for how long these words would remain prophetic. Although even the Gospel says that the killers of souls are to be feared more than the killers of the body. I do not doubt that each of us, even in private, asks himself whether he fits in this Procrustean bed. Although as regards "each," I have apparently exaggerated considerably.

Television may be greatly thanked for the fact that it has shown that the "befouling and corruption" of souls has not as yet been overcome. We are, as before, living with corrupted and befouled souls. And this is what is most appalling. Unless we overcome this, society will die. So, will we continue to help "Comrade" Stalin or become just a little wiser? Or once again give our, in my view, great poet N.A. Nekrasov reason to say about ourselves: "vandals, savage crowd of drunkards, masters not of creation but of destruction." Or will we once again lose the battle at the Kalka and wait for the next yoke to terminate for us our bloody, fratricidal strife?

It is shameful, repulsive, and nauseating watching the "super-cultured" methods frequently employed by our people's elect and party delegates. Could any normal person not go insane, observing the present-day political shows, compared with which gladiator fights are models of ethics and chivalry.

Do you remember how V. Gilyarovskiy said:

There are in Russia two misfortunes,
Below the power of darkness,
Above the darkness of power.

However, this, generally speaking, most profound assertion is, I believe, hardly suitable for an evaluation of our present situation. There is in our country now below a superpower of darkness, and above, a paralysis of power. Although recent congresses compel one to wonder whether there is not now taking place an integration of the power of darkness at all levels—below, above, and in the middle. All politicians, and not only they, need to think deeply about this if, of course, the interests of the people are for them above provincial political ambitions. It is altogether necessary to have done with the collective

rape of the people. I have never before in my life seen such a quantity of concentrated malice as at the congresses.

What is, for that matter, the social base of the CPSU, the ruling party, as we now say? The stereotypical answer is that the CPSU is the party of all working people. But, Lord have mercy, and forgive me repeating myself: Even Jesus Christ was unable to unite all his "sympathizers." And what can be said about the miners who at their first congress in Donetsk publicly disavowed the CPSU? And is it just they?

Let us say plainly: The CPSU was never a party of workers (do you remember Shlyapnikov's "worker opposition"), it never personified the "dictatorship of the proletariat," it was always a "party of a particular kind"—that is, a party of the apparatus which directed the party masses, me included. On behalf of the working people we enslaved the working people and made labor forced, and the system a slave-owning-feudal empire of the "soldier" class of the USSR. We "abolished" man's exploitation of man, but observed and continue to observe with great pleasure how the state of workers, peasants, and the people's intelligentsia is super-exploiting the one, the other, and the third.

It is shameful when an audience of communists rapturously applauds I. Polozkov, for whom conviction as to the rightness of Marxism-Leninism is higher than feeding, shoeing, and clothing our destitute, half-starved population. I feel ashamed of Belov, the new-sprung theorist-ideologist of the Communist Party of the RSFSR, who is calling on everyone to sober up, but proposes intoxication with the raw vodka of his "home-brew," "moonshine" communism. I feel ashamed of myself.

I am absolutely certain that the reader will be asking in perplexity why S. Shatalin needs to waste time repeating these truths which set the teeth on edge. Why indeed? Only to one end: to warn, if only myself, against another temptation to achieve something without altering anything. And recent events in the country are a tocsin warning of coming catastrophe and another temptation. We wish once again to accomplish the insoluble task of squaring the circle: the erroneous, superficial evaluation of the situation in April 1985 in terms of the "deformed" socialism—the choice of varnishing policy (acceleration, S&T revolution)—failure of the strategy—the call for humane, democratic socialism without private ownership and man's exploitation of man and without alienation of the working people from the product of their labor—a new varnishing of policy and... the edge of the abyss. An absolute shortage of absolutely everything, other than words, and the attempt at the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies to take the abyss in two jumps. My God, how many times has all this already happened in Russian history. Or was Hegel apparently right in saying that the main lesson which people learn from history is that they learn no lessons from it? And for this

reason a study of the sources of Russian communism is by no means an academic competition in liveliness of intellect.

We found ourselves frighteningly far from the people and came to a stop at historical materialism, which has shown more than convincingly that the "market-capitalist" economies have defeated the "planned-socialist" economies by a stunning knockout. I believe that even in a fantastic dream K. Marx would not have dreamed of the shelves of "socialist" stores filled with air and would have personally pronounced anathema on all his quasi-Hegelian reasoning concerning commodity fetishism. But Torquemada and Ignatius Loyola had not yet been born, evidently.

How indifferent does one need to be toward one's own people to be able to speak about their "socialist choice" and "communist outlook" of not producing but making fetishes of commodities. Need it be explained after this why the "500 days" program was turned down to the rejoicing of the "upper strata" and the "masses"? A "thousand and one nights" program would not have helped here. The interests of self-preservation and power once again proved higher than the interests of the peoples.

The Fourth Congress of People's Deputies did not breathe a word even about how to emerge from the most profound economic crisis and the total collapse of the economy, although it discussed the question of power against the background of a general and absolutely obvious shift to the right.

Why this happened is a question for a separate analysis. Either the actors did not understand what the director wants or wanted of them or the director "scored" an artistic failure or...? I do not know all the "or's." Society, unless spurred by hunger and cold, once again wishes to fall into a lethargic slumber and content itself with its brutish way of life to which it is so habituated. Interethnic relations and democracy have once again been delivered a clumsy, but planned blow. What, have they already started a referendum in Lithuania? Too much has already been said about the knockout of the economy, but does the president of the USSR wish to entrust the salvage operations to the right people? Or does he believe that the team which sustained a most telling punch has the incentives and courage to put things right? Or does he think that the final match for the World Cup can be won from the bench? The referee had already counted to nine, but the bell sounded. Or have we, for the umpteenth time, not heard it? The Politburo has once again given a reminder of who the true master in the country is. But is this not a Pyrrhic victory?

People's deputies, change your minds and think: Will you have once again to assemble for a special congress? What currently represents the "transition to the market economy" is chaotic suicide and navigation without rudder and sails. Hardly in the history of Russia have there been instances of a more "dexterous" reduction of

the state budget deficit, the outcome of which will be merely superinflation and economic catastrophe. In order to swim in this "sea" a new, intelligent and strong-willed team is needed which could as quickly as possible become a team of interethnic and interparty cooperation, which is particularly necessary now, perhaps, in the sphere of the economy. But it should be finally professionals who are cooperating. The present organization of power will not solve this problem. Let us immediately return to the "500 days." If they are not enough, we will add "A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich." I personally would like to defend myself before the people for my lack of principle.

Debate Over Need for 'Iron Fist' Continues

Center-Republic Tensions Encourage Authoritarianism

91UN0780A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 23 Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with Andranik Migranyan, candidate of historical sciences, by correspondent Andrey Podkopalov; place and date not given: "The Left Wing Did Not Have the Right to Take Over Power"]

[Text] *As early as August 1989 in a newspaper discussion Igor Klyamkin, doctor of philosophical sciences, and Andranik Migranyan, candidate of historical sciences, predicted the inevitability of a reinforcement of authoritarian tendencies during the country's changeover to the market.*

As a result both scholars became the objects of mass criticism—as proponents and apologists for the "iron fist." Today we return to this discussion. The discussion, which is conducted by our correspondent Andrey Podkopalov, we warn you at the outset, is not an easy one. But it is necessary: We must move on from mutual accusations and emotions to sober analysis. The discussion continues.

[Correspondent] Andranik, you have long been discussing the need for strong authority and you must be satisfied with the way events are developing.

[Migranyan] No, the kind of authoritarianism about which I was speaking and the kind that has developed today are two different things. At one time I developed a concept of the transition from totalitarianism to democracy through an authoritarian regime. And I warned that a direct changeover to democracy is impossible: It is fraught with all kinds of disintegration and chaos. And the only way out of chaos is into tyranny.

It was necessary to understand that we are reforming a totalitarian empire. In and of itself a totalitarian regime can sustain itself only on political power, and this is even more true of an empire. A totalitarian regime and a totalitarian empire are mechanically connected parts, and they are connected in the political sphere because in a totalitarian regime there is no other: All spheres—

including within the family—are politics. Therefore to affect the regime in the political sphere is to upset the entire system, which inevitably causes its destruction with unpredictable consequences. I have been discussing this for the past three or four years. This is why I warned that changes in the political sphere should not be too radical—they must be preceded by reforms in economics and a maturation of the civil society under the conditions of a strong authority which is strong politically.

But what is taking place today is something else. Yes, today we are moving toward authoritarianism, but this authoritarianism arises as a result of the loss of control over events. The country is actually uncontrollable, the centrifugal tendencies have acquired their own logic of development, the collapse has reached the critical mark, and the center is trying to restore the control it has lost. There are essentially no alternatives, since neither in the republics nor in Russia have the democratic forces turned out to be strong enough to emerge victorious from this chaos.

In general the process of emerging from totalitarianism has two phases. First comes the end of the party's sovereignty and noncommunists take over leadership. The second phase includes privatization and the creation of stable political institutions.

It was quite obvious to me even three years ago and after the elections in 1989, when the democrats had won a number of convincing victories, that they were not capable of creating viable democratic institutions of power. And not because they were bad or incapable; the majority of them are extremely noble people. But because democracy cannot yet be supported by the differentiated and separate interests of society—it simply has no social base. The democrats came to power not because people voted for them but because they voted against the old structures. But if the communists, who were in a similar situation at one time, had created their support base in the society by force, the democrats could not do this. Having ended up in power without power, the leftist forces were objectively doomed to defeat.

[Correspondent] Does it follow from this that democracy does not yet have a social base, the civil society you speak about, and that the democratic movement has no future?

[Migranyan] I do not think that. It is simply that the leftists had to be in the opposition all the time and did not have the right to take over the power, wherever it may have been, without having been victorious on the scale of the country or without having a solid majority.

Of course, here I am not speaking about the national republics, where the national liberation process has overshadowed all the others, including democratization. Once I entered into a public debate with an eminent Lithuanian scholar—in the United States, I think it was Berkeley. And I asked whether Lithuania was closer to democracy under the Communists or under Sajudis. He

laughed and answered: During the transition from the Communists to Sajudis. After all, what is democracy? It is a condition of consensus among opposing national and social forces concerning certain basic values. This has never existed yet. Even in places where noncommunists are in power they are giving themselves extraordinary authority and strengthening the executive structures.

Democratic Russia, Moscow, and Leningrad are in the most difficult and vulnerable position. While the national idea and the existence of certain state structures have become the support base for the new power in the republics, in the absence of control over the majority of the economy and such institutions as the Army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the KGB, the democratic powers have nothing to rest on. This has also predetermined the dual nature of the situation. The illusion of power on the one hand and the actual powerlessness on the other. There is a great deal of desire to change something but no real possibility. And as a result there is discrediting of the democratic movement. I consider this to be the fatal mistake of the leftist forces—taking power without taking all of it.

[Correspondent] Well, what could they do? The elections were scheduled and the democrats won. What can you tell the voters: "Excuse me, but we are going to wait until democracy wins out on the scale of the entire country"?

[Migranyan] As soon as they came into power and found out that they did not have enough authority they should have stepped down immediately, explaining to the people, naturally, what was going on. This would have made it possible to "save face" as well as gain the sympathies of the voters. And also they would not have had to share in the responsibility for what happened next—for after the elections the situation changed everywhere from bad to worse. And today the democrats cannot say that they have nothing to do with it. This is a tragic situation.

[Correspondent] Andranik, what, in your opinion, determines the concentration of power in the hands of the few—the desire to make radical transformations or the fear of the apparatus of losing power?

[Migranyan] The present concentration of power is an attempt to restore control over the country from the center...

[Correspondent] But in your time would you not have welcomed this kind of strengthening of power?

[Migranyan] I would have welcomed it before the republics had departed—before the elections to the republic soviets. But today the aspiration of the national formations, which have been through the elections, for independence has gained legality and legitimacy. And it is possible to restore control over them only by force, which is what we are seeing in Lithuania. I would like for us to avoid this situation, and if there had been no republic elections we would not have the lack of control we see today. The center itself created this situation, and

now it is trying to turn everything backward by using force. This, I repeat, could have been avoided.

But today I think differently—since this has already happened, it would be better to turn the power over to the republics and let them establish their own horizontal ties. This, of course, will lead to a weakening of the center but, in my view, from both a moral and rational standpoint, this is preferable to the restoration of control by force. Although it would seem that the center has made a final choice in favor of the latter.

[Correspondent] And is there nothing that will force it to back down?

[Migranyan] Two factors could be decisive—the degree of resistance of the republics, above all, Russia, and the external factor. It seems to me that the moment was chosen very fortuitously for the center in both cases.

Resistance within Russia will be insignificant—the people are tired of the confusion and political instability, plus disenchantment with the democrats has reached its peak. And so society as a whole is prepared to accept any power which will provide law and order. And in this respect Russia is especially vulnerable since its leadership has nothing with which to oppose the center except for Yeltsin's authority which, in turn, has nothing with which to bolster itself...

As concerns the external factor, the main political forces of the West—the United States and Germany—are not interested in complicating relations with the Soviet Union at the present time. Germany is awaiting the forthcoming ratification of the treaty for reunification of Germany in our parliament—and you know what our parliament is like: from rapture to a hard line. And America is engaged in a military conflict in the Persian Gulf. Therefore at the level of words there will be many condemnations, but they will not be followed by strong pressure that would be capable of keeping the center from regaining control over the republics.

[Correspondent] What, in your opinion, will be the outcome of the open confrontation between Yeltsin and the Union authorities concerning the events in Lithuania?

[Migranyan] Yeltsin will do everything he can in the situation in which he finds himself. It must be understood that for Yeltsin this is a struggle not only for Lithuania but also for the sovereignty of Russia and for himself. Because the next target is the Russian leadership and himself. From the standpoint of the center it is absolutely intolerable to have a situation in which the nucleus of the empire, Russia, gets out of control and declares independence. Many people may not be able to understand his appeal to the United Nations. But if you think about it, the national republics can appeal to democratic Russia for support. But where can Russia turn? Yeltsin's position is that of a person who has decided to see things through to the end.

[Correspondent] Perhaps this is the variant which you suggested for the democrats—either gain real power or go out with a bang.

[Migranyan] Yes, I think that by engaging in a frontal confrontation with the center Yeltsin wants to be removed by force—so that he can retain his name and prestige and the possibility of returning at a new level—not only for himself but for the entire democratic movement.

[Correspondent] But, to be honest, I cannot imagine how Yeltsin can be "removed." Russia is not Lithuania and they will hardly be able to take advantage of the acuteness of the national conflict here...

[Migranyan] I will tell you what they can do in Russia. Public discrediting of Yeltsin has already begun—on television. They are saying that he betrayed the Russians in the Baltic region and is ruining the Union... He has a shaky majority in parliament—and perhaps he does not even have one. The congress showed that not a single radical resolution has passed—especially in the reform of power. In this situation it is possible to raise the question of the crisis of power. In Lithuania an anonymous "Committee for National Salvation" has gone into operation and in Russia this committee might turn out to be a good half of the parliament—mainly the "Communists of Russia" faction and people of their ilk. They can appeal directly to the president and demand the overthrow of Yeltsin—for discrediting Russia and undermining the Union. It seems to me that this would be supported by both the generals and military and industrial complex. In general, organizing such an action is not as difficult as it may seem...

[Correspondent] Well anyway, I hope things will not reach that point...

'First Wave' of Democracy Limited

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in Russian 23 Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with Igor Klyamkin, doctor of philosophical sciences, by correspondent Andrey Podkopalov; place and date not given: "Without the Democratic Movement Our Ruling Elite Would Never Have Restructured Itself"]

[Text] [Correspondent] It seems that your and Migranyan's analysis is being confirmed. How do you feel about this?

[Klyamkin] In the first place, Migranyan and I were speaking about two different things. I was proceeding from the idea that since combining the posts of general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the chairman of the Supreme Soviet the movement in the direction of authoritarianism has already begun, and it has begun in a very original way—under the guise of democratization. Migranyan thought that democratization would lead not to authoritarianism but to collapse,

and authoritarianism, on the contrary, could prevent a catastrophe. Therefore he called for the most rapid establishment of an authoritarian regime.

In the second place (and here our positions largely coincide) we did not have in mind precisely the regime which has taken form in our country in recent months. We were speaking about a kind of authoritarianism that arises under the conditions of a movement toward the modern market. This has very frequently been the case in history: A society that is changing over to the market splits up, people's interests come into conflict, and nothing but a strong authoritarian power can coordinate them. The peculiarity of this kind of power lies in the fact that it protects economic and spiritual freedom while limiting political freedom. But what has been happening here is altogether different: We have been given an authoritarian regime not as a result of changing over to the market but as a result of the crisis of the existing power, which arose because of its inability even to begin a movement toward a market economy.

So, believe me, I am not experiencing any special rapture, if only because what has started to happen is not exactly what I predicted. Moreover, even for the market, as it were, classical authoritarianism I never expressed even the slightest sympathy. I simply gave a warning: Here is world experience in the movement toward a modern economy, and our economy must be prepared for the fact that authoritarian tendencies could also arise in our country while it is on this path.

It is a sad thing, but in the majority of regions of the country our democracy has not been able to organize itself in this way. This is why it was unable to prevent the tragedy in Vilnius. It is understandable that our special, pre-market authoritarian regime, which began counting its historical time with this present-day Bloody Sunday, is even less attractive than the authoritarian market regime. But in order to break out of the impasse and in order to avoid more tragedies, we must be aware of what happened. And here is what happened. In the first place, our former political system revealed a genetic disinclination for democratization. In the second place, our democracy revealed an inability (I hope it is not genetic but historical) to become a real alternative to the previous system. This is sad, it is painful, but it absolutely must be recognized.

[Correspondent] Did you foresee what happened in Vilnius?

[Klyamkin] I repeatedly spoke in public about the fact that the development of events revealed the keenest contradiction between the two forces—the military-industrial complex, which is a bearing structure of the empire, and the interests of the republics striving for independence. As long as the system was held together by totalitarian nails, this contradiction did not bother anybody and almost never became apparent. But as soon as these nails were weakened by democratization, as soon as the republics started to talk about real sovereignty

instead of sovereignty on paper, it immediately became apparent what a sharp contradiction it was and how unyielding it was in the form of the intransigent "war of the laws."

I never had any delusions about the fact that the center's interests in the republics are also represented by the defense enterprises and thus by the tens of millions of people who work in them. This has become obvious now, since the January strikes in the Baltic region. But still right to the last day I did not believe that the center would decide to use the Army and force in a political conflict.

[Correspondent] As early as the middle of November you wrote in OGONEK that perestroika had come to an end. This has now become a commonplace, almost a cliché. But if perestroika has ended, what has begun?

[Klyamkin] Unfortunately, like everything else in country, words about the end of perestroika have been transformed into a fashionable phrase which covers up a void of meaning. I said this in the sense that the old ruling elite had completed their perestroika. Having gradually understood that the old way made it impossible not only to feed and clothe the people but also to maintain ability to compete with the West in the area of arms production, in a matter of six months they mastered a new language and included in their vocabulary such foreign words as "market," "private property," and "pluralism," and sent off for a well-earned rest those who found perestroika difficult because of an unwillingness to forego principles. They recognized that it is impossible to lead the modern economy and the modern society from offices run on the basis of ideologies. They even allowed a multiparty system, that is, they allowed political competitors to appear, permitted more and more free elections, turned the press loose, and transformed the soviets into parliaments where, if you can force your way up to the podium, you can say anything or almost anything you see fit.

The ruling elite adapted to the new conditions, which are almost not hampering them from retaining their economic (through the Union state) and political (through the CPSU) monopolies, and in this sense perestroika has indeed come to an end.

But it certainly does not follow from this that now everything is going to stop and turn backward, to preperestroika times and customs. It is impossible to go back because the old ideologized system will never come alive and go into operation again. It is also impossible to stop because nobody ever before has been able to stop a process of decline or collapse. This means that the restructured old apparatus will still have to allow certain reforms to take place in order at least to stabilize the situation and protect itself from a crash.

[Correspondent] That sounds very sinister: The events in Lithuania were the first steps to reform.

[Klyamkin] It seems even more terrifying when you realize that the troops obedient to the Union center were against the power that appeared as a result of free elections which, in turn, became possible because of the democratization proclaimed by that same center. What does this tell us? Above all that perestroika has not been without cost for the ruling elite: They will not be able to restore the destroyed stability of the system without foregoing power. Moreover, in certain republics the monopoly on power has been lost since organizations (people's fronts) have appeared there which have crowded out the CPSU and deprived it of influence on the course and results of the elections and, hence, influence in the elective organs. The latest events in the Baltic regions have shown quite obviously that there is a limit which our restructured power cannot and, judging from everything, will never be able to cross. It cannot and never will be able to use democratic and nonviolent means to resolve conflicts generated by its own policy over many years. When we think about it this is very important: Was it really an accident that force was applied before the referendum on preserving the USSR which was proposed by the president? Do the introduction of troops into the Baltics and the latest terror in Vilnius not mean that the center does not believe that the referendum will have an outcome that is favorable to itself and wants to use force to create conditions that will preclude failure.

I have written repeatedly about the fact that it has been in vain that all these years the leftist forces have been demanding that Gorbachev take more resolute actions against the conservatives and more confident steps in the direction of the democrats. This is absurd: The president can move to the left only to the point to which he is allowed to do this by the structures that move him (the party apparatus, the military and industrial complex, the central departments). If these structures control the state of affairs in the central electoral organs then Gorbachev, while subject to the majority of them, appears as the most consistent liberal he can be, and to demand more of him means to hope that he will want to cut off that very branch which nobody would advise anybody to cut off. But if the parliamentary majority gets out of control somewhere, sooner or later the power will show its true nature and resort to force. This is why, incidentally, our president has never found the words to condemn the crime in the Baltics.

I shall say even more pointedly that democratization of a power such as ours in any stage will inevitably lead to problems and conflicts which in principle it cannot resolve democratically.

[Correspondent] But then what was the point of starting democratization at all? After all, no other communist reformer has ever done this on such a broad scale before. Tito in Yugoslavia, Kadar in Hungary, and Deng Xiaoping in China began with economics and not politics. And they managed to achieve much of what our president and all of us today can only dream about...

[Klyamkin] This seems strange, but apparently without democratization our power would not even have been able to begin the work which the Yugoslavs and Hungarians began in the fifties and sixties. It is sad but true: We spent six years on reaching the point from which Tito and Kadar began more than 30 years ago.

[Correspondent] It is not very comprehensible. Why did our reformers have to begin with democratization anyway?

[Klyamkin] I think they began with it because our agriculture, as distinct from Hungarian or Yugoslav agriculture, could not be liberated without affecting the interests of the broad segments of the nomenklatura (they were rooted in agriculture more in our country than in any other). The apparatus would never allow any deep kind of land reform, nor would they allow any encroachment on the agricultural monopoly of the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. This could be done only under pressure from society, and for this society itself had to wake up. And it was impossible to wake it up without democratization—particularly without free elections. But if we had had only today's Union parliament, elected under the control of the party apparatus, nothing would have changed anyway. The latest ukase from the president on land reform would have been impossible if the republics' parliaments had not adopted laws forcing the kolkhozes to share with the free peasants the land which they could not use effectively themselves. But without democratization our republics would not have been able to adopt those laws.

All that is left is to add that now the center does not need any democratization of any kind, and this is why it has begun to cut it back.

[Correspondent] So now, 30-40 years late, we will catch up to such countries as Hungary, Poland, or Yugoslavia?

[Klyamkin] That certainly cannot be ruled out. Like these countries, we are beginning to enter the market with agriculture, trade, and light industry. Like these countries, we will begin while retaining the monopoly of the Communist Party in power. Yes, a monopoly weakened during the course of democratization, a monopoly that is only political, one that no longer applies directly to state and economic life (in Tito and Kadar's time the party had its full power). But in one way or another we too shall begin with the monopoly of the CPSU and with an authoritarian leader who has been able to make up for the harm caused to his party by democratization through colossal personal authority gained during the course of this same democratization. But the reformist capabilities of the CPSU are very limited.

Pay attention: Poland and Hungary began to introduce free prices after the Communists were ousted from power. Free prices mean the end of an economy of deficit and an abundance of products on the shelves, but initially it also means an overall drop in the standard of living. The Communists were almost unable to do this when they were in power since this would not have been

entrusted to them. But now, after the fall of Mazowiecki, who lasted only a couple of months, we know that even noncommunists will not last long in cases like these. This is why I ask: Will our central power which, as you know, does not have confidence, decide to introduce free prices? Will Gorbachev not prefer the path of Tito and Kadar?

Our central power might decide on free prices in only one case: If the republics decide on this beforehand. Thus they will take all the responsibility for the consequences. After the "parade of sovereignties" the center would have the possibility of conducting painful reforms with others' hands, risking almost nothing. If one adds the fact that all the main power levers are in the hands of the center, the ones that make it possible to keep the reforms on track (remember how the faction of the CPSU in the Russian parliament blocked the introduction of real private ownership of the land), the political destiny of the present republic leaders is very difficult. I will even go so far as to say that the extremely painful problems they are experiencing today are just a foretaste. In any case, if the new republic authorities are unable to contain the dissatisfaction of large segments of the population, mainly workers, which will be inevitable when free prices are introduced, the center will be left with the possibility, not without political gain, of moving to the moderate positions of the Hungarian and Yugoslav communists of the fifties and sixties.

[Correspondent] Is there no other way out?

[Klyamkin] Another important lesson of the Lithuanian bloody Sunday is not to look for a way out where there is none. We cannot escape our notorious historical past alone. Therefore we need at least two things. First, an alliance of republic leaders against the imperial claims of the center. Such an alliance was earmarked at the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies, where it was discovered that there was no essential difference in the political positions of the communist Nazarbayev and Yeltsin who had left the party. The possibility of such an alliance also appeared in the unanimity discovered by the republic leaders in the Council of the Federation on 12 January, which spoke out against the use of force in the Baltics.

But a couple of hours later, in spite of their demands and the assurances of the president, blood was spilled in Vilnius. Thus they clearly showed that the power today remains with the imperialist forces. And it will remain with them as long as—and this is the second thing—their opponents counter them with the idea of national liberation alone. Then the conflict between the center and the republics or, to put it differently, between the reactionaries and the democrats, will inevitably shift to the republics and be transformed there into a conflict between Russians (Russian-speaking) and non-Russians (indigenous population). Thus millions of people working in Union enterprises and stationed in military garrisons will automatically become supports for imperialist forces. And what will disappear or recede into

background will be such an apparently obvious consideration as the fact that both Russians and non-Russians are victims of that very imperialist policy and militaristic economy which laid the basis for their present conflicts. It will take not a national ideal but a broader democratic ideal to bring us out of this impasse. The imperial union must be opposed by an organized union of democratic forces in the country. To think otherwise after the most recent events means to refuse to think altogether.

[Correspondent] You began to speak about the weakness of our democracy at the very beginning of our conversation. But many people think that it is not very appropriate to speak about its shortcomings at this time...

[Klyamkin] I think, on the contrary, that now we must talk about these weaknesses more and more loudly than ever before. On 13 January we saw the defeat of democracy. And the defeat was the result of weakness, a progressive one which revealed itself long before the fatal day and was expressed most clearly and stunningly in the failure of the voters of Moscow and Leningrad to appear at the elections to support the known representatives of the Interregional Deputy Group.

It seems to me that we cannot get rid of the old illusions and advance new takes without first answering three questions regarding the ebbing wave of democracy. In the first place, what kind of democracy was this? Second, what did it and what did it not give our society? Third, what can it give and on what does it depend?

[Correspondent] Let us take them in order. What was this democracy?

[Klyamkin] This can be answered with one word: It was a post-totalitarian democracy. In other words, it was a democracy in a society without private property or a market or—which is the same thing—in a society where the democracy had no economic roots. In such a society, strictly speaking, there are no producers; it has only consumers. For even if I work at the plant, that is, engage in some kind of productive labor, I perceive other people as competitors in consumption and not in production. For such a society the totalitarian regime is even very constrained. On the one hand, it forces everyone to work, ridding people of worries about the meaning of their work, and on the other—it takes over all concerns about distribution and redistribution.

It is not difficult to guess that if a representative democracy were introduced into such a society, the parliaments could not but be transformed into clubs of zealous consumers who, on the one hand, demand the redistribution of incomes in favor of their voters at the expense of other groups of the population and, on the other, outdo one another in daring to unmask any leadership that does not want to give them what they are asking for. But since the "leadership," in order to give, must take away from somebody else, and there is nobody to take from, is left with one option: to print a lot of new money

and divide it up among all who need it. How this happens and what happens as a result of it we now know from first-hand experience.

[Correspondent] But the East European countries also had a post-totalitarian democracy, although it is occupied with an altogether different kind of transition to a market economy; it is bothered by production and not just by distribution.

[Klyamkin] This is true, but again you have forgotten that Communists are no longer in power there. And the people who have replaced them, unlike the Communists, can say: Give us time, be patient! while we all transform the economy together. But even in these countries the peculiarities of the post-totalitarian democracy are just beginning to manifest themselves.

In a totalitarian society the people mainly wait for the authorities to improve life. Because in such a society there is no one from whom to expect anything more except the all-pervasive power. That is all there is. Therefore man's political consciousness pulsates here in an empty space between two poles: power (from which everything bad comes since you keep expecting things but never receive anything) and the anti-power (as something good). But when the anti-power becomes a political movement and is itself transformed into the power, the person out of habit expects that it will rapidly solve all problems that were not resolved previously. And if this does not happen, psychologically he feels that he is in a worse position than one he was in before: After all, his previous political consciousness, in which one pole balanced out the other, was more or less stable, but now one of them has disappeared while the problems still remain and are even getting worse. In brief, the "anti-power" is restored in man's awareness—but this time as the opposite of the new power. With the one difference that now man has many more doubts and it is not very clear from whom he can expect salvation and whom to believe. And since this is not clear, he wants a miracle.

The recent presidential elections in Poland showed very well what impasses and traps await the post-totalitarian democracy which has removed communists from power. Mazowiecki, who honestly warned about future difficulties, was thrown out by a majority of the people. Walesa, who mercilessly criticized Mazowiecki and promised improvements without any chance of keeping his promises, was elected, but as soon as the elections were over he began to use the same tactics as his opponent. And I do not know how he and his followers answer the question that was asked daily of Mazowiecki's followers: If you say that society must pay for the transition to the market with a temporary decline in the standard of living, then why does everyone not have to pay, why do certain groups, on the contrary, become economically stronger? I do not know whether a fragile post-totalitarian democracy can stand up under this question or whether it will slip into some kind of authoritarian regime of a post-communist type. But if this happens, it will still be authoritarianism which appears during the

transition to the market, and not the kind that has developed in our country so far.

But that is still not all. The most alarming thing that happened in the Polish elections was that one-fourth of the votes were cast for Stanislaw Tyminski. A person who has not lived in the country for 20 years and whom nobody in Poland knows. A stranger. All it took were several scandalous demagogic attacks against Mazowiecki and millions of people believed him. This is a complete collapse of consciousness; this is a signal of threatening danger: People have lost their faith in everything and are ready to believe whomever comes along. It is a signal not only to the Poles but to all countries that share a common destiny with them. Including, of course, us. Incidentally, we are observing very poorly and inattentively the experience of changing over from totalitarianism to democracy in East Europe. This is another peculiarity of a post-totalitarian democracy, this time in international relations: After decades of officially imposed friendship—we have an almost complete lack of interest in one another.

[Correspondent] If you are right, then the post-totalitarian democracy is completely fruitless. Have the several years of our democratic movement really not produced anything at all?

[Klyamkin] That is not so. The post-totalitarian democracy is strong as a means of dismantling the old system. Without the democratic movement we would not have had either the change of Article 6 of the Constitution, or the multiparty system, or the Law on the Press, or the "parade of sovereignties," and hence we would not have had those insignificant changes we have had in property relations (above all with the land). Without the democratic movement, incidentally, our ruling segment would never have "restructured itself" and would not have been able to master either a new language or its new role. Without democracy it would not have been possible for such people as Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and Bakatin, who represented the best of the Brezhnev nomenklatura, to appear in the highest echelons of power and operate successfully. They will disappear from the scene along with the decline of the first democratic wave, but without them and without the political reference points they gave us, this nomenklatura would have remained the same as it always was. Regardless of how we feel about the new people around the president, we all must recognize that these people were somehow different from Chernenko, Solomentsev, Grishin, Romanov, or Ligachev. Were it not for democracy our ruling caste would never have known the degree to which it was capable of change or whether it was capable of change at all.

[Correspondent] So has democracy worked not for itself but for the restructuring of the old apparatus?

[Klyamkin] No. It has worked for itself, but it had just enough power to force the apparatus to restructure itself and to take over certain positions which the weakened

apparatus had to let go of in spite of its will and its interests (for instance, in the Baltics). Now that it has been restructured, it will try (as the events in this same Baltic area show, it is already trying) to take back these positions. And it is possible to oppose this—I shall answer my third question—in only one way: through unification and self-organization of the fragmented democratic forces.

Coalitions, Schisms of Political Parties Analyzed

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Second Edition p 5

[Article by K. Grigoryev, candidate of philosophical sciences: "Whom Should We Expect in the Multiparty Home?" subtitled: "Registration of Political Parties Began on 1 January 1991"]

[Text] However the fate of our country shapes up subsequently, it is obvious even now that the years 1989-1990 will go down in its history as a time of the "explosive" formation of numerous new political parties and social and political associations (popular fronts and various blocs and coalitions).

How Many of Them Are There?

Approximately 20 parties and social and political organizations laying claim to all-Union status are operating in the country's political arena currently. It would be advisable, in my view, to attribute to them also the parties of the RSFSR which have stable ties to political forces which are close to them in other republics.

The strength of the majority of the subjects of political relations fluctuates from several hundred (the Socialist Party, Liberal Democratic Party, Islamic Revival Party) through several thousand (the Democratic Party, "Democratic Union" Party). The leaders of some of them maintain that their organizations are tens of thousands strong. N. Travkin, for example, chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia, has declared that his organization has approximately 25,000 members. This party has, according to its chairman, many city and rural rayon organizations in a number of regions of Russia.

Determining the real strength of the absolute majority of subjects of the political system of our society would simply not seem possible. Why? First, because the numbers are fixed, as a rule, on the basis of statements of the leaders of these organizations. And they, as practice shows, endeavor to exaggerate the number of their supporters by a factor of 1.5 to two on average. Second, many of the newly emerged political parties do not maintain a register of their members. This is especially typical of the so-called "party movements" recognizing not only individual but also collective membership. Third, numerous instances of dual and triple membership have been noted: this applies not only to the rank and file of the parties but shows through at the level of their directive bodies even.

Nor should it be forgotten that some of the newly emerged political organizations recommend against the advertising of participation in them. Here is a highly typical provision taken from the statutes of the Russian "Shchit" union, which consists mainly of servicemen, those liable for the draft, and members of their families. The document says that a member of the union has the right "to keep secret his membership of the union." Proceeding from such premises, it is impossible to either recruit or confirm the truthfulness of the declaration of V. Urazhtsev, cochairman of "Shchit," that the union "now unites 20,000 persons. It has over 500 primary organizations operating in garrisons, on ships, and among members of servicemen's families."

While, incidentally, like all "democrats," paying lip-service to the depoliticization and de-party-ization of the law enforcement authorities, the Soviet Army and enterprises and establishments, the Democratic Party of Russia, the Republican Party of Russia, and the Russian Christian Democratic Movement are attempting in parallel to create their own primary organizations according to the production principle also. In other words, communists should not have the slightest illusions: The leaders of these parties are endeavoring not to depoliticize those same law enforcement authorities but to effect their political and ideological reorientation.

The "moment of truth" for the majority of the newly emerged political parties laying claim to an all-Union scale of activity came as of 1 January 1991, when the USSR Law "On Public Associations" took effect. A minimum membership quota of 5,000 persons was established for parties, as is known. This membership threshold will be impossible to surmount for many of them, it would seem, first time round, at least. There is reason to believe that many parties that have not been registered will continue to operate without prior permission or, which cannot be ruled out either, will merge with others close to them in spirit.

Search for a Principle

We may today speak of two main forms and types of newly formed political parties from the viewpoint of their organization. These are, first, vanguard-type parties. And, second, movement-parties.

Pertaining to the first is the Democratic Party of Russia, which functions on the principles of democratic centralism, has tight discipline, recognizes only individual membership and so forth. N. Travkin has built such a party on the basis of the fact that the main political opponent—the CPSU—may be beaten only in the event a "noncommunist" party similar to it in terms of principles of organization is counterposed to it. The version of party organizational development which he proposes is perceived far from unambivalently by many "democrats" accustomed to "democratic freedom," so to speak. As a whole, N. Travkin's policy is frequently viewed by them as "neo-Bolshevism," "Fuehrerism," and so forth. Thus it was largely on account of this that

a split occurred at the constituent congress of the Democratic Party of Russia held in May 1990 in Moscow. A group of delegates quit the congress and somewhat later (in June) organized the even more avowedly anticommunist Free Democratic Party of Russia.

The majority of other political parties (besides "Shchit") are taking shape not as vanguard-type parties but as movement-parties. Fundamental in their activity is the principle of "democratic unity": Merely the decisions for which they have voted are binding on the lower organizations. The remainder are of recommendatory nature. Collective membership, which on the one hand undoubtedly weakens them, but, on the other, enables them to unite under one "roof" quite heterogeneous groups, is permissible also in many of these parties. Thus until recently there were in the "Democratic Union" typical movement-party five factions, among which were a group of anarchists and even... a "communist" faction. Of course, the communist nature of the latter was very conditional, to put it mildly, but a fact remains a fact, nonetheless.

'Democrats,' Unite!

Voices talking about the need for unification have been heard increasingly often among "democrats" since last spring. This process was initiated by the statements of a number of "democrat" leaders concerning the fact that perestroika in its apparatus-party appointments understanding was already exhausted: Power was, as before, allegedly, in the hands of the party and state schedule of appointments, while the democrats could counterpose to it merely several scattered and small parties.

An important landmark in the business of unification of the "democratic forces" was the constituent congress of the "Democratic Russia" bloc (October 1990). Representatives of over 30 "democratic" organizations and movements took part as delegates and guests. The leitmotiv of the congress were the words of A. Murashov, chairman of the "Democratic Russia" organizing committee: "We are for an alternative movement to CPSU policy." In other words, anticommunism, "anti-CPSU-ism"—this was that little which really united the congress participants and guests. "Democratic Russia" today is quite a right-wing, liberal-bourgeois pole of the political life of the RSFSR and, to a considerable extent, of the country as a whole.

The "Left Democratic" bloc, the basis of which is the "Popular Self-Government" movement, is being formed actively, although somewhat behind the forces of the right. Its sponsors and backbone are three political organizations: the Socialist Party, the "Green" Party, and the Confederation of Anarcho-Syndicalists. In September 1990 they drew up a draft platform of forces of the left. Its essence consists of criticism of the Russian Government's "500 days" program and substantiation of the position of "nonaffiliation" of the left democrats to the "Democratic Russia" bloc. By 5 November this

platform had been signed by, apart from the above-mentioned, representatives of "Memorial," the left social democrats, the Committee for Assistance to the Workers Movement, and the Communist Democratic Movements.

The Center Bloc uniting approximately 20 political parties and movements gave notice of its existence for the first time at the end of last October. It incorporates, inter alia, the Liberal Democratic Party, the A.D. Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces, the Russian Popular Front, the Democratic Party, and "Soyuz"—a group of people's deputies of all levels. The main mission of this bloc is the search for peaceful, nonviolent methods of solving the crisis, struggle by political methods against extremism, and the formation of a government of national accord. In the fall of 1990 the leaders of the majority of organizations which are a part of the Center Bloc met with certain leaders of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the country's Council of Ministers. The problems and prospects of the conclusion of a Union treaty were discussed, inter alia, in the course of these meetings.

The process of bloc-forming and the unification of different political forces is not unidirectional—a great deal of internal work in all three blocs on specification of the positions of this party or the other constituting them is under way together with it.

Divisions, Divisions...

Now about the divisions. They are today a kind of birthmark of the "democratic" forces. The contradictions between V. Zhirinovskiy and K. Krivososov (Liberal Democratic Party), N. Travkin and A. Murashov (Democratic Party of Russia), V. Lysenko and V. Shostakovskiy (Republican Party of Russia) and A. Obolenskii and O. Rummyantsev on the one hand and certain other leaders of the Social Democratic Party of Russia on the other are widely known. These contradictions are so severe that in a number of cases they have already led to the disintegration of certain newly formed parties and social and political organizations and the appearance of new ones. Such cases are by no means precluded in the future also.

How to evaluate these divisions and severance of relations? There is the viewpoint that they testify to the weakness of the "democrats." This is, indeed, the truth, but not the whole truth. For as a result of the divisions not only are even smaller and, consequently, less viable structures than the initial ones being formed but a search is under way also for more "natural" political allies.

In addition, the initiative pertaining to creation of the "Democratic Congress" bloc may even now be regarded as a qualitatively new stage of the existence of the forces of the right. Whereas earlier they united mainly on an anticommunist and "anti-CPSU" basis, there is now evidence of a search for constructive (from their viewpoint) bases for a coalition. While not rejecting anticommunism as such, they are speaking more particularly

than before about their model of society, in which private ownership of the main means of production should predominate, the CPSU should be removed from power and an end should be put to Marxism-Leninism as the ideology of the working class and the working people.

The "palette" of social and political movements we have provided is incomplete. The so-called national patriotic movements are missing. But this is the subject of a special discussion. The article has dealt with those whom it is customary to call "democrats." What is the general nature of this movement? It may, as a whole, be defined as "liberal-bourgeois with strong prosocialist tendencies." Although not one program of the parties and associations which are a part of "Democratic Russia" specifies directly that this party or the other is calling for a restoration of capitalism in our country, the socioeconomic goals to whose achievement they aspire may unequivocally be defined as "procapitalist." Under these conditions the task of unification of all left, prosocialist forces, which could confront the trends of the country's "capitalization," is exceptionally important. However, we are in this respect merely at the very start of the road as yet....

The main colors of our political palette have been illustrated. What kind of picture will emerge, time will tell.

Liberal Democratic Party Leader States Political Position

91UN0632A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 8 Dec 90 p 2

[Interview with Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, chairman of the Liberal-Democratic Party of the Soviet Union, by Pavel Romashin, correspondent: "The Union Will Not Break Up, The Army Has Not Decayed"]

[Text] Non-staff correspondent of SOVETSKIY MOLODEZH [Pavel Romashin] interviews the chairman of the Liberal-Democratic Party of the Soviet Union, Vladimir ZHIRINOVSKIY (44 years old, Moscovite, two higher education [degrees] - international affairs lawyer and orientalist, knows five foreign languages, has never been subjected repression, never in the CPSU).

SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH information box. LDPSS [Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union] is part of the so-called "centrist bloc" under the leadership of the "Soyuz" deputies group. This right-wing bloc comes out against the separation of republics from the USSR, for a new Union treaty, for a politically unified army, for bringing the republican constitutions to accordance with the Union constitution. The bloc demands from the President more decisive actions against the "separatists" and the nationalists, up to the introduction of direct presidential rule in some republics.

[Correspondent] Vladimir Volfovich, please tell all our readers, who follow political life in the Soviet Union very attentively, about your party.

[Zhirinovskiy] Our party is the first opposition political party which held its own congress legally. This was on 31 March 1990 in Moscow.

The LDPSS is founded neither on anti-communism nor on any other "anti-" positions. We calmly regard other parties, also including the one on the right - the communist. Our founding principles are LAW, a MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM, MULTI-ORGANIZATION SYSTEM, PRESIDENT, and DEIDEOLOGIZATION. But the chief one is in politics, the economy and pluralism must prevail in ideology. I think we must begin no more historical experiments, as we have seen how many victims it cost.

[Correspondent] What do you mean, naming among LDPSS basic principles "LAW" and "PRESIDENT"?

[Zhirinovskiy] We respect the Law and consider that everything must be done within the framework of the Law. We will never call anyone to illegal actions, and moreover, we will apply all efforts in order that this Law be changed, improved, give more of a kind of economic freedom.

In regard to the President, I can say the following. We see all his mistakes, all his indecision, but we respect the President and his government, because they are the symbol of the State, the symbol of Power.

[Correspondent] You call the USSR the State and the Power. But you know how many today assert that there is no more Soviet Union...

[Zhirinovskiy] It is a delusion to think that the Union will break up and soon there will be many sovereign states. Not one new state will be created on the base of the Soviet Union, and we will not tolerate forcible change of the borders on the territory of the USSR. The State borders will remain sacred and inviolable, and the forces of the Committee for State Security will preserve them as before.

[Correspondent] And how will the republics proclaim their independence which has not yet be recognized by anyone?

[Zhirinovskiy] Even though one may announce the sovereignty of one or another a thousand times, this will be only a wish that does not mean the birth of a new state at all. Throughout the history of mankind, new states have been born after bloodied wars. If someone wants to create on the basis of the USSR some kind of new states, let him prepare for war, if he wants this. But we do not want war. Have the Baltic republics detached themselves? No - they announced their desire to separate. But let them declare it! Northern Ireland has wanted to join with the Irish Republic for twenty years now, but this will not happen until the time that London decides. It is the same in the internal and external politics of Canada and the USA.

The adoption of a declaration on sovereignty has nothing legal about it, is nothing more than the unilateral will of

part of the politicians of the republic, and it does not signify since in Russian "declaration" [deklaratsiya] is declaration [zayavleniye]. Being in the Union is a two-sided contract, and a new state appears only when the head of all of our state, having that right, signs a document on granting independence to a definite territory. We will be able to achieve success if we are in this huge state together, when we pass to a new, liberal economy, when there are changes in the law, when we enter into a new Union treaty. There will be created new political structures, there will be a new basis for the Union, but the TERRITORY will remain unchanged.

[Correspondent] That is, in your opinion the present borders will remain thus for ever?

[Zhirinovskiy] When I hear the suggestion to change the borders of our state, I agree: let us change the state borders - on the side of expansion.

[Correspondent] Then how is it with the Kuriles?

[Zhirinovskiy] If we return four small islands to Japan, we will do it only when we compensate the loss of the territory in another region. Only that way - territory for territory.

[Correspondent] You speak a lot about the State and about the Center. Let us suppose that the authorities have the Centrist Bloc, of which your party is apart, or LDPSS separately. And again officials from Moscow are directing the whole country?

[Zhirinovskiy] No. We consider that it is necessary to resolve all questions on the spot - in Riga, in Tbilisi, in Vologda... Every region, every republic is to pay its own way on ability: as how much it produced and sold, that much money in the pocket. And no kind of "common pot!"

The next central government will take on itself only seven questions. This is already a classic plan and all civilized confederated states live according to it. Here are these seven questions: DEFENSE, FOREIGN POLICY, FINANCES, TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, ENERGY, and ECOLOGY. Everything that remains is the management of local authorities: economy, culture, sports, public health, education, social security, and everything else.

[Correspondent] You have explained what must be the functions of the central and local authorities. But what, in general, must be the organs of authority?

[Zhirinovskiy] The State structure must be completely different. The present Soviets are too cumbersome. We think that the best of all is thus: in the village - the elder, in the city - the mayor; in the province (republic, kray - however you want to call it) - the governor, and in Moscow, a strong President with his crew. And every three to five years, let us change them; they annoy us - give us another! This is better than hundreds and thousands of deputies arguing, cursing at one another, and wrangling, unable to change anything.

Concerning the republican Supreme Soviets and their chairmen, I can say immediately: I do not like them at all, they all make mistakes, and they are all enjoying positions of trust. Their time is short - a few months, a year or two maximum.

And mainly, look at the competency of these new parliamentarians and ministers. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is a motor mechanic with a boat station. How can he lead the department? And how did these political activists understand that he is a good minister. He relates well to the NFL [People's Front of Latvia] - what a criteria for professional fitness today. There are more examples - composers, poets, dramatists become presidents and ministers... These are people who understand nothing in state and law.

[Correspondent] What is your relationship to the new political parties in the country?

[Zhirinovskiy] As the new political forces of the extremist plan are striving for power to achieve their own goals, they use the most modern and ancient method - to pull down that which exists today. New bolsheviks head similar movements today. Their founding slogan, as it was 73 years ago, is "Away!" Our Society has already tried to destroy in the name of creating - the creating did not come off. But these new political leaders are leading the country to civil war by their own activity, to a war of nationalities; they realize that the nationalities question is the most painful one today in our country, but their career is more important.

The nationalities question. Wrongly resolved 73 years ago, it is leading today to a sharp exacerbation of relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union. And today this is profitable to certain forces.

[Correspondent] How should the government act if shooting comes?

[Zhirinovskiy] If we introduce troops and shooting ends in the region, this is better than if these revolutionaries kill each other (and at the same time also the world population) in the beginning, and later we bring in forces. The examples of Moldavia and Osh oblast corroborate this. But the government of bolsheviks waits - suddenly everything becomes calm on its own. And troops come in when corpses are already lying on the damp ground.

From two ashes, we must be able to select the lesser. To introduce troops is bad, it is aggression. But this is better than to allow the murder of innocent people. Gorbachev is afraid of tough measures, he persuades. But understand, the present extreme situation has not yet been introduced anywhere in the USSR. It will be - any shooting will be stopped.

Moscow defends both the Abkhazians in Georgia and the Gagauz in Moldavia and the Russians wherever they are. Any nationality, any people. I do not want to give back the preference of the Russian nationality, but such

historically has arisen, the Russian majority is 120-140 million, half the population. And they are everywhere, in all of the Union.

For the present, we have such an unhealthy nationalities question (for the present, temporarily!) - let the central government consist only of Russians, from this it will be better for everyone, because it will conduct a policy of respect for all peoples.

And it is better if there are people in the government who have not been sitting in prisons or lying in psychiatric wards, as those who have suffered during the epoch of communism (guilty or not guilty), will take vengeance all the same (as the bolsheviks who had gone through tsarist hard labor took vengeance). The government (non-party or multi-party) - should be only of professionals, and at first, only of Russians. But then, when the nationalities question is not so sharp, we may return to the classical variation: in the government, the best specialists, and nationality will play no role.

[Correspondent] How do you see the armed forces of the USSR in the future?

[Zhirinovskiy] If anyone today does not like the name "Armed Forces of the Soviet Union," we have another variation - the Russian Voluntary Army (RDA). And four million are not needed - 1.5 million highly organized professional military men who will receive good money for their work will be enough. Many today think that the Soviet Army is decaying, that it is ruled by "grandfathers." This is a delusion. Yes, there is something similar in certain parts with better officers corps, the strongest soldiers and modern technology. These parts are standing and waiting for the President's commands.

[Correspondent] How do you regard communism?

[Zhirinovskiy] The communist era has come to an end in our country. Western Europe has fascism, Eastern Europe had communism. At last our recovery is arriving. Out of a 70-year detention at the station "Communism," we have fallen quite far behind the majority of countries of the world, but I think our lagging behind is not hopeless.

Possibility of Geydar Aliyev's Political Comeback Examined

91UN0762A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian, 17, 18, 22 Jan 91

[Article in three installments by Special Correspondent Aleksandr Oskin: "Is Geydar Aliyev Making a Comeback? If So, Is it Not to Take the Republic Back to the Past?"]

[17 Jan pp 2-3]

[Text] *BAKU-MOSCOW. It is heard more and more—the name of one of the former presiding officers of the highest echelons of party and state offices in the country, and a*

comrade-in-arms of Brezhnev—Geydar Aliyevich Aliyev. Careful political analysts think that the total number of articles, interviews and simply mentions in the press of this man, today a personal pensioner of union significance, has exceeded the 200 mark. Half questions-half prognoses have begun to creep into print: Is Aliyev...making a comeback? And, it would seem, not only he.

And it is true—reports have appeared that other autocrats of the era of stagnation from the cohort of “true Leninists” have also once again decided to engage in political activities. Remembering the past, D. Kunayev has begun to travel throughout the republic. And Rashidov's cronies have begun a campaign to rehabilitate their former patron. Old fellows of less exalted rank, grown weary of their insipid vegetative state in retirement—after all there once was!—have begun to stir themselves; like a phoenix they aspire to rise again from the ashes of their political limbo. Apparently the phenomenon of Boris Yeltsin has riled the blood of many. In principle, from a personal point of view, this is altogether understandable. But what is shocking is something else: the return of these has-beens has, it turns out, found a certain amount of support among part of society in the ballot box as well. A striking example of this was the fact that last September Geydar Aliyev was elected a People's Deputy of Azerbaijan from District 340, Negramskiy, in Nakhichevan ASSR. He was also elected a deputy of the Supreme Soviet (today, the Majlis) of that same autonomous republic.

There is no doubt that we are not dealing with some kind of strange aberration of the times, nor with some random event, but with a profoundly political phenomenon. Where are its roots? How can one explain if only the phenomenon of Geydar Aliyev, in order that one may make out all the rest? I decided to seek an answer to these questions in Baku.

...The city which I encountered seemed to be an unhappy one. Perhaps this impression was formed by the uninviting streets, the somehow graying aspect of the buildings, the half-empty shelves in the stores, and the unsmiling people. But after all, in Moscow one sees the same kind of uninviting and dilapidated streets, the same poverty on the shelves in the shops... No, it is not just the faded colors that creates this mood. Noticeably fewer women are appearing on the streets. The city-dwellers' clothes are mostly gray and black. Ten or fifteen years ago, the citizens of Baku used to speak their peculiar language—a mixture of Azerbaijani, Russian and Armenian. They were temperamental, witty, and internationalistic. But now the city dwellers looked different. As a whole, it was painful for me to observe, they appeared to be somehow subdued, so that if one wished to ask a question, one would do so in a whisper. Many new graves have appeared in the towns and villages. Death has been reaping its harvest in the regions bordering on Armenia, and continues to do so. The walls of the houses, pocked with bullet holes, tragically recall the bloody events of the beginning of last year. Every citizen of the republic today lies down and rises up with

thoughts of the introduction of the state of emergency, about Nagornyy Karabakh, and about the fact that living has become harder and harder and less secure.

These are not the superficial views of a visitor. I went to school in Baku, served in the Army in Stepanakert, and was a member of the Komsomol Obkom Bureau of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of Azerbaijan. And I remember very well the epoch of Geydar Aliyev. At that time the mood of the people was altogether different. At least that was the way it seemed to us.

When in July 1969 Geydar Aliyev was at the head of the republic party organization, and set about introducing radical reforms, he could count on the unequivocal support of the public. No, even then intellectual circles were wary of Aliyev's cadre carousel, when he replaced “someone else's” clan with “his own”; but they supported his steps to improve the situation in the republic. And they approved. Let us note carefully: Today many people recall those times with a certain melancholy. Some of my interlocutors in Baku assured me that Geydar Aliyev would never have allowed such humiliation and pauperization of Azerbaijan. His firm hand, they say, would have maintained its grip on the reins of leadership, and would not have allowed either the pogroms or the insertion of troops and the deaths of the people. “Aliyev was and remains a real man!” a “private taxi” driver assured me, taking me from the airport to the downtown area for only a fiver.

And what does the subject of our attention himself think about his 14 years of leadership?

“At present certain people in Azerbaijan, guided by their own subjective considerations, have taken the path of roundly criticizing the past, attempting to besmirch the activity of the republic party organization in the 1970's... I categorically reject and decisively protest such lack of objectivity,” Aliyev declared in a wide-ranging interview with the independent Moscow publication, NASHE DELO [Our Cause]. The former Azerbaijan CP Central Committee first secretary believes, that the republic took a giant step ahead in the years 1970-82. Two hundred and fifty new enterprises were built, machine-building productivity increased more than five-fold in three five-year plans, and production of consumer goods increased threefold. Beginning in 1970, industry and agriculture developed at rates that surpassed the average nationwide indicators.

It's God's truth—one can glean all of these figures from the newspapers and statistical handbooks of those same years. True, there are also other views in Azerbaijan about the republic's economic past and on the statistics of that past. It is well-known that there was major exaggeration and wide-scale falsification... But more on that later. But now we must in all good conscience note that in the official socio-political opinion of that period, Azerbaijan walked among the heroes; at times, even in the literal meaning of the word. The republic was awarded orders and banners. The number of persons

awarded high decorations and prizes in the towns and villages multiplied. The leader of the republic himself was twice honored with the Gold Star of Hero of Socialist Labor.

They say he just barely missed a third one.

Sometimes one got the impression that there was a continuous holiday in Baku and its environs. Brezhnev especially favored Aliyev. The ailing general secretary, who devoted less and less attention to other republics and oblasts, was three times a guest in Azerbaijan, and received "with profound satisfaction" the heady oriental marks of attention. The people of Baku remember how, when meeting the high-ranking guest they would arrange Slavonic folk dances along the route of the cortege, with young men and women in national costumes; how they would cover the streets with carpets and flowers; how they would paint designs on the asphalt; and finally, how they had erected the magnificent Gyulistan Palace in the center of the city to receive the guest from the Kremlin... During one of his visits Brezhnev declared that "Azerbaijan is making great progress!" And, we would point out, in his own way he was right.

Geydar Aliyev was a strict "master." He rigidly followed the moral-political mindset of the leading cadres and the party aktiv. The newspapers of those times would often report on the exposure of bribe-takers and embezzlers of public funds. Anyone practicing protectionism and nepotism was mercilessly punished. "I was not interested in the number of people exposed. We were working on the problem of total elimination of negative phenomena. And, I will tell you frankly, in this respect we made no compromises," Aliyev stressed in the aforementioned interview.

For example, groups of "provincials" [tsekhovikh] in the local industry system were exposed effectively, with great fanfare. Nearly 80 people were convicted on this account. The entire staff of the State Trade Inspectorate—24 people—was arrested and put on trial. And one could cite even more such examples. Insincerity was punished, as was the attempts of certain people in leadership positions to cover up certain dark spots in their biography, to conceal from the party the criminal past of their relatives, and so on. From the heights of the present day, all this looks different, of course. The party is not the sword of chastisement, but a political organization, called upon to serve the interests of the people. Aliyev, however, by means of his drastic measures, became a man to be feared. And, he was feared. And they met him with standing ovations, and emotional outcries and slogans, and in the final analysis tried to indulge him in everything that he might desire. Although, naturally, far from everyone.

There is yet another aspect. During the years of Geydar Aliyev, it was as if there were no problems at all, per se, in Nagornyy Karabakh. The autonomous oblast, as he believes, had developed energetically enough. In terms of socio-economic indicators, the NKAO surpassed the

average republican level of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Geydar Aliyev is convinced today, that he had devoted a sufficiently large amount of attention to the oblast. "I have always displayed the very friendliest relations to the Armenian people," he noted in his next interview late last year. "I had a warm relationship with Marietta Shaginyan. She was interested in the condition of the Armenians, and literally told me the following: 'Your Armenians are living off the fat of the land.' During the period of my work, citizens from the NKAO sent no letters or made no oral statements to the CP Central Committee whatsoever on withdrawal from Azerbaijan. Not once."

Well, what of it? Perhaps they did not. But insofar as I can remember the mood of the Armenians in Stepanakert in those years, there was a problem all the same. Historical facts testify of, to put it mildly, the very old nature of the problem. In this connection I would like to quote a report from the Baku press of 1 November 1918. It is not a long one: "From Karabakh it is reported that life has settled down to normal: the warmest of relations have been established among the Muslims and Armenians." And then on 21 March 1919 the newspaper BORBA reported: "The situation in Karabakh remains complex. Armenia has issued a protest against the naming of an Azerbaijanian governor-general in Karabakh..." In a word, the conflict has deep roots, and my present task precludes analysis of it.

"What do you think of Geydar Aliyev and of the phenomenon of his return to mainstream politics?" I asked the young Professor Farkhad Badalbeyli, People's Artist of the USSR, a composer and pianist.

We were sitting in one of the auditoria of the Azerbaijan State Conservatory. Farkhad Badalbeyli thought for a while, took his time, and delivered himself of a long, harmonious and temperamental monologue. He categorically condemned the authoritarianism of Geydar Aliyev and all the practices of the stagnation period in the history of the republic, and figuratively depicted the past life as the theater of the absurd. But even he decisively spoke out against attempts to present the leader of the republic only in a bad light. Geydar Aliyev, the composer stressed, did a lot of good for Azerbaijan. He actively helped artistic figures. With all the pompousness of official musical activities, of the decade of Russian and Azerbaijanian culture, they did produce an undoubted educational and enlightening effect.

Not only Brezhnev was invited to Azerbaijan, but also the stars of Soviet art, the leading artists. Geydar Aliyev steadfastly promoted, for example, the Azerbaijan Ballet in Moscow theaters. And he patronized young talents. "Myself, personally," stated my interlocutor. "He did only good. And not only to me. There were, of course, figures whom the leader did not reward—for example, K. Karayev, A. Ayisli and others. But no one persecuted them. Although, of course, as a whole the Azerbaijanian intelligentsiya largely gave in, as they say, to pressure from Geydar Aliyev and his diktat, his totalitarian style

of life. We had resigned ourselves. Poets wrote poems in his honor, and composers wrote music... But we too were to blame for that. We voluntarily made obeisance, as it were. This, perhaps, sounds degrading, but it is the truth..."

"And what about the present?" continued my temperamental interlocutor. "For the last three years, we have observed total regression. No one in the republic has created a single significant musical or literary work. The muses have suffered collapse. In science too, things are no better... Therefore, many people see a certain chance in Geydar Aliyev. Although I personally think that in the new conditions Geydar Aliyev could not return to power. In the past he was magnificent. He was, perhaps, Brezhnev's best pupil and brilliantly carried out the mandate of his time. One must look at Aliyev objectively. And write objectively," the composer smiled gently, clearly giving me to understand how I should write about Aliyev. And at that we parted company.

Following this precept, I am now obliged to also present the views of the direct opponents of Geydar Aliyev. I met with former procurator of Azerbaijan Gambay Mamedov, and asked what he thinks of the former leader with whom he had worked for seven years.

"This man is a dangerous hypocrite, a deserter, a big liar and an amoral type," Mamedov declared decisively.

[18 Jan 91 pp 2]

[Text] In June 1976, Gambay Mamedov was relieved of his responsibilities as republic procurator by decision of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, "for serious shortcomings in his work, and for protecting criminal elements." Later on, naturally, he was deprived of his mandate as a deputy of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet; that same year, 1979, he was expelled from the CPSU.

Ten years later, by decision of the Party Control Commission at the CPSU Central Committee, the former republic procurator was reinstated in the party with an uninterrupted record of service. The USSR General Procurator lifted all the groundless accusations against him in the line of duty. And justice triumphed.

But why did Gambay Mamedov become unsuitable to Geydar Aliyev in far-off 1976? If today he has been completely rehabilitated, does that mean that his opponent and colleague in the KGB organs made a serious mistake (if not more)?

"I am an old front-line soldier. I was accepted into the party in the heat of the battle of Stalingrad," the corpulent, greying veteran related unhurriedly. "I have never been afraid of telling the truth; therefore, at a certain stage I became unsuitable to Geydar Aliyev, and later on simply dangerous.

"While working as the republic procurator, I began to receive more and more signals on the fact that the so-called 'successes' of Azerbaijan were inflated, and that

the record harvests, goods production and industrial output were—grossly falsified. And hundreds of embezzlers of public funds were living off these criminal activities. All attempts by the law-enforcement organs to put a stop to the violations by highly-placed persons were halted. There was no reaction whatsoever to all my written signals to the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Bureau. Even after I was relieved of my post, I was compelled to speak out at sessions of the republic Supreme Soviet, and try to open the eyes of the parliament to the extensive system of anti-state practices that had been established in the republic, both in agriculture and in industry. All decisions on awards to Azerbaijan were taken without careful examination of the state of affairs. At that time a great many words were spoken from lofty rostrums on the aspect of morality; however, in actual practice this morality was utterly destroyed..."

Mamedov had worked in the KGB system for 16 years. He both knows and remembers a great deal. He knows, for example, that after the start of the war Geydar Aliyev, in effect, deserted, for he evaded being sent to the front. After vanishing from the study hall of the industrial institute, the young Aliyev appeared in his native environs in Nakhichevan with a certificate for a virulent form of tuberculosis. Later on, it is true, my interlocutor was bold enough to state, "I quickly regained my health," and took up work in the organs of the NKVD. Mamedov also remembers how the first party organization of the Azerbaijan KGB expelled Geydar Aliyev from the party for cohabitation in a clandestine apartment (!) with a female KGB agent. Later on, the CP Central Committee reduced this measure to a severe reprimand, with a reduction in rank. However, none of this prevented Aliyev from rising to the very highest positions.

"I know everything about him," says the former procurator. "In short, he is a big liar, a careerist, and an amoral type. I have to laugh, for example, when he talks about his poverty today and about the fact that he does not even have his own transistor radio... Not long ago I spoke out in the newspaper ADALYAT, proposing a television debate with him, and telling the Azerbaijanian people what kind of monster is trying to return to political life in Azerbaijan. And what came of it? There was no response."

Well, how did Aliyev's policies look—among, shall we say, the scientific intelligentsiya?

...I am in the office of Professor N. Kh. Mekhtiyev, a people's deputy, doctor of sciences, and director of the Biotech Scientific Production Association, Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences. During Aliyev's years, this scientist spent two years in prison. Later on, he and his friends at the institute, victims of the same misfortune, were completely rehabilitated: officially, "for lack of evidence of a crime."

What is worse is that Mekhtiyev was alleged to have committed grand theft and embezzlement, and was

summarily placed under sentence of death by firing squad. I read in NEDELYA No 27-1989, that Geydar Aliyev was personally concerned with Mekhtiyev's case; and, you will note, while it was yet in the investigatory stage.

I will briefly recount the tale of the man who was miraculously spared from execution. It is all so banal. Mekhtiyev was an obstinate sort, and had his own views on science and the state of affairs in the scientific spheres. But the most damning thing was that he did not want to voluntarily give up his chair as director of the institute in favor of—A. Aliyev, a brother of Geydar Aliyevich; therefore, they dealt with him, just as they dealt with others who got in their way.

"The Aliyev epoch was a catastrophe for Azerbaijan," says N.Kh. Mekhtiyev. "It was a time when the destructive, shameless exploitation of natural wealth and the impoverishment of the populace were in full flower; a time when the shadow economy was flourishing, the mafia was growing wildly, and dissidents were cruelly oppressed. In addition, Geydar Aliyev was widely and steadfastly appointing his numerous relatives and fellow-countrymen from Nakhichevan to sundry official posts. Science and the arts were degraded. The rights of man were trampled and ignored."

[Oskin] "Grante. But all that is in the past. But what do you think of the phenomenon of the return of Geydar Aliyev to politics?"

[Mekhtiyev] "In my view that is not so terrible. At present favorable conditions for that have come to pass in the republic, temporarily. On the surface there is a lot of flotsam and foam of all kinds. The best people were morally or physically repressed by Aliyev's clan. Right now we are experiencing a shortage of cadres; or as far as that goes, a shortage of decent people as well. The Aliyev period as a phenomenon was profoundly immoral. It must be resisted publicly. And that is why we have established the Azerbaijan-Helsinki group, which I headed. I do not intend to leave the party. I spent time in prison, but I did not give up my party card. I think it will be easier for me to struggle with the shades of the past from within the party. As far as Aliyev is concerned, I would say this: The Azerbaijanian people have already awakened and have crossed over into another dimension; but their former tyrant and oppressor has forgotten to reset the hands of his clock to the new time."

On 27 September 1990, VYSHKA, the newspaper of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, published the article, "Red Banners Without Embellishment." In it I found facts which contradict the interview with Geydar Aliyev in NASHE DELO. It turns out that during the years 1971-1980, republic housing construction was nearly 1,750,000 square meters **below** what the state plan called for. During this same decade, plans for putting schools, kindergartens, clubs, houses of culture and movie theaters into operation **were spoiled**, and the hospital construction **rate fell**. Things were even worse in the rural

area. During the years of the 9th and 10th Five-Year Plans, the countryside was **thrust back** 20-25 years into the past. During those years the absolute growth of the number of elementary school pupils in the republic **declined by a factor of two**, and the number of students in higher and secondary education fell sevenfold. **The birth-rate fell, and the death-rate grew.**

MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA reported in an article of 25 March 1990 that during these years reports on cotton production in Azerbaijan were inflated by no less than five million tons. For this "air" the state budget had disbursed a minimum of three billion rubles. Half that amount was stolen.

In order to get a complete picture, I decided to find a relatively young person, from the new formation—and what is especially important, one who had not been hurt by Aliyev, nor by his relatives.

...I enter the Museum of Art, and ascend the marble staircase to the second floor. In the light blue hall, there is a small group of people. Leyna Yunusova, a diminutive, elegantly-dressed young woman, a candidate of sciences, one of the leaders of the People's Front of Azerbaijan, is presently a member of the bureau of the Azerbaijan Social-Democratic Party.

"What do I think of the phenomenon of Geydar Aliyev? I think that today he has no chance of once again becoming the leader of Azerbaijan. But on the other hand, our people's lack of democratic traditions and experience in the political struggle does not allow one to hope that the democrats will come to power here either. Many people blame Aliyev for economic blunders and for exaggeration. He is reproached for the apartments and dachas he gave away to his relatives and friends... Perhaps. But nevertheless the main thing is his crimes—the moral decay of Azerbaijan society. Today there is a crying need for truly intelligent, well-brought-up and well-educated people in the popular movement. This alone is the reason that nationalistic forces were so active in the People's Front. Hence also the extremism and the weakness of the democratic forces. In all this, I lay the principal blame on Aliyev and his followers."

In present-day Azerbaijan no one is indifferent to the figure of Aliyev. Even now some people hate him and fear him, while others believe in his return, and are staking their own hopes and the satisfaction of their own ambitions on his political reanimation. But I have also met those who simply joke and laugh about it. They think it is funny that a former leader is returning. Witty people in Baku are saying that Geydar Aliyev began his political activity with an interview in a newspaper...for the blind. They humorously relate that he was elected a deputy of the Supreme Soviet from a village upon which the famous Azerbaijanian satirist Dzh. Mamedkuli-zade bestowed the name "Danabash" (translated, "telyachegoly" [Naked Calf]). True, this was at the end of the last century...

Well, jokes aside, what about it? On the whole, the situation in Azerbaijan is, of course, very complex. What might Geydar Aliyev's future be like in the republic's political life? The fact that he will return is a plain as two times two: two times a deputy, elected by democratic means.

[22 Jan 91 pp 2-3]

[Text] *Last July, when Geydar Aliyev arrived in Baku, he was unable to freely exit the air terminal: an angry crowd awaited him on the square outside. The people were protesting the return of the former leader of the republic, who had tarnished himself in service to the partocracy, of which he was in many ways the personification. The negative emotions aroused by this meeting were repaid with interest in Nakhichevan.*

The political meeting there was attended by many thousands, and reminded one of the colorful, exultant scenes of the past in the squares of Baku. Here Geydar Aliyev saw reproductions of his parade portraits, from the time of his membership in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and heard toasts given in his honor. Certain of his fellow-countrymen strove to touch Aliyev, as if he were a saint.

Did everyone share in the rapture?

Former Sumgait Party Gorkom First Secretary N. Balakishiyev delivered his own opinion:

"Aliyev should not have come. With the heart-breaking conflicts in the republic, he will only make the crisis worse. Besides, it is wrong to return without repenting before his people. Many people would probably forgive him. But Aliyev does not want to go to confession. On the contrary, he would be more likely to try to justify his past and become firmly established in the present."

N. Balakishiyev is a victim of the unjust wrath of Geydar Aliyev. However, in spite of the long years of persecution and unemployment, he still has a capacity for weighty analysis and objective judgement.

And how do the workers feel about Aliyev? What do they think about the former leader of the republic? I shall cite a typical opinion, which I heard at the Machine-Building Plant imeni Lieutenant Schmidt, the oldest enterprise in the country for producing oil equipment, where the Azerbaijan People's Front is strong. Malakhata Aslanova has been working here for ten years. She told me that the workers are worn out, and they are tired of political games and uncertainty. They no longer trust anyone: neither their own President Mutalibov, nor USSR President Gorbachev. "They are all trying to deceive us," says Aslanova. "Both the military, and the communists, and the democrats, and the journalists. And I do not trust Aliyev either. When he was in power he would ship all the republic's food to Moscow. I have stood in line for meat until midnight just before the New Year... Can one really forget that?"

I would like to quote one more opinion about the personage of this investigation: altogether unanticipated; but, I believe, an important one.

We met in a teahouse at the seashore. A middle-aged man, with children and grandchildren—who has suffered, incidentally, at the hands of Geydar Aliyev. He asked me not to reveal his name.

"I can understand the misgivings connected with Aliyev's arrival in the republic," said my partner in dialogue. "In my opinion, they are exaggerated. I know him very well; he is a political chameleon. At every time period this man was exactly what it was necessary for him to be. He could brilliantly adapt to any demands, and carry them out. In the KGB he was one thing; in the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee another; and at the CPSU Central Committee, something else altogether. Even now he is trying to radically restructure himself, and enter the service of the new currents."

(Here I began to understand how during the days of the 27th Party Congress, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member Aliyev was able to convince the journalists at a press conference that party officials have no privileges whatever. Why did he try to do that? Apparently he did not consider those illegal perks, of which he took full advantage, to be privileges.)

My conversation partner opened a newspaper and recounted a report from TURAN, the Turkish Information Agency, about the fact that in Nakhichevan, Geydar Aliyev "is acting as an intermediary" between the People's Front and the communists, and that he is "trying to reconcile" the different political blocs. In truth, the ways of Allah are past finding out. Geydar Aliyev in the role of peacemaker, and an advocate of democracy?

But, strictly speaking, why should we be surprised? Probably every man has the capacity to change. Then why do we exclude that possibility for political figures? One must acknowledge in all candor that every person should have the full right to speak and to be heard. Although, in times past, even the close comrades-in-arms of Stalin went to their graves silently. But here in any case, the situation is not the same...

From everything that I learned in Baku, one can draw the conclusion that there are in the republic certain circles for whom Geydar Aliyev's appearance on the political scene is necessary. It was in the distant past that Geydar Aliyev was the authoritarian leader, possessing great power and might. Today it is not he that leads; perhaps it is he that is being led. More likely, the former leader is today very much needed by his numerous political and administrative appointees, whom he at one time skillfully appointed to various positions on the command-administrative staircase.

Today Geydar Aliyev and his political descendants are increasingly clashing with the new, reformist forces. And it is not only in Azerbaijan that this is noted. It is not a question of conflicts between the ruling party and the

opposition. On the contrary. The struggle for personal power is becoming more intense among people of approximately the same circle, the same system of views, and the same historical past. They have sensed that democratic power is becoming weaker, and that—perhaps this is their chance, those men of yesterday, to replace the captain, and thereby acquire all the abilities that the captain's bridge provides? Perhaps, somewhere this is the normal political process. With us—it is a dangerous one.

The tragedy that occurred in Baku last January must not be forgotten. Many people in Azerbaijan are demanding disclosure of the underlying cause of the troops' behavior in the republic's capital. The truth must be told about the workings of the inner mechanism; about the struggle of the clans and the "provincials" [tsekhovyye]; about the dealings of the sharp traders in the shadow economy, and the party functionaries, who betrayed their people; about the present conflicts in the People's Front; and about the entire process of change in Azerbaijan. Apparently one must also speak seriously about some kind of compromise among the various political forces, between the "Aliyevites" and the "Anti-Aliyevites."

Let us ask ourselves: what could Geydar Aliyev's future be like?

In order for him to become a major political figure and a leader on the republic scale, he must have some kind of support: a popular movement, the party, or some other kind of real power. Fellow-countrymen, relatives and personally dedicated people might be only a motor with limited resources for propelling the man to Mt. Olympus, to the levers of real power. In order to grasp it, other forces are needed.

One can also imagine the following working hypothesis. Let us say that Geydar Aliyev tries to place his stake on Islam and nationalism, counting on becoming a politico-religious figure. There are grounds for this. The number of active supporters of Islam has grown sharply in the republic. Those who advocate unification with Northern Azerbaijan, the northern part of neighboring Iran, where about 20 million Azerbaijanians live, are becoming increasingly vocal.

In a word, one could imagine that with an attempt to the promote ideas of a unified Muslim Azerbaijan, Aliyev could cast himself as one of the leaders of this hypothetical state... It is possible. But it is real? I think not. In the first place, with all his talent at mimicry, Geydar Aliyev cannot separate himself from his past in the CPSU, and with his atheism. And secondly, to the best of my knowledge, beyond the Araks [river separating USSR and Iran] there are among the Iranian elite better "prepared" and more "capable" figures. But the main thing is—this path is a risky one, to put it mildly. One would not take it in one's old age, if one has not lost one's common sense.

Could Geydar Aliyev count on the republic party organization? Hardly. We are convinced that the former

leader has practically no open, fervent followers among prominent communists. For the Azerbaijan Communist Party, this page in history has, for all practical purposes, turned.

But can he not try to rely on some other kind of party, or on the People's Front itself? He has already tried. In a number of his interviews, Aliyev expressed his piety to the newly formed democrats, to the People's Front, and professed his support to them. However, these signals did not generate any reaction. That is, they did generate a response, but not like the one he had been counting on. A number of the prominent figures from the democratic parties and movements have decisively disassociated themselves from Geydar Aliyev. Moreover, in Nakhichevan, an extraordinary incident took place early this year. Deputies of the Majlis—communists and democrats—united, and together demanded Geydar Aliyev's ouster from the presidium of the parliament. And he was forced to leave it. This was reported in the newspaper ADALYAT. I see an evolution in political thinking in this event. And that is of greater significance than the election of the "returnee" as a deputy of two parliaments.

In a word, Geydar Aliyev's appearance in a minor proscenium of power has caused a complex and contradictory reaction.

Geydar Aliyev himself once described his present creed as follows: "I see my principal wealth and happiness in the fact that the Azerbaijanian people have not forgotten me, and that in this difficult hour I stand with them... My future is in the hands of my people."

Yes, it is precisely a matter of how the people look upon the current actions of the retired general and former vice-premier of the country. I think the people are forgiving, and even sympathetic; but without any kind of profound hopes, in any case none that are involved with the future of the country. Azerbaijan's tomorrow will be different.

WHEN THIS ISSUE WAS BEING COMPOSED. Today, 10,000 more people in Baku will be able to read this issue of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, with the article "Is Geydar Aliyev Making a Comeback?..." than the preceding one. It was decided to increase the circulation by that much in view of the great interest the first two parts of the article aroused among the readership. Albert Kemko, deputy director of the KOMMUNIST Publishing House of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, informed our correspondent of this. Moreover, the newspaper will be published at its own expense, since on 22 January the PRAVDA Publishing House set retail volume at only 3,000 copies.

**Retail Distribution of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
Cut Due to Aliyev Series**

91UN0763A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 19 Jan 91 p 3

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA Special Correspondent in Baku: "Who Stopped the Printing Press?"]

[Text] *Never before in my relatively short career as a staff correspondent has the phone at our news office rung so often, as it has in the last three days. The reason is, that RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA has suddenly vanished from all the news stands in Baku. And at the very same time that the newspaper began to publish a series of articles by Special Correspondent Aleksandr Oskin, "Is Geydar Aliyev Making a Comeback?..."—which, one would think, would be of no less interest to Azerbaijanian readers than to others. People in the republic often complain of the fact that the central newspapers allegedly pay no attention to our region. But this time the opposite is the case: the attention is there, but the newspapers are not.*

Why? After all, after RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA's critical article on this topic last December, its retail circulation increased fourfold. And the Baku kiosk operators stopped selling the newspaper "for a little extra" from under the counter. That is the way things went until 16 January. And then everything returned to its own course. It is costing me a good deal of effort to explain to the highly suspicious readers that the disappearance of the newspapers with the articles about Aliyev and the Aliyev Period—was not because the Mafia was buying up all the TRIBUNA's wholesale from the kiosks, but was more likely the work of the bunglers one finds everywhere.

But which ones? Yesterday's call to the printing shop of the KOMMUNIST Publishing House of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee helped clarify the situation somewhat. Shop Foreman Rovshan Labibov reported that on 17 and 18 January 8,262 copies of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA would roll off the presses. Nazim Novruzov,

director of the Azersoyuzpechat Production Association specified further: of that amount, 3,030 would go on retail sale, including 2,158 to the kiosks of Baku. Divide this number among the 346 kiosks in the republic capital, and you get precisely 6.23699 newspapers each, whereas the actual demand is for 30-40 copies at every point of sale.

But who has stopped the printing presses? It would seem the Mafia has nothing to gain here. In the representation from the PRAVDA Publishing House, I was shown "Information on the Mailing of the Newspaper RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA." The publishing house sends this document to Baku every day. Here is the data for 16 January: subscriptions, 5,232; retail, 3,030; total, 8,262. The day before these figures were: subscriptions, 5,232; retail, 8,530; total, 13,762. Five-thousand-five-hundred copies were dropped from retail sale with a bang.

Of course, they can find an explanation for this in Moscow; they will talk about the paper shortage. But Azersoyuzpechat Director Novruzov ticked off for me a whole list of newspapers and magazines which are not in demand (which one can verify at the kiosks), for which in spite of the sanctions of that same PRAVDA Publishing House, retail distribution is growing. At the very same time that the readers are asking, might they read at least the conclusion of the article, "Is Geydar Aliyev Making a Comeback?..."

But it would be better to allow the PRAVDA Publishing House to answer this question, and hopefully, with the restoration of the previous circulation.

FROM THE EDITORS: Yu. Popov, chief of the Local Printing Plants Department at the PRAVDA Publishing House, confirmed that the order on changing the circulation of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Azerbaijan was actually "sent down" to the KOMMUNIST Publishing House. However, as he stressed, the suggestion to reduce retail distribution by almost a factor of three came from the Baku Department of Soyuzpechat. And so, just who was it that stopped the printing press?

Western Republics

Lt Gen Pankratov on Carpathian MD Political Situation

91UM0186A Moscow KOMMUNIST

VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 21, Nov 90

(signed to press 31 Oct 90) pp 18-23

[Lt Gen Yu. Pankratov, Political Directorate chief, Carpathian Military District, answers questions furnished by KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL editors under the "Theory and Practice" rubric: "Sore Spots of Democracy"; first paragraph is KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL introduction]

[Text] A complex socio-political situation has arisen in many areas of the country. Certain movements and organizations are paying "special" attention to attacks on the Armed Forces. What are political organs and party organizations doing under these conditions? The editors' questions on the subject are answered by Lieutenant General Yu. Pankratov, Military Council member and chief, Political Directorate, Red Banner Carpathian Military District.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] How would you characterize the socio-political situation in the oblasts in which the district's troops are stationed?

[Pankratov] The situation is complex of course and varies with the particular location in the district. I can say that the situation in Zhitomir, Volyn, Khmelnytskyi, Vinnitsa, and Chernovtsy oblasts is more stable and does not give particular cause for alarm. The local organs of authority and the population of the cities and rayons get along well with the servicemen. Any problems that do arise are resolved in a businesslike and constructive manner.

That is not the case in Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, Ternopol, and Transcarpathian oblasts. While the latest elections were being held, the leadership of the soviets was approached by representatives of the so-called "Democratic Bloc of the Ukraine (DBU)." The majority of them have taken an antisocialist position and stand opposed to Marxist-Leninist ideology, which they declare is "incompatible with democracy."

Forming in this area are structures of new political organizations: the Ukrainian Republic Party, the Ukrainian Peasant Party, the Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth (SNUM), and a number of others. What are their goals? On the whole, their main purpose is to work toward secession of the Ukraine from the Soviet Union. This is the motivation behind active propaganda and other actions (rallies, processions, boycotts) intended to discredit socialist values, the Communist Party, the Armed Forces, and to derogate our history. Certain representatives of the Democratic Bloc of the Ukraine (DBU), including Ukrainian SSR People's Deputies Ya. Kendzor, V. Chervoniy, and S. Khmara, suffer no qualms as they inflame nationalistic

and religious passions. All this destabilizes the situation. To understand the causes of such variation in conditions in various areas of the district, it is necessary to take a look at history, in this case of the western oblasts of the Ukraine. For a long time they were under Austro-Hungarian and Polish authority, becoming a part of the Soviet Union only in 1939, after they rejoined Soviet Ukraine. The nationalist bands OUN-UPA [Association of Ukrainian Nationalists-Ukrainian Insurrection Army], under the leadership of the notorious S. Bandera, Ya. Steisko, R. Shukhevich, and other ringleaders, were active on the territory of the Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, and Ternopol oblasts. Unfortunately, it was not possible to neutralize their ideologies completely. Now, in the period of glasnost, the old slogans have surfaced. I cannot fail to mention that the nationalistic and separatist mood of some of the population is being fuelled by speculations about the repressions that took place in that area in the 1940s.

That is the situation, to put it briefly. It should be understood that it is also greatly influenced by the presence of healthy forces. I must admit, however, that they do not take an active position in all locations.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Since we are taking a look at history, it may be appropriate to recall that the Soviet Army played a decisive role in liberating the Ukrainian people from the fascists. Nevertheless, certain Rukh activists and this movement's press are intensifying their attacks on the Armed Forces with every passing day. What is the reason? Also, what can be done to counter these attacks? Are we not strictly on the defensive here?

[Pankratov] This has already been mentioned in the press. I can say that there is variation in Rukh relative to makeup and views. There are healthy, constructive strata. There is also a confrontational, even an extremist, wing. That is what is promoting the antiarmy hysteria. The Soviet Army is accused of supposedly "occupying" the Western Ukraine in 1939. There is a clamor for organizing a "Ukrainian National Army," with attempts to set up obstacles to drafting youths into the Armed Forces. In addition, demands are being made to turn over to local authorities various Ministry of Defense facilities and buildings; military commissariats are being picketed.

We are countering these antiarmy manifestations with expository work among the population, servicemen, and dependents of the latter. For example, this work was carried out most actively in connection with the 50th anniversary of reincorporation of all the Ukrainian lands into the Soviet Union and the 45th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War. We are continuing the work with the same intensity. In addition, we conduct seminars, conferences, and press conferences with the ideological aktiv and representatives of creative unions, organizations, and mass media in the oblasts in which the district's troops are stationed.

All this has had a definite influence on reducing antiarmy tensions in the area. This, however, is not a time for complacency. Many problems remain unsolved. We are not always at our best in predicting and handling possible development of events.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] In meetings conducted by Rukh there is undisguised agitation to encourage youth to avoid military service. Appeals are made to organize its own armed units. Is this not a repeat of the Lithuanian condition? Or is there something different about this campaign? What opposition is being offered by the Military Council, the district Political Directorate, local organs of authority, and social organizations?

[Pankratov] No, I can say nothing about the Lithuanian condition. However, much has been borrowed from it. For example, in rallies and in picketing of military commissariats, certain unofficial persons, especially SNUM representatives, demand that Ukrainians serve only in the Ukraine and that soldiers of other nationalities serve in their republics. I have already spoken of their plans to organize national military units (registration for the "Ukrainian Army" is actually under way in Lvov). There have been cases where military service cards and residence identifications have been burned. However, this has not occurred on a mass scale, in spite of all the efforts made by the "Snumites."

I wish to emphasize once again that in the Rukh leadership there is considerable difference of opinion on these questions. Not everyone supports extremist tendencies. Voices of reason are to be heard both at rallies and in the periodical press.

Relative to the Military Council and the Political Directorate, we mount major efforts to oppose attempts on the part of destructive elements to undermine the authority of our Army, and we seek ways to effect productive cooperation with the healthy forces of the new social movements. Dialogues and discussions that we set up with the leaders of the unofficial associations on our initiative have been successful in dissipating a considerable amount of social tension in this sphere.

We are also invoking a wide range of measures intended to improve the effectiveness of draft age youth training and the forming of a healthy social opinion relative to callup for military service.

We are inviting party and Komsomol organizations of the area, war and labor veterans, and internationalist soldiers to participate in this important work. We are holding open door days in military schools and open house activities in military commissariats. Highly successful have been rallies called by soldiers' mothers, servicemen, and draft age youth.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] There is reason to believe that not all local party organs are doing all they can to resist those who promote antiarmy sentiments. The press has reported that the previous

leadership of the Lvov Party Obkom was led around by extremist forces for a considerable period of time. How does the district Political Directorate presently relate to the CPSU obkoms and gorkoms?

[Pankratov] Our political organs have a fairly good idea of the difficult environment in which party committees must operate in certain locations. Indeed, not all of them were prepared to wage political combat; many could not consolidate the party forces.

Thus, the previous leadership of the Lvov Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party, its former first secretary Ya. Pogrebnyak, could not make a proper evaluation of the situation and adopt an active position. At first it levied sharp and irreconcilable criticism at the unofficial organizations, without attempting to determine "who is who." No room was made for reasonable compromise, even in cases where there was a crying need for this. Later, the criticism virtually ceased. The obkom leadership exhibited growing confusion and indecision, eventually permitting itself to fall behind. The result was defeat for communists running in the elections for USSR people's deputies, especially for people's deputies of the Ukraine and local soviets.

I say that we on many occasions did provide the local party organs with our evaluations of how the sociopolitical situation may develop in the area. Time and again we brought the party leadership's attention to the dangerous nature of the political and psychological climate that was being shaped by extremist-minded associations, movements, and groups with the Armed Forces in mind. Unfortunately, we were paid little attention.

New persons have joined the leadership of many oblas and city party organizations. The Political Directorate has established normal businesslike relations with all the obkoms, and, through the political organs, with most raykoms and gorkoms of the Ukrainian Communist Party. First secretaries and bureau members participate regularly in meetings held by the District Coordinating Council on questions of patriotic education of youth and training for service in the Armed Forces, and in the work of the military councils. However, 100 communist servicemen have been elected to serve in local party organs. Mutual support and coordination of actions have contributed to strengthening party and Army authority among the population.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] Commanders and workers in political organs, the party political apparatus in military units evidently will find the going even more difficult.

[Pankratov] It is definitely more difficult for them. A complicating factor is the number of additional difficulties—something commanders and unit political workers did not have to face in the past—that has arisen under the present conditions. For example, there were previously no problems associated with parcels of land set aside for combat training. Now these problems loom large. It is sufficient to say that the Lvov Oblispolkom

has computed a bill in the neighborhood of one billion rubles for—of all things!—use of the land on which the training center is situated. There is no end to the rally euphoria aimed at eliminating a number of military facilities: airfields, radar stations, etc. Attempts are being made to take away officer club buildings located in certain garrisons, including Lvov.

The ties commanders and political workers have with local soviets have been encumbered. Some new leaders in the latter avoid contacts with unit and garrison authorities, ignore the interests of servicemen, and refuse to meet with officers and other personnel, in spite of repeated offers to do so.

The most pressing problem is housing. In this case, much depends upon the local organs of authority. On the basis of the debt accrued from past years, they are supposed to provide the district with more than 1,000 apartments. As of 1 October, in Ivano-Frankovsk and Vinnitsa oblasts and the city of Rovno, not a single meter of living space was made available under the 1990 plan. One or two apartments were provided to servicemen in the Khmel-nitskiy and Chernovtsy garrisons. The picture is better in Zhitomir and Volyn oblasts. The new leadership of the Lvov Oblast Soviet made the assurance that the 150 apartments slated for delivery next year will be made available to servicemen. This, however, is merely a promise. Meanwhile, officers have nowhere to live.

I am not speaking about the growing difficulties involving residential registration and employment opportunities for servicemen's dependents. The language problem is formidable. It has assumed a dominant position as far as job placement of wives of officers and warrant officers is concerned. There are difficulties facing children, also: Under way is a reduction in schools where Russian is the language of instruction. All this in combination with a hostile attitude on the part of the local population and youth toward persons in uniform and their relatives. At rallies and during picketing you often can hear the insulting shouts: "Occupiers!"; "Get out of the Ukraine!"; etc. That is why now, as never before, questions of social protection of servicemen and their dependents have come to the forefront. The USSR Presidential Decree on Certain Measures for Strengthening the Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen issued by country President M. S. Gorbachev in September is encouraging. We need more rapid implementation of new legislation that would insure the legal and social protection of servicemen and their dependents.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] How many servicemen have been elected to the republic and local soviets? What is your opinion as to their contribution to the resolution of Army problems?

[Pankratov] I would like to answer that by saying that the latest elections were more difficult than ever before, especially for us, servicemen. We fought hard for each of our candidates and strove to seat servicemen as deputies in each soviet. The elections placed 407 servicemen into

deputy positions in soviets of the various levels. This includes four people's deputies for the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR.

Organizational sessions have elected a number of our comrades to serve on various commissions of local soviets. I feel that it is too early to evaluate the work of the service deputies. Nevertheless, first impressions indicate that there they suffer from a certain amount of inertia and lack of confidence. That is why our deputies do not in all cases actively stand their ground.

The Political Directorate intends to organize a group that will work with the deputies to coordinate their actions and develop unity in position and approaches.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] How does the situation you were discussing affect sentiments in the military rank and file? Especially youths called up in the Ukraine? The point is that, judging from letters we receive from our readers, Transcarpathia is witnessing the appearance of various youth organizations of a nationalistic, pro-Bandera type, which cannot fail to influence the outlook of youth. How is this handled by commanders and political workers?

[Pankratov] In general, morale is healthy. However, it is clear to us that the activity of the SNUM and of similar organizations has a definite effect on the youth environment, and, as a result, on people called up for military service.

Ukrainians make up the majority of personnel in district units. Commanders and political workers take this into account in their political education work. They study personality traits, interests, and activities of each serviceman, his feelings about the service, and his attitude toward various socio-political phenomena and processes.

Interethnic relations groups that are organized in each unit take an active approach to international education and strengthening of friendship and troop comradeship.

Compared to previous years, in propaganda, cultural, and enlightenment work, more attention is devoted to the history of formation of the USSR, the united struggle of the Soviet peoples in the years of the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War, brotherly understanding, and mutual action in the peaceful construction process. We are doing a great deal to acquaint soldiers as much as possible with the area in which they are serving and with the history and culture of the Ukrainian people.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] A person cannot fail to notice that in a number of areas—the western oblasts of the Ukraine are no exception—nationalism is closely linked to antisovietism. Under this kind of condition, it seems that some commanders, even some political workers, have fallen into a state of bewilderment. This in spite of the growing ideological hunger,

to coin a phrase, in military collectives. If we do not satisfy this hunger, the vacuum will undoubtedly be filled by other ideas.

[Pankratov] Faced with this difficult situation, some party activists, especially those serving in remote garrisons, have not particularly suffered bewilderment; rather, they have adopted a wait-and-see attitude. This passivity is fraught with serious omissions. Initially, it was caused by a lack of factual information on events occurring in the area and on existing social forces.

By regularly providing information to officers and the party aktiv, and, through them, to all personnel, we were able to get across to the people the meaning of current events, counter the numerous rumors and insinuations, cool to a significant extent the intensity of passions, and reduce tensions.

We actively employ mass information media to pursue these purposes. We are not afraid of offering our ideological opponents the opportunity of presenting their opinion. Thus, in May of this year, the district newspaper interviewed V. Chernovil, who is the chairman of the Lvov Oblast Soviet. He was frank in his manner as he explained his position to the correspondent. The readers were able to judge for themselves in what he said just what was constructive and what—to put it mildly—is not in tune with our realities and the interests of perestroika.

We have set up in the Political Directorate a center, and, in political organs, groups, which furnish factual information. The time has come to create in the Political Directorate special departments that would collect and analyze information and develop instructions for organizing work in each particular situation. They would also be capable of forecasting the development of events in a particular area.

[KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL] We obviously also cannot be satisfied with the level of ideological work performed by party organizations, especially primary organizations. Party committees and party bureaus are increasingly prone to becoming absorbed in patently intraparty issues, losing sight of the spiritual life of people. What do you think this can be? Shortcomings in training of the party aktiv? Shortcomings in party ideological work in general?

[Pankratov] Yes, the level of ideological work commenced to lag behind life's requirements at some stage of our development. I have more than the Armed Forces in mind: There were serious shortcomings in party ideological activity in general. When glasnost and openness opened the gates to delivering insults—and at times outright slander—a considerable segment of the ideological aktiv was incapable of opposing the antagonistic forces and confidently defending its ideological values.

After the 28th CPSU Congress, the district Political Directorate identified the ideological orientation as its priority effort. Some progress has already been made.

Nevertheless, ideological work is still associated with inertia, passivity, and adherence to former stereotypes and obsolescent procedures. Here is a specific example. Certain party organizations elected deputy secretaries for ideological work. And they went no further. They decided that the level of the work is improving automatically.

I wish to emphasize that we are proceeding from the belief that, in ideological and nurturing work in the existing situation, communists cannot be divided into active and passive; each party member should be a convinced defender of the party's positions and ideals. The center of gravity in restructuring of work with people is shifting in favor of the revolutionary and transformational function of ideology. In addition to improving the quality and effectiveness of political training, we are aggressively introducing active forms of instruction: discussions, dialogues, political contests, and "round tables."

Now the conclusion. We are in possession of forces, means, and experience. If we are able to employ them in full measure, there can be no doubt as to positive results of our work. However, in this connection, we must not ignore the realities of our time, the fundamental tasks of perestroika in the country and the Armed Forces.

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Caucasus

Former Investigator Reiterates Guilt of Armenian Deputy Manucharov

91US0253A Yerevan EPOKHA in Russian No 17,
13 Dec 90 p 3

[Article by Garik Karapetyan: "Who Closed the 'Manucharov Case' and When?"]

[Text] "Where is Manucharov?"—Almost every day when I take my place in the press box in the meeting hall of the republic parliament the first thing I do is look around for Arkadiy Manvelovich. And almost every time I "find" him sitting far away from the live television cameras and the blinding floodlights. He very rarely goes up to the microphones standing in the passageway between the aisles, and the number of times he has appeared at the central podium can be counted on the fingers of one hand.

I recall that this happened for the first time when quite unexpectedly for the former prisoner of Butyrka they began to read statement No. 34-18/67146 of acting (in those days) USSR General Procurator A. Vasilyev in which he raised the question of obtaining permission to bring charges against the Armenian people's deputy who, incidentally, had been elected twice during the year and a half he had spent in three well-known isolation facilities in the country (Shusha, Lefortovo, and Butyrka)...

Naturally, our colleagues throughout the rest of the country read our newspaper as well. The interview-confession with the former senior investigator for especially important cases under the USSR General Prosecutor K. Maydanyuk and the subsequent interview-unmasking of A. Manucharov were published on the pages of KOMSOMOLETS (today—EPOKHA) on 7 June and 2 August, respectively, of this year. The international weekly MEGAPOLIS-EKSPRESS was the first of the popular Moscow publications after the release of A.M. to report on this event, placing next to the interview with him a fragment of my conversation with K.M. The daily NEDEL'YA, which until recently was another of my native weeklies, in Issue No. 36 for September, under the rubric: "Sensational Discussion," made the hero of the small publication a USSR people's deputy who is not unknown to us in Armenia and Artsakh, from the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] incidentally, who is now president of the Scientific Industrial Union, A.I. Volskiy. Allow me to quote one paragraph: "...Incidentally, much of what the extremely popular investigators in the country take credit for now was actually done by altogether different people, true pioneers of all these matters. There was the remarkable investigator Maydanyuk—he was the one who stirred things up in Uzbekistan. But to be quite frank—I do not know by whom and I do not know where—but at some point this person began to be treated quite unfairly. He simply dropped out of sight. And yet he was the best investigator for especially important affairs."

Probably after returning to Moscow Arkadiy Ivanovich stopped reading Armenian newspapers, for otherwise I could have quite quickly put him in contact with K.M. who had always lived in the capital. I am struck by the fact that neither in this publication nor in the March one nor on the pages of IZVESTIYA, which introduced this "remarkable investigator" to the country—there is not a word, not a hint of the participation of both Volskiy and Maydanyuk in the "Manucharov case" included on the list of "remarkable" achievements of the age of glasnost and perestroika.

Recently my colleagues from "MEGAPOLIS-EKSPRESS" sent me a copy of a letter from K.M. whose full content, in my opinion, should definitely be made known to the readers of EPOKHA.

Esteemed editor! Having read in your newspaper the article entitled: "My Position..." (the full version of the title starts: "My Position. Apparently, Is an Immoral..."—G.K.) I was sorry to see that my "clergy" in his desire to marshal facts to support his concept violated not only the secrecy of the confessional but one of the biblical commandments: "Thou shalt not lie!" For the television selection of the quote from our conversation with the emphasis placed as it was cannot be regarded as anything but a lie.

I would not get into an argument with those who out of market or other speculative motivations undertook to defend Manucharov or to write about him. I agreed to an

interview only in connection with the fact that the name of the "law upholder Manucharov" was mentioned in the article by Ye. Bonner (Yelena Georgiyevna's surname is Bonner-Alikhanyan—G.K.) in an issue of OGONEK and also with the capricious mention of the name of A.D. Sakharov, in the same breath Manucharov's name. Sanctified by these names, he does indeed enter the role of a great martyr, and the investigator, the role of over-reflective ex-hangman shedding belated tears over an innocent victim. But the people must know their hero's true face. This is the circumstance that motivated me to address this letter to you.

In my interview with Karapetyan I said that I had read and still read: Materials from the case show that Manucharov was guilty of bribe taking and improprieties for the purpose of covering up his own previous criminal activity, although, undoubtedly, the decision of the question of guilt is the court's prerogative.

The materials gathered during the course of the investigation make it possible for me to assert: Manucharov was a typical representative of the party-economic oligarchy in whose activity corruption is a constituent and indispensable part. Because of certain Caucasian traditions in Karabakh, this oligarchy took on all the features of eastern despotism, with each of its subjects assuming his allotted position. Manucharov had such a position, giving the tribute to the sovereign that is indispensable in such cases.

The "Karabakh Spring" whose nature, if one goes into it deeply, springs not so much from the national question as from hatred for the existing authorities, stirred up these muddy waters. The despot fled to the metropolis (as I understand it, they are speaking about Kevorkovo.—G.K.) and his former satraps went out on the square to greet the people and give their clever speeches about freedom. It was then that Manucharov came out and ambitiously adopted the false title of "leader of the Artsakh people." With inflammatory speeches he gathered around him the city riff-raff, who subsequently played the role of a catalyst among the unruly crowds. The intellectual part of the national movement received Manucharov's ultraradicalism with irritation but they were forced to deal with him because of his popularity "among the people."

Manucharov, having gathered points through what is now called cheap populism, became the leader of the "Krunks," which had not existed for very long. But being an enthusiastic player, he could not resist the temptation to put all his cards on the table. Soon after Vezirov came into power in Azerbaijan he secretly met with him. But the cat was let out of the bag and Manucharov could not give satisfactory explanations for what he had done. He was suspected of treachery and people began to avoid him. From that moment Manucharov's authority declined steadily and by the time he was arrested he had no significant amount of influence among the people. So there was no point whatsoever in confining him for political purposes in 1988. This will be confirmed by anybody who is aware of the situation in Karabakh at that time.

Manucharov was arrested for committing criminal acts. He admitted his guilt regarding a number of the charges in the criminal case against him and he gave testimony that completely fit in with other evidence gleaned during the course of the investigation. Nonetheless, after his arrest his pushy relatives, taking advantage of extensive connections and lobbyists in the CPSU Central Committee, began to literally put pressure on the general procurator, who was forced under this pressure to make the most contradictory decisions. A consequence of this pressure was the visit described in the "confession" of two colonels from the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs who made a special trip to get Manucharov and take him to Moscow for fear "something might happen" to him. From these same levels, through the Committee of Special Administration (at that time it was led by that same Volskiy who had such praise from Maydanyuk in his article in NEDELYA—G.K.) came instructions to give Manucharov clean linen and give him permission to receive additional packages and more meetings than were indicated in the preliminary investigation. From this same place followed instructions to submit to the court "in abridged form" what eventually determined his fate.

So the entire investigation took place under the benevolent supervision of the public organization that today is being avoided so ungratefully by its former ally. And here I have come back to the phrase in the heading of the interview.

I saw the immorality (a very imprecise word but it has been used and I cannot reject it) of my position in the fact that, giving in to the demands, I sent the case to court without working it up to the point of submitting the full charges against Manucharov. I see the immorality of my opponents in the fact that they, knowing what Manucharov was really like, put him in a deputy seat at the same time as he was sitting on the bench of the accused. If I had completed the work on the case, Manucharov would have served his sentence honestly, without worrying about the need to fabricate delusions about torture, and the journalist Karapetyan would not have taken on his soul the sin of violating Christian commandments and the elementary norms of journalistic ethics.

The publication of this letter will spare me the unpleasant task of applying to the court. With respect and hope—K. Maydanyuk.

One thing at a time. As we know, in connection with the inquiry of the USSR procurator, a deputy group was formed to study the materials and submit a draft decree to the parliament for discussion. I recall a fragment from it signed on 16 August by Chairman of the Republic Supreme Soviet L. Ter-Petrosyan: "To declare the initiation of a criminal case against A.M. Manucharov to be unconstitutional and regard it a persecution for political nonconformity and therefore to reject the application of acting USSR Procurator General A. Vasilyev for permission to file criminal charges against Armenian SSR People's Deputies Arkadiy Manvelovich Manucharov."

It would seem that his case had finally been closed. Now I would like to think about something else. The members of the "Karabakh" committee and A.M., you will note, were arrested at almost the same time. The difference in the dates is two weeks, but the essence of what was dreamed up in the large Moscow and Yerevan offices was the same: "Corrupt elements" had destabilized the situation in Armenia and Artsakh. From the first day of these arrests it was clear to all the Armenian people that this utterly unjustified and illegal "business trip" behind bars was organized for just one purpose: to eliminate the leaders of the democratic forces united under the "Karabakh" and "Krunik" committees.

Now about the "professionalism" of Maydanyuk, who prepared the "Manucharov case". If we take a careful look at the hearings we must recall—a stitch in time saves nine!—that the numerous meetings ended with two verdicts: to forward the "case" for further investigation and to change the preventive punishment.

The investigatory group was not in a position to find any evidence or criminal actions. And this is in spite of the fact that, according to the most approximate calculations, in a year and a half the "Manucharov case" was handled (and is still being handled) by 120 specialists who were sent to Stepanakert from various regions of the USSR. To their great sorrow, they found nothing essential, even with the help of two Japanese computers that carefully studied the economic activity of Arkadiy Manvelovich.

As he told me, the entire archive of the construction materials combine where he worked as director until his arrest was turned into scrap paper—so frequently did they leaf through the documentation that they literally looked at and reread everything down to the blank spaces... Moreover, a detailed study of the materials submitted to the Supreme Soviet of Armenia shows: The investigation was conducted in gross violation of the laws in effect. This is confirmed, I repeat, by the fact that on the same grounds the judicial authorities of Belorussia returned the criminal case three times (!) for further investigation—tell me, esteemed Konstantin Karlovich, another country where such a thing is possible.

As for your attack regarding the secret meeting of Manucharov and Vezirov, I have not been able to discuss this dramatic conversation giving names and details only because of the shortage of space in the newspaper. Everything in its own time—all that lies ahead, although a little bit has been said about this "rendezvous" in Baku by A.M. on the pages of the Yerevan newspaper KOMMUNIST (8 July 1990).

And, finally, the last bit of news for EPOKHA readers and K.M. personally. A.M. did not manage to fly to Yerevan from Moscow, and he did not have time to get used to the many hours of meetings of the republic parliament because the "Manucharov case" was taken up in Stepanakert. Since the time when the upholder of

the law, who is known throughout the world, was released with a written prohibition on leaving (A.M. lost his patience and by the time these lines were written he had already been in Artsakh for several weeks), in the pockets of the senior officers of the internal forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, who are maintaining special conditions and who have no authority in the oblast, lies the original "visiting card": a full-face photograph of A.M. and 15 (!) points of the most detailed description of the external appearance of this member of the Armenian parliament, right down to his gait and "aural cavity," although, as is noted on this same flier, there are no distinguishing marks. This "visiting card" was given to me by Arkadiy Manvelovich as a token of gratitude for my forthright support of his position on the pages of KOMSOMOLET and MEGAPOLIS-EKSPRESS. I keep this original souvenir under the glass on my desk. But why do the military in Stepanakert keep this "visiting card?" Who dares to answer this sacrilegious question?

Georgia Alters Law on Age for Marriage

91US0248B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
21 Dec 90 p 1

["Republic of Georgia Law on the Introduction of Amendments and Supplements to Several Legislative Acts of the Republic of Georgia"—ZARYA VOSTOKA headline]

[Excerpts] The Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet decrees:

To introduce into the codes of the Republic of Georgia amendments and supplements to the following legislative acts:

1. To word Article 15 of the Republic of Georgia Code on Marriage and the Family adopted as a Georgian SSR Law on 18 June 1970, as follows:

"Article 15. The Age for Marriage

The age for marriage is established at 17 years for men and at 16 years for women."

[Passage omitted]

Z. Gamsakhurdia, chairman,
Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet
Tbilisi, 20 December 1990

Gamsakhurdia Justifies Abolition of South Ossetian Autonomy

91US0209A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
14 Dec 90 pp 1-3

[Speech presented by Zviad Gamsakhurdia, chairman of Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet, at Supreme Soviet session on 11 December]

[Text] Respected deputies!

Respected guests!

Respected public!

The Georgian national liberation movement, which was recently revived and became particularly strong, always set as its main goal, in addition to the restoration of Georgia's independence, the establishment of genuine national accord and mutual understanding between members of all of the nationalities living in Georgia. The programs and charters of the Round Table political organizations stress the need to uphold the ideals of equality, mutual respect, and the peaceful coexistence of national groups.

More specifically, our campaign platforms underscored the need to preserve the autonomy of the ethnic minorities in Georgia, although the autonomous units were formed after the Bolshevik annexation and against the interests of the Georgian nationality and although this was, in a certain sense, a violation of the principles of ethnic equality. We took this stance for the purpose of the peaceful development of inter-ethnic relations, the settlement of conflicts by means of negotiation, and the promotion of the process of civic peace and stabilization in Georgia.

Regrettably, however, the members of some ethnic minorities in Georgia did not draw the proper conclusions from this. A separatist movement is known to have reached its culminating point recently in the so-called South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, historically called Scythia Karthlia. Last year an official commission was set up at the insistence of our movement to study the status of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. Its members included authoritative scholars, writers, and public spokesmen. You will hear some of the commission's findings today, and the complete report will be published soon. In connection with this, I want to explain our position on the expediency of the existence of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast in line with the requirements of international law.

We acknowledge the right of the Ossetian people, just as all other people, to self-determination and their right to form an independent state, but this must be done in their historic homeland, in present-day North Ossetia, and not on the Georgian territory they appropriated, territory which is an integral part of the sovereign Republic of Georgia.

Today the Ossetian separatists are trying to cut Georgia off from its heart, from the historical seat of the Georgian people's material and spiritual culture, and are establishing the so-called "South Ossetian Soviet Republic" on the pretext of their right of self-determination. Furthermore, they assure us that this is no threat whatsoever to the territorial integrity of the Georgian Republic.

A look at the declaration of South Ossetian sovereignty, adopted on 20 September 1990 by the oblast soviet of people's deputies in the South Ossetian Autonomous

Oblast, is enough to convince anyone that they are creating an independent political entity.

In spite of repeated warnings by the Georgian Supreme Soviet, in oral and written form, this "declaration" acknowledges "the inviolable right of the Ossetian people to free self-determination," declares the autonomous oblast "the Ossetian people's form of government" (?), requiring "complete independence as a natural and essential condition for its further development (?), with the exception of all of the political and socioeconomic matters it voluntarily (?) turns over to the jurisdiction of the Georgian SSR and USSR on the basis of the treaty concluded with them," says "any action committed against the South Ossetian national government (?)...will be punishable by law," "the citizens living in South Ossetia" constitute the South Ossetian nationality (?), representing the only authorized source of official authority in South Ossetia (?), and this "authority (?) will be exercised in line with the constitutional provisions of the USSR and legal instruments of South Ossetia" (?), "outside the boundaries of the authority of the Georgian SSR and USSR, delegated to them voluntarily by South Ossetia (?), South Ossetia will make independent decisions on its foreign and domestic (?) affairs, and the supremacy of the South Ossetian people's will (?) will be recorded in the laws and constitution of South Ossetia" (?), the status of the "South Ossetian citizen" (?) will be "defined by sovereign South Ossetia (?) on the basis of the Constitution of the USSR and international legal documents and will be confirmed in the Constitution of South Ossetia" (?); "South Ossetia will be the supreme authority throughout its territory" and "will decide matters of administrative and territorial organization within its territory" (?), and "all of the natural resources within South Ossetia's borders" are "the property of its people" (?), constituting the "material basis of South Ossetian sovereignty" (?), and stipulates that "South Ossetia is a party to the union treaty and international law" (?) and will "conduct foreign relations with other parties and states of the federation autonomously" (?).

As we can see, the "declaration" ignores the Constitution of the Georgian Republic and the political, economic, and other vital interests of Georgia in general, and ignores the basic principles of the Constitution of the USSR, which subordinates autonomous oblasts completely to the sovereignty of the union republic and assigns them the status of local administrations.

Besides this, a resolution was passed that same day: "On the Transformation of the Autonomous Oblast into the South Ossetian Democratic Republic."

These acts were annulled by the Presidium of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet (in a decree of 21 September 1990), but on 16 October the soviet of people's deputies of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast not only overturned the decree, but also created a republic executive committee and scheduled elections to the Supreme Soviet of what was now to be called the: "South Ossetian Soviet Republic."

Although the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Republic annulled these decrees on 22 November and warned the parties directing these actions that they would be held completely responsible, the elections did take place on 9 December.

All of the Georgian Government's attempts to stop this unconstitutional action by means of peaceful negotiation were futile. The leaders of the self-styled regime responded to all requests for an end to their illegal activity with amazing hostility and audacity.

In any case, unconstitutional elections were held on 9 December, and according to the reports of the self-styled regime, 71 percent of the voters cast a ballot in the elections, although who would believe this?

Therefore, the conflict was not resolved peacefully, and today we are facing a fact—an independent political entity has been created on the territory of the Georgian Republic but does not acknowledge the supremacy of republic authority and is encroaching upon the territorial integrity of our country.

What should we have done next? Continue the "war of decrees" or settle the problem once and for all in the manner dictated by law, primarily the Constitution of the Georgian Republic, and by our national interests?

If we proceed from the fact that Georgia was taken over as a result of military intervention and occupation and that the Soviet regime was established by violent means, we could refute all of the legal arguments cited in connection with the creation of the self-styled entity in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast and end the matter there.

If, however, we proceed from political and legal realities and the current objectives dictated by the transition period to complete independence, announced by the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet, we feel it is necessary to investigate matters connected with the status of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast with a view to Soviet law, because we know that our opponents will arm themselves with these statutes when they attack us.

I will briefly explain how the Ossetian population appeared in Scythia Karthlia and how the autonomous oblast was created. A detailed investigation of these matters would carry us far afield, but some knowledge of the main stages of the process is necessary for a correct assessment of the current situation.

In the 9th through 13th centuries the Alans (called "Ovseti" in Georgian sources) had a feudal state in the northern Caucasus which was overwhelmed at the time of the Mongol invasion (13th century) and was then conquered by Tamerlane (14th century). The Ossetians who were driven out of the northern Caucasian valleys took refuge in a narrow canyon of the Caucasian range. Later they began moving to the southern slopes of the

range. In the 17th and 18th centuries some of the Ossetians settled in the territory north of Scythia Karthlia.

In search of better living conditions, the Ossetians began moving into the Georgian mountain villages and settling on lands belonging to feudal lords. They were able to do this because the Georgian population was moving to the lowlands in response to the economic influence of the valley regions and to invasions by foreign enemies.

The territory occupied by the Ossetians moving down from the north was called South Ossetia. Most of them settled in the canyons of the Didi and Patari Liakhov rivers and Ksani. This is why Ossetians later settled in the Gori and Dusheti districts, with a comparatively small number living in the Rachino and Shorapan districts.

Georgians treated the Ossetian settlers well and aided in the further development of their culture. The first Ossetian religious book, for example, was published in manuscript form in 1753 by a Georgian missionary and was compiled with the use of the Georgian alphabet. Georgian letters were used to print it. At that time there was no Ossetian alphabet. The first Ossetian alphabet, based on Georgian letters, was composed by Ivane Ialguzidze, and an Ossetian alphabet based on the Russian alphabet began to be used in the 1830's.

After Russia annexed Georgia in 1801, the government was dissolved and the region was called the Georgian Province and was governed by a chief administrator. In 1809 the province was divided into five districts (Gori, Lori, Dusheti, Telavi, and Signakhi. The territory inhabited by Ossetians was mainly in the Gori and Dusheti districts.

Captain Vasilyev was appointed the chief police officer of the Ossetians in 1838. The village of Dzhava was chosen as his official residence. In 1842 the Tushino-Pshavi-Khevsuri Mountain and Ossetian districts were created within Georgia's boundaries as territorial-administrative units. The Mokhev mountaineers living along the Georgian Military Road were originally part of the Ossetian District, and the Mtiuletsk village of Kvisheti was chosen as the district center.

In 1843 the basin of the Zemo Tsklevi River in Ksani gorge and its tributaries, an area inhabited mainly by Georgians, were cut off from Gori and Tbilisi districts and were made part of the Mountain District. Later this territory was divided into the Khevs, Mtiuletsk, and Ksani sections. The Ossetian District was officially created in 1843 and was divided into the Dzhava, Malyy Liakhov, and Narsk sections. That same year a special directive made the commander of the Mountain District the commander in chief of the mountaineers, with jurisdiction over the Ossetian and Tushino-Pshavi-Khevsuri districts. The Ossetian District took in only part of present-day South Ossetia and the Ardon gorge. The district commander's official residence was in Dzhava.

The left flank of the Caucasian line was created on 3 April 1858 during the military campaigns in the North Caucasus and took in the Ossetian District. Because the Narts' section was close to Vladikavkaz and offered easy access to it at any time of year, Baryatinskiy removed the Narsk section from Tbilisi Province and reassigned it to the Ossetian Military District of the left flank of the Caucasian line, which later became part of Tersk District.

The Dzhava and Malyy Liakhov districts, which constituted around a third of the present South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, remained part of Tbilisi Province but were later reassigned to Gori District as its Ossetian section to facilitate administration.

The district administrations were dissolved by the statute of 11 April 1855, and the territory inhabited by the mountain Ossetians was divided into rural communities.

After the February bourgeois democratic revolution in 1917, the tsar's vice-regent was replaced by the Special Transcaucasian Committee (Ozakom), which was later replaced first by the Transcaucasian Commissariat and then by the Transcaucasian Sejm. The South Ossetian Popular Assembly and National Council, which were created after this revolution, were influenced from the very beginning by Bolsheviks who had returned from the front and were trying to seize political power by means of widespread intervention in all spheres of South Ossetian economic, political, and cultural life. They hoped to make South Ossetia a separate territorial-administrative unit in the form of a district or autonomous entity.

The government of the independent Georgian Republic was aware of the Ossetians' attempts to create a separate state within Georgian boundaries and felt that they were undermining Georgia's integrity. The Fourth National Council of South Ossetia drafted a constitution of autonomous South Ossetia with the active participation of South Ossetian political parties and submitted it on 16 June 1919 to the Commission on Local Administration and Self-Government of the Georgian Constituent Assembly.

After lengthy negotiations between the government of the Georgian Democratic Republic and the South Ossetian National Council, the government rejected the council's territorial claims.

A "revolutionary" movement began in South Ossetia. On 18 March 1918 the rebels took the village of Tskhinvali and established a Soviet regime there, which was later defeated. The government viewed this as a reaction against democracy and a nationalist Ossetian uprising against the Georgians.

Soviet rule was established on 8 May 1920 in the village of Roki, and Soviet Ossetia was declared part of the RSFSR. The rebels were aided by North Ossetia and were opposed by the Georgian Government.

People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs Chicherin of the RSFSR sent the Georgian Government an interesting note on 17 May 1920, demanding the withdrawal of Georgian troops from Ossetia because their presence constituted unjustified intervention by Georgia in Ossetian affairs, which was equated with intervention in foreign affairs.

The reply to Chicherin's note was categorical: "The Government of Georgia is extremely surprised by the part of your note referring to the Georgian Government's intention to suppress the South Ossetian Soviet Republic with armed force. We feel obliged to remind you that there is no South Ossetia in Georgia. There are Ossetian rural communities in Georgia, located in the Gori District of Tiflis Province. The villages are an indisputable part of Georgian territory. By the terms of the treaty (this is a reference to the decree of 7 May 1920), these are within Georgia's borders, and any administration other than the administration of the Georgian Democratic Republic is inadmissible there."

The uprising of 12 June 1920 was defeated, but the facts testify that the government of democratic Georgia treated loyal Ossetians well: Treasury funds were used to compensate them for the losses they had suffered due to military hostilities, and wavering elements were granted the right to move to other parts of the republic.

On 5 March 1921 Soviet rule was established in Ossetia and the rest of Georgia as a result of intervention. The South Ossetian Revolutionary Committee was established in the areas inhabited by Ossetians by a decree of the Georgian Revolutionary Committee, and mixed revolutionary committees were formed in regions with a mixed population. The Gori District Revolutionary Committee included one representative from South Ossetia.

By July 1921 there were seven rural communities in South Ossetian Rayon, excluding eight purely Georgian settlements (in Anati, Atskuriskhevi, Khoshura, Sadauriantkari, Dvani, Zemo Avnevi, and Kvemo Avnevi), which remained administrative elements of Tskhinvalskiy Rayon in the Gori District and were not under the jurisdiction of the South Ossetian Revolutionary Committee.

The South Ossetian Revolutionary Committee constantly demanded the immediate establishment of a commission for the administrative separation of South Ossetia from adjacent regions. The Georgian Revolutionary Committee sympathized with the demands. It would be difficult to remain indifferent after reading letters to the government from inhabitants of Tskhinvali and other regions inhabited by Georgians. They implored the government "not to infringe upon the rights of Georgians living on their ancient land" and not to add these territories to South Ossetian Oblast. It is significant that the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs sent a lengthy report to the Georgian Revolutionary Committee to say that, judging by the materials

gathered by the administrative department, it would be effectively impossible to set up a single integral territory in South Ossetia.

"South Ossetia," the report said, "does not exist as an integral geographic entity...and is only a separate rayon populated by Ossetians, who have no economic and topographic contact with one another...."

Because of this, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs felt it would be impossible to create a single administrative entity out of segments of Gori, Dusheti, and Rachino districts, but the Georgian Revolutionary Committee did not agree. To hasten the separation, in September 1921 the South Ossetian Revolutionary Committee officially requested central party and soviet organs in Georgia to grant South Ossetia the status of a separate and sovereign political unit with federal ties to the Georgian SSR.

A combined session of the South Ossetian Revolutionary Committee and the party oblast committee was held from 6 through 8 September 1921 and adopted a decree on the creation of the South Ossetian Soviet Socialist Republic, approving the preliminary outline of its boundaries and a draft constitution. The need to create a republic with its center in Tskhinvali was acknowledged. The draft document: "On the Borders of the South Ossetian Soviet Socialist Republic" was appended to the decree and located Tskhinvali, with all of the adjacent Georgian communities, and the territory inhabited by Ossetians in Gori, Dusheti, and Shorapan districts, including adjacent regions with a mixed population, within the confines of the new political unit.

The reasons cited for the formation of this republic were the geographic location of South Ossetia, the size of its population, the level of its economic and cultural development, the history of the revolutionary struggle of the Ossetian laboring public, etc.

The draft constitution consisted of 15 articles and defined the organizational features of Ossetian administrative bodies. All of these documents were submitted to the Caucasian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, and the revolutionary committee of the Georgian SSR by an Ossetian delegation on 14 September 1921 for thorough consideration and a final decision.

On 31 October 1921 the issue of South Ossetian self-determination was discussed at a meeting of the Presidium of the Caucasian Bureau. The assumption of independent, sovereign status by an entity as small as South Ossetia was called unrealistic. The objective reasons cited as the grounds for this demand were sufficient for the creation of a South Ossetian autonomous entity at best. A decision was made to recognize the national self-determination of South Ossetia in the form of an autonomous oblast and to define its borders.

The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs requested the revolutionary committee to shelve the discussion of a South Ossetian administrative unit temporarily and continue to be guided by the people's commissariat's decree of 20 July 1921. On 17 November 1921 the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia also discussed the matter in accordance with the Caucasian Bureau decree. **The national wing quite justifiably opposed the inclusion of Tskhinvali and neighboring Georgian settlements in a South Ossetian autonomous unit.**

During the process of the national separation of South Ossetia, the Communist Party of Georgia denied all of its historical rights to its borders and put the interests of the Ossetian people above the interests of the Georgians. In view of Tskhinvali's importance to South Ossetia, the party passed a resolution on 17 November 1921, creating the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast with its center in Tskhinvali. The numerous appeals to the Soviet government of Georgia from Georgians living in Tskhinvali (after all, at that time there were only two Ossetian families living there) confirm this. The revolutionary government responded to the Georgian people's anger over the inclusion of Georgian villages in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast with high-flown "agitation and propaganda," ignoring the interests of the inhabitants of Georgian villages, and said it would be possible for the border between South Ossetia and Gori District to run above Tskhinvali and Ergeti, as a result of which the Georgian villages of Dgverisi, Tamarasheni, Achabeti, Kurta, Kekhvi, Kemurta, Zartsemi, Skveti, and Kheiti became part of South Ossetia along with Tskhinvali.

We are intrigued by the legal decision: "On the Ossetian Autonomous Unit," where the Georgian people's complaints about the inclusion of Tskhinvali and several Georgian villages in South Ossetia are interpreted as provocations and heinous plots by Mensheviks hoping to hurt the Soviet regime. It said that: "Ossetia, with its Tskhinvali, represents an autonomous oblast, but it is wholly within the boundaries of the Republic of Georgia and is an integral part of it.... The insistence on the inclusion of Tskhinvali in the boundaries of the Georgian Republic is the result of a total lack of understanding of the state of affairs and a refusal to consider it.... It is absurd to make this demand...and on the other hand it is impossible and impermissible for the South Ossetian Oblast to exist without a center, and its center is Tskhinvali. It would be completely impossible to separate it from the Ossetian autonomous unit. This would seriously undermine the cause of Soviet construction on the local level. For this reason, Tskhinvali must remain part of South Ossetia." Any commentary would be superfluous!

The revolutionary government of Georgia, which "insisted" on the endowment of nationalities with sweeping self-determination rights, placed no value whatsoever on the opinions and wishes of the Georgian

people and "presented" Tskhinvali, with all of the Georgians and members of other nationalities living there, to Ossetia only because Ossetia needed a center, and supposedly so that the cause of "Soviet construction" would not suffer. We wonder how anyone can justify the self-determination of a nationality in a place other than its own homeland, and at the expense of the interests of the native population which has lived here for centuries.

The revolutionary government of Georgia countered the legitimate demands of the Georgian people with ideology, agitation, and propaganda, trying to convince the Tskhinvali Georgians that it was defending the interests of "all nationalities" equally.... It was encouraging them to trust the small segment of the population that had always wanted separation from Georgia and regular contact with North Ossetia—i.e., with Russia.

The decision on the formation of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast had already been made, but it had not been legally ratified by the highest government organ in Soviet Georgia yet.

The Constitution of the Georgian SSR of 1922, adopted on 2 March, mentioned the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast in passing—a footnote to the first article said that "the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast will become part of the republic on the basis of voluntary self-determination."

A decree of 20 April 1922, however, defined the exact political and territorial structure of the autonomous oblast. This decree created the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast as part of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. Tskhinvali was named as the oblast center.

The Georgian SSR Constitution of 1927 defined the exact status of the autonomous units in Georgia and their relationship to the central government. This applied above all to border changes. According to Point 3 of Article 19, changes in the borders of the Georgian Republic would be wholly and completely within the jurisdiction of the All-Georgian Congress of Soviets, and no other organ would have these rights. The Congress and its Central Executive Committee would be in charge of the administrative divisions of the republic and would set the boundaries of autonomous entities. Any disagreements between Georgia and the autonomous units (including South Ossetia) over constitutional issues and legal and ethnic policy would be settled by the All-Georgian Congress of Soviets or its Central Executive Committee.

As for the relative force of the legal instruments of the oblast and the Georgian SSR, according to the constitution the All-Georgian Congress of Soviets or its Central Executive Committee could annul or uphold any decree of the oblast congress of soviets or its central executive committee.

The laws and other legal instruments of the Georgian SSR would be binding throughout Georgian territory,

including the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. In cases of conflicting statutes, the laws of the Republic of Georgia would prevail.

Until 1937, when the new Constitution of the Georgian SSR was adopted, the relationship of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast to Georgia was defined exclusively by the Constitution of 1927 and the laws passed on that basis. The USSR Constitution of 1924 and the Constitution of the ZSFSR [Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] did not regulate the status of autonomous units directly because this was one of the internal functions of the republics making up the federation.

As for South Ossetia's participation in the work of the government bodies of the USSR and the Transcaucasian Federation, it had a representative on the Nationalities Council of the USSR Central Executive Committee, and representatives of the oblast participated in the work of the ZSFSR Central Executive Committee, its Presidium, and other organs with deliberative status.

The territorial-administrative division of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast began undergoing changes in 1922.

When Georgia was divided into rayons, the oblast was also divided into three rayons—Dzhavskiy, Tskhinvalskiy, and Akhalskorskiy—in 1929. Kornisskiy Rayon, which was later renamed Znaurskiy Rayon, was added to them in 1931, and Akhalskorskiy Rayon became Leninskorskiy Rayon.

The USSR Constitution of 1936 not only acknowledged the uniform status of autonomous oblasts, but also granted them broader rights to distinguish this status from the status of ordinary territorial-administrative units (krays, oblasts, etc.). The autonomous oblasts had broader representation in the Nationalities Council of the USSR Supreme Soviet (five representatives each, instead of one). Whereas the formation of an autonomous oblast (and other autonomous entities) within a union republic had always been the exclusive prerogative of the republic up to that time and did not require the approval of the USSR, the Constitution of 1936 stipulated that the formation of an autonomous oblast would have to be approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet (Article 14, Point C).

Using the USSR Constitution of 1936 as a basis, the Georgian SSR Constitution of 1937 included the basic provisions defining the status of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast.

Chapter 7 of the Constitution presented a detailed list of the government and administrative organs of the autonomous republic (the oblast soviet of workers' deputies and the ispolkom of the oblast soviet, which would create departments and administrations), defined their jurisdiction, specifying that the creation of rayon, city, and rural organs of government authority would have to

be conducted in line with the paragraphs in the Constitution pertaining to local government, defined the network of oblast law enforcement agencies, etc.

In spite of the sweeping powers with which the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was endowed, decisions on setting and changing the oblast borders were made by administrative organs of the Georgian SSR, with no need to seek the consent of the oblast itself. The USSR only had the power to approve the creation of a new autonomous oblast, and obviously on the basis of recommendations submitted by the republic.

In spite of this, however, union authorities made obvious attempts to separate the autonomous oblasts from the union republics, connect them directly to the center, and assume the right of guaranteeing their status.

The union treaty, adopted by the First All-Union Congress of Soviets on 30 December 1922, envisaged the creation of only a unicameral supreme administrative body: The congress elected a Central Executive Committee of the USSR, with the union republics represented in proportion to the size of their population—371 members in all. Just a few months later, however, a bicameral body was proposed at the insistence of I. Stalin, and the proposal was then ratified, along with the revised and augmented text of the treaty, on 6 July 1923 by the Central Executive Committee (the treaty and declaration were finally ratified in constitutional form at the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets on 31 January 1924).

In accordance with Article 13 of the treaty (or Constitution), the Central Executive Committee would consist of two chambers—the Union Council and the Nationalities Council. Whereas the members of the first were to be elected in the same way (although the number of members rose to 414), the Nationalities Council would consist "of representatives of union and autonomous Soviet republics"—chosen in such a way that each republic would have five representatives and each autonomous oblast of the RSFSR would have one representative.

A note stipulated that: "the Adzharia and Abkhaz autonomous republics and the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast will send one representative each to the Nationalities Council."

Therefore, the draft of the union treaty which was finally ratified equated the representative status of union republics with the autonomous republics of Russia—five representatives each. The Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (which was made up of three republics—Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia) would elect as many representatives as the Bashkir, Crimean, Tatar, or Kirghiz autonomous republics.

This was the beginning of the autonomization of the union republics, which not only equated them with autonomous republics but also isolated the autonomous entities from the union republics and set them against

each other in one of the chambers of the highest administrative organ of the USSR, without which the Union Council was powerless to do anything. The simplest calculations produce the following results—four union republics (the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Transcaucasian Federation, and the Russian Federation) had 20 seats on the Nationalities Council (5x4), and the autonomous republics had 40 seats.

In this way, from the very beginning the autonomous units were given a chance to set themselves up against the union republics and to sabotage decisions on any matter. By the same token, with the support of one of the union republics, they could make decisions on any matter. It is true that the representation of the union republics later increased (with each republic sending 32 deputies to the Nationalities Council of the USSR Supreme Soviet, autonomous republics sending 11, autonomous oblasts sending 5, and autonomous okrugs sending 1), but the proportional influence of autonomous entities in the Supreme Soviet is still strong (they occupy more than 100 seats in the present Nationalities Council, or much more than a third of the total votes in the chamber).

As we can see, in 1923 the autonomous units already had a chance to undermine the sovereignty of union republics from within, and this was a clear violation of the jurisdiction of the so-called "sovereign republics." Furthermore, this process developed quickly.

The governments of the union republics of that time accepted the strong unitarian tendencies submissively, and the backbone of the national struggle was broken by countless terrifying acts of repression. Georgia was no exception. In fact, we could even say the opposite: Its party and government became the most tractable instruments in Stalin's hands, at the expense of the interests of their own people.

The 1977 Constitution of the USSR, with the amendments and additions adopted in November 1988, says little about the status of autonomous oblasts. The special chapter (the first) entitled: "The Autonomous Oblast and Autonomous Okrug" (Articles 86-88) says that the autonomous oblast is part of a union republic or kray, that the law on the autonomous oblast is passed by the union republic Supreme Soviet at the request of the oblast soviet of people's deputies (Article 86), and that the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast is part of the Georgian SSR (Article 87).

The same thing was done when the 1978 Constitution, which contains a short chapter (9) entitled: "The Autonomous Oblast" (Articles 83-84), was reworded.

In 1980, however, the status of the autonomous oblasts underwent a significant change because it was equated with the status of the autonomous republic.

On 12 November 1980 the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet passed a law: "On the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast" based on the USSR law: "On the Basic

Powers of Kray and Oblast Soviets of People's Deputies and the Soviets of People's Deputies of Autonomous Oblasts and Autonomous Okrugs."

Article 3 defined the "territorial-administrative structure of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast." This was the first stipulation that "the territory of the autonomous oblast cannot be changed without the consent of the Soviet of People's Deputies of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast." There was also the statement that "oblast borders will be changed in the manner prescribed by law," but it does not specify which law. The next point says that creating rayons, cities, settlements, and other populated points in the oblast, abolishing them, naming and renaming them, and establishing or transferring administrative centers will be conducted according to the procedure defined in the laws of the Georgian SSR.

Therefore, the law: "On the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast" seems to acknowledge the Georgian SSR's right to establish oblast borders, but the statement that the territory of the oblast cannot be changed without the consent of the oblast soviet of people's deputies effectively abolishes this right. **It is interesting that the USSR law on which this act is based does not contain this article.**

As far as the creation of new rural, settlement, and other oblast administrative units and organs is concerned, the Georgian SSR Constitution conferred the following right on the central administration, the Presidium of the Georgian Supreme Soviet (today this is the prerogative of the Supreme Soviet): "...to set and change the rayon division of the autonomous oblast, create cities, rayons, and municipal rayons, and establish the jurisdiction of cities; to rename rayons, cities, municipal rayons, settlements, and other populated points." Therefore, the 1980 law was based on this article in the 1977 Georgian SSR Constitution.

Dear friends!

Several amendments and additions to the existing Constitution of the Georgian SSR were made at the time of the unprecedented growth of the national liberation movement in Georgia (19 November 1988).

From now on, only the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet will have the right to make decisions "on matters of national-state structure" (Article 104, Point 2) and "to determine the procedure of making decisions on the territorial-administrative structure of the Georgian SSR" (Point 11).

Therefore, the existing Constitution of Georgia, in comparison with the 1980 law, reinforces republic sovereignty over the territory of the autonomous oblast and, as the Basic Law, is higher than the 1980 law of the Georgian SSR. It stipulates the right of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet to make decisions on changes in the territory of the autonomous oblast.

The previously mentioned transformation of the oblast would signify the creation of a new state—the so-called South Ossetian Soviet Republic—within the Georgian Republic, and this would call for corresponding changes in its national-state structure. This is a matter within the jurisdiction of the Georgian Republic. In particular, in accordance with Point 3, Article 72, of the existing Georgian Republic Constitution, "the jurisdiction of the Georgian SSR, represented by its supreme organs of governmental authority and administration, will extend to: the formation of new autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts within the Georgian SSR and the subsequent submission of requests for approval by the USSR Supreme Soviet." The right to make this decision is delegated specifically to the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet in Point 3 of Article 104 of the Georgian SSR Constitution. It says that the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet is empowered to make decisions on matters of national-state structure within republic jurisdiction.

Therefore, there were no legal grounds whatsoever to turn the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast into an autonomous republic, not to mention a sovereign entity, without the consent of the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet.

What are the powers of the USSR in this respect? It can only approve the creation of new autonomous units in a union republic (when the union republic submits the appropriate request). This power is now delegated to the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (Point 1, Article 73, and Point 2, Article 108, of the USSR Constitution).

It is important to note one significant fact: The matter is only discussed by the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in the event of a positive decision by the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet. If the republic Supreme Soviet decides not to create this kind of unit (or to turn the autonomous oblast into an autonomous republic), this decision is final, in accordance with the abovementioned articles of the Georgian SSR and USSR constitutions, and is not subject to review by any other government body.

Obviously, there have been cases in which an autonomous oblast has become an autonomous republic. By the same token, the Tajik Autonomous Republic (created in 1925) became a union republic (1929, 1931).

This was done with the consent of the Government of the RSFSR, because the demand was clearly justified. Today, we are witnessing a "sovereignty parade" of autonomous republics appropriating a higher status.

The Ossetians living in Scythia Karthlia, however, are not a nationality in the full sense of the term. They constitute an ethnic minority with the appropriate status, in line with international standards. As a rule, they can only aspire to national-culture autonomy. This is how the status of ethnic minorities is defined in the international pact on the civil and political rights of the individual

(Article 27): In countries with ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities, the people belonging to these groups cannot be denied the right to practice their own culture and religion, perform their own religious rituals, and use their own native language. For this reason, the territorial-administrative autonomy which took shape during the formation of the USSR national-state structure was artificially conferred upon some ethnic minorities, and this effectively Balkanized the union republics (fragmenting them and violating their territorial integrity). This is particularly true of Georgia.

The Ossetians living in Scythia Karthlia have the status of an ethnic minority and cannot claim the status of an autonomous republic or any other kind of state. The autonomous oblast, according to an authoritative source, "is not a state, but a national-state structure, a form of national-political autonomy. The autonomous oblast is an oblast distinguished by a particular way of life and ethnic composition and is a direct part of the union republic or kray (in the RSFSR) with an autonomous status."

The autonomous oblast is a national entity where administrative and cultural affairs are generally conducted in the national language. The autonomous oblast is categorized as a local administration with a view to the national characteristics of the people living within its territory ("The Constitution of the USSR," "Political-Legal Handbook," Moscow, 1982—the editors of this book include A. Lukyanov, V. Kudryavtsev, and B. Lazarev).

An analysis indicates that in one case the status of the autonomous oblast artificially restricts a nationality's right to self-determination, in another it reflects the existing situation exactly, and in a third it transcends the boundaries of the permissible legal rights of the population.

The population of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast cannot have the same right of self-determination as a nationality or national group living in its own historical homeland, as in the case of the Ossetians living in North Ossetia. The South Ossetians can only claim the status of a narrow territorial-administrative division. The self-determination right of these groups is restricted by one important fact: Self-determination cannot violate the territorial integrity of a union republic. In other words, it cannot reach the point of secession or the creation of an autonomous state because an ethnic minority is not living in the historical territory of its nationality, but within the territory of another nationality, even if it has lived there for many years.

As we can see, turning South Ossetia into a republic of any kind would be impossible not only because it would require the consent of administrative organs of the Georgian SSR, but also because there are no legal grounds whatsoever for this kind of demand, even if it takes the form of an oblast soviet decision.

This is the right place to answer another question: To what degree do the "changes brought about by radical renewal" in the federation of the Soviet Union or the law of 26 April on the separation of powers between the USSR and the members of the federation, apply to the "South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast."

As I have already said, the unitarian tendency throughout the history of the USSR's development has limited the jurisdiction of the so-called union republics in favor of the "center" and has also led to the "Balkanization" of republics—i.e., the augmentation of the proportional influence of autonomous units at the expense of the historical integrity of the "sovereign republics."

Although almost none of the national groups in the autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts of the Russian Federation has ever had a state of its own as a form of national self-determination, these groups have had the right to enjoy the freedom they were granted in the: "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia" (November 1917), and many of them could have established an independent state but preferred to remain within the Russian Federation because of the political situation. Today some of them are demanding the higher status of sovereign republics. This is an internal affair of the Russian Federation, and we will refrain from commenting on these processes.

The parties to the union treaty are only the union republics, and the creation of any autonomous entity is the internal affair of the sovereign union republic, unless it decides to make this matter an item regulated by union law.

As for the announcement that autonomous entities are equal members of the union federation, this would require that a new union treaty be signed, and only by those who would agree to belong to this kind of union.

Therefore, in accordance with existing laws, the 1922 union treaty and the 1977 USSR Constitution provide no legal grounds for the passage of laws granting autonomous units the right to secede from the union republics. Even the slightest change in the borders of the union republic would be impermissible without the consent of this republic (USSR Constitution, Article 78).

For this reason, the USSR law: "On the Procedure of Making Decisions on the Withdrawal of the Union Republic from the USSR" (3 April 1990) and the law of 26 April are flagrant violations of the sovereignty of union republics, as it is defined in the 1922 treaty and all subsequent constitutions, which stipulate the union republic's sovereignty over all of its territory, including the territory of autonomous units.

Because of this, there are no legal grounds for the abovementioned laws, and their enforcement in the Georgian Republic was therefore forbidden by the decree of the Georgian Republic Supreme Soviet of 20 June this year.

Can an autonomous oblast be liquidated?

The Georgian SSR Constitution prior to 18 November 1989 (prior to the passage of the law on additions and amendments to the republic constitution) envisaged the creation of autonomous republics and oblasts in the Georgian SSR with their subsequent representation in the corresponding union organ (Point 3, Article 72, and Article 104). Article 104 of the constitution said that this right was the exclusive prerogative of the republic Supreme Soviet. As for the liquidation of an autonomous unit, the constitution did not envisage this, and if this question had been raised, it should have been dealt with by analogy—i.e., it should have involved a procedure similar to the creation of the autonomous unit.

The situation changed after the passage of the abovementioned law of 18 November 1989. This law reworded Article 104 of the constitution. Now it does not refer to the creation of new autonomous units, but states that "the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Republic...will make decisions on national-state structure within the jurisdiction of the Georgian Republic" (Point 3).

This article also concerns the liquidation of the autonomous oblast, because this is a matter pertaining to the national-state structure, and the Georgian SSR, as a "sovereign state," is empowered to make this decision (at least by analogy with Point 3 of Article 72 of our constitution, assigning the creation of new autonomous units to Georgian jurisdiction).

Therefore, only the Supreme Soviet of the Georgian Republic is empowered by the Constitution of the USSR and the Constitution of the Georgian Republic to liquidate an autonomous oblast.

Now we should define the rights of the USSR in connection with this matter.

The Constitution of the USSR assigns the approval of new autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts constituting part of a union republic to the jurisdiction of the USSR (Point 1, Article 73). As for the approval of the liquidation of autonomous units, including the autonomous oblast, the USSR Constitution does not envisage this directly.

Point 2 of Article 108 of the USSR Constitution mentions the exclusive prerogative of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR to make decisions on matters of national-state structure within the jurisdiction of the USSR. The question of the liquidation of an autonomous oblast is within the jurisdiction of the union republic and the USSR, because Article 87 of the 11th chapter of the Constitution of the USSR ("The Autonomous Oblast and Autonomous Okrug") lists all of the autonomous oblasts within union republics, including Georgia. This means that if an autonomous oblast is liquidated, Article 87 of the USSR Constitution will have to be amended (the name of the autonomous oblast will have to be deleted from it). Amendments to the

Constitution of the USSR, however, are the prerogative of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies.

Therefore, there is no question that the liquidation of an autonomous oblast is the object of a joint decision by the union republic and the USSR. After the union republic decides to liquidate an autonomous oblast, the corresponding amendment must be made in the USSR Constitution.

During the consideration of the matter, the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR will agree or disagree with the union republic's decision to liquidate the autonomous oblast.

In the first case the matter will be settled and the decision will be final.

In the second case, the decisions of the union republic and USSR will conflict. In these cases, according to historical precedent, the decision of the union republic should prevail (Article 77).

The fact is that if the union republic is a sovereign state, as the Constitution of the USSR says, this state should make its own decisions on its own national-state structure. Decisions on these matters are its internal affair, and no one should be able to intervene without the republic's consent. This was the rule during the early period of Soviet national-state construction, and after the union had been established the union republics made independent and final decisions on the creation or liquidation of their own autonomous units. Union organs did not intervene in these affairs because the union republics did not delegate these rights to the USSR. The USSR treaty does not envisage this. The Constitution of 1924 did not legitimize it either. The Constitution of 1924 mentioned autonomous entities only in connection with their representation in union organs.

The situation changed in 1936, when the second (Stalin's) Constitution of the USSR empowered the union to approve the creation of new autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts in the union republics. The same procedure was stipulated in the Constitution of 1977 and, as I have already said, is still in force today, but it cannot be considered valid, because it restricts the sovereign rights of the union republic without any legal grounds and contradicts the fundamental union treaty, which is still in force for the Soviet Union today and which is higher than the Constitution of the USSR by its legal nature (although this treaty is not binding either for the present Georgian Republic).

Therefore, it is clear that in the conflict mentioned above, preference has to be given to the union republic. By the terms of the union treaty, the union republic's decision to liquidate its own autonomous unit must be followed by the amendment of Article 87 of the USSR Constitution. Otherwise, it will be a pointless and invalid

statute. Even if these amendments are not made, however, the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the sovereign Georgian Republic will remain in force anyway.

The demand for the liquidation of autonomous status is a sign that the public associates the escalating friction with the national-state structure of the republic. We must admit that it has not been misled by its perceptions. The two matters are closely related. It is probable that incidents of such heightened inter-ethnic enmity have never occurred before in Georgia's centuries-long history. The traditional national-state structure of Georgia played an important role in this. It corresponded to the interests of the Georgian people and the other people living within the territory of Georgia and secured their normal and peaceful joint existence.

The South Ossetian conflict has grown beyond local boundaries, and it is already clear that it poses a threat to the common interests of all the Georgian people. Each Georgian will have to give this matter serious consideration. It naturally concerns all of the nationalities living in Georgia.

When the present situation is being analyzed, we must not forget the socioeconomic essence and cultural aspects of this extremely complex problem.

The creation of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was an infringement of the interests of the Georgian population of Samachablo, Sapalavando, and the Ksani fiefdom. Matters reached the point at which the Georgians became an "ethnic minority" in their own native land. One report compiled in the autonomous oblast actually says that "the ethnic minorities in South Ossetia are Georgians, Armenians, Jews, Russians, and others."

The Georgian population is still in a pitiful position in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast today. The personnel policy conducted in South Ossetia provides evidence of this. An analysis indicates that the proportional number of representatives of the Georgian population on the party, soviet, and economic administrative staff of South Ossetia is lower than the proportional number of Georgians in the oblast population and that there are clear signs of an Ossetian ethnocracy. Here are a few examples to prove this.

According to the 1989 census, 29 percent of the population of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast is Georgian and 66.2 percent is Ossetian. According to 1990 data, 34 of the 140 people on the party staff were Georgians, and 85 were Ossetians. On the staff of the party obkom itself, there were only 6 Georgians and 29 Ossetians.

Ossetians occupy 176 of the 227 positions in the machinery of state, and Georgians occupy 49.

Ossetians occupy 1,500 of 2,408 positions in the service sphere, and Georgians occupy 631.

Ossetians occupy 174 of the 226 official staff positions in the trade sphere, and Georgians occupy 32. In other words, there are clear signs of a genuine Ossetian ethnocracy.

The composition of art and cultural establishments in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast is the following: The oblast has 109 clubs, 153 libraries, two museums, one art academy, two art schools, one music academy, two music schools, the Ossetian and Georgian dramatic theaters, an art gallery, etc. The head of the oblast cultural department and all five rayon department heads are Ossetian. The directors and academic administrators of the Tskhinvali art and music academies are also Ossetian. In general, 77.5 percent of the officials of cultural bodies, educational establishments, theaters, concert halls, and entertainment enterprises are Ossetian.

The Georgian population of South Ossetia essentially has no chance to develop the Georgian culture or to use its own native language, which is the official state language of the republic, freely in all spheres of life. The Georgian culture is being victimized, Georgian historical monuments are being vandalized, and ancient Georgian place names are either being distorted or changed. It is noteworthy that there is not a single Ossetian cultural monument within the territory of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. All of the historical monuments and place names are Georgian. In spite of this, no conditions exist for the continued development of the Georgian culture or for the proper study of existing Georgian historical monuments. Georgian language and literature and the history of Georgia are not included in the subject matter of the South Ossetian Research Institute of the Georgian Academy of Sciences: This has contributed to the uncontrolled spread of anti-Georgian propaganda and the falsification of past and present history. The absolute majority of the oblast population has no idea of the actual situation in this area. Only one of the 32 lecturers and instructors at the Tskhinvali Institute of Advanced Training for Teachers is Georgian, and this creates serious problems in the training of teachers for Georgian schools.

The South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast now has 145 general educational schools—47 Georgian, 36 Ossetian, five Russian, three Georgian-Ossetian, three Georgian-Russian, 45 Russian-Ossetian, and six Georgian-Russian-Ossetian.

I also have to say that there are two types of schools in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast: The first is the type in which only the Ossetian language and literature are taught in the Ossetian language from the 1st through the 11th grades and all remaining subjects are taught in Russian; the second is the type in which all subjects are taught in Ossetian in the primary grades (1st through 4th), after which the Ossetian language and literature are taught in Ossetian and all other subjects are taught in Russian from the 5th grade on. The Georgian language is not used in either type. In other words, Russian is the

practical (and actual) language of instruction in 90 of the 145 schools in the autonomous oblast. This means that instruction in the so-called Ossetian schools in the Georgian Republic is conducted in the same way as instruction in similar schools in the RSFSR, with a total disregard for the constitutional requirements of the sovereign republic. All of this is intended to Russify the Ossetian population, and this is regrettably promoted by the clearly tendentious (to put it mildly) segment of the Ossetian intelligentsia that is guided primarily by personal ambition.

I would also like to report on the additional funds that were allocated to the South Ossetian Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies from the republic budget in 1979-1989. The supplementary funds over these 10 years totaled 10,099,300 rubles.

These, my respected friends, are the basic findings of the abovementioned commission.

The Bolshevik annexation of 1921 destroyed the Georgian state government and turned our country into part of the communist totalitarian empire. The territorial integrity of Georgia began to be violated from the very first days of Sovietization when a third of our territory was given away to neighboring countries, and illegal autonomous entities were created on the rest of the territory and are still putting a heavy burden on Georgia.

By the terms of international law, it is completely impermissible for one country to create any kind of autonomous units on the territory of another country without considering the wishes of most of the population or to give away most of this country's territory to a foreign, non-native population for the creation of an autonomous unit without any kind of referendum or plebiscite. For this reason, the creation of illegal autonomous units on Georgian territory by the expansionist Bolshevik empire should be viewed as a violation of universally acknowledged international legal standards and as an international crime. All of this is illustrated superbly by the example of the creation of the so-called South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, when the historical Samachablo, Sapalavando, and Ksani fiefdom were first declared South Ossetia and when an oblast was then created without any consideration for the Georgian population's wishes. The traditional Georgian place names were distorted—Akhalgori was called Leningori, Kornisi was called Znauri, etc.

In 1975 the civilized countries of the world concluded the Helsinki accord. The Helsinki Final Act focused attention on humanitarian issues, especially the rights of ethnic minorities. In particular, the 7th paragraph says that "signatory countries with ethnic minorities within their territory will respect the legal right to equality of the members of these minorities, give them every opportunity to exercise human rights and basic liberties, and thereby defend their interests in this sphere."

Although the Ossetians represent an ethnic minority in Georgia on the level of the whole country, this is not true

of the specific regions, particularly Scythia Karthlia or the so-called South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, where the vicissitudes of history made the Georgians an ethnic minority. This is acknowledged in a report compiled in so-called South Ossetia in 1929. Therefore, the violation of the rights of Georgians, their oppression, and the discrimination against them in this region are encroachments upon the rights of an ethnic minority and should be viewed as a violation of the Helsinki accord and other international laws. No one is violating the rights of the Ossetians living in various parts of Georgia. No one is oppressing them, and no one is causing them to suffer indignities for ethnic reasons.

Because the main goal of the transition period we declared was the elimination of the results of annexation, we should concentrate first on restoring the territorial integrity of Georgia, which was violated by the annexation when the so-called South Ossetian autonomous unit was created illegally in Scythia Karthlia as a result of Bolshevik totalitarianism and the unrelenting authoritarianism of Stalinism.

In line with everything I have said, it is our firm conviction that the protection of the rights of the Georgian population now representing an ethnic minority in historical Scythia Karthlia can only be guaranteed fully and reliably by the complete liquidation of the so-called South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast, to preclude encroachments upon Georgia's territorial integrity and the continued escalation of inter-ethnic friction in this region, stemming from the creation of the so-called South Ossetian "sovereign Soviet republic" and the organization of the unconstitutional elections. In connection with this and in line with everything I have said, I am proposing the complete elimination of the so-called South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. I also have to say that this will satisfy the requests of the population of Scythia Karthlia and all Georgia and of most of the Ossetians living in Georgia. I also have to say that we will do everything within our power to guarantee the protection of the rights of the Ossetian population of Scythia Karthlia, the thorough development of the Ossetian language, the maintenance of Ossetian schools, and the preservation of broad cultural autonomy.

I am asking you to support the bill on the liquidation of the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast and approve the corresponding amendments to the constitution.

Long live united and indivisible, independent and democratic Georgia!

Central Asia

Kazakhs Petition Gorbachev for Aid, Political, Economic Sovereignty

91US0107A Alma-Ata QAZAQ ADEBIYETI in Kazakh
21 Sep 90 pp 1,2

[Article by Azilkhon Nurshayygov, Kazakh SSR people's writer: "Four Requests to Comrade Gorbachev"]

[Excerpts]

Honored USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich! We were waiting for you to come to Kazakhstan during the latter half of June. But you did not come. We planned to submit to you four requests in the name of the Kazakh people when we met you. Now we are sending them to you via the newspaper QAZAQ ADEBIYETI.

It is clear that a place where one is born and raised is a little fatherland, close to the soul, and thought about warmly. You were born in the Stavropol region; I was born in Kazakhstan, in Semey Oblast. But it is well known that each person is drawn to the place where he was born, has a fondness for it. I to be sure wish those from my area well, and hope that my kinsmen are in good health and that all are happy. I think that you feel the same way as well.

But the place where I was born, my little fatherland, has encountered disaster, and is today in a very bad state. Comrade President! The adults have fallen to incurable diseases, the children are born defective, crippled. Livestock, even the heartiest, die and lose the qualities bred into them. The surface of the earth gapes like the skeleton of a dead animal after the spring thaw. The water is poison; the soil, dust; and the air, death. Is this not a calamity for my homeland?

Only recently (21 June of this year) this was written about in the press: "The rate of increase in the incidence of environmental illnesses in Semey Oblast is now much higher than the average rate for Kazakhstan. Among them, the incidence of circulatory illnesses has increased two times since 1970... Every third child born in the oblast is either born dead or defective. (I repeat, every third child born in the oblast is either born dead or defective.) Among them, the birth of children with internal defects has increased 7.3 times during the last 10 years. In Abay, Besqaragay and Zhangasemey rayons located near the test area, basic human cell immunity has decline 1.5-2 times."

From where has this calamity for my homeland come? We all know where, but we could not open our mouths to say so. But let us say it, to be sure timidly, looking over our shoulders (this is a custom left over from the time of Stalin), whispering so no one may hear. This is because "God hears what is whispered." We have been afraid of telling the truth. We have gritted our teeth and been unable to communicate to others the grief which fills our souls: we have had to control our thoughts and lock our tongues. We now tell our tale, encouraged by democracy and glasnost. Now we can state openly the source of the disaster, fearing no one. The calamity has come from the test area, spewing death into the environment. The whole world now knows this. Kazakhs and Russians, Uighurs, and representatives of all the nationalities living in the area are demanding that the test area be shut down, to protect their own lives and the lives of later

generations. They beg on bended knee, appealing to the entire world. Our president, comrade N.A. Nazarbayev, has made specific suggestions on closing the test area from the honored rostra of two all-union forums. Olzhas Suleymenov, distinguished son of the Kazakh people, president of the most honorable and greatest movement in the world, has repeated the suggestion again and again, not letting the issue die. In addition, the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet has passed a resolution approving the proposal...

But, as Abay, the great poet of our people, has said: "An old rock...is a rock. You never see it suddenly shift position." Our bitter desires, grown out of this tragedy which troubles our souls, have not reached the ears of many of our great honorable leaders.

We are hopeful with each step of the government, and pray for a just decision. In the second half of June, an order of N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, was issued setting forth additional measures for the economic and social development of Semey Oblast. It was stated in the order that **two hospitals and one maternity facility were to be assigned to the rayons of Semey Oblast damaged by the test area, and 23,000 tons of sugar and 1700 tons of confections released.** This is indeed help. We are thankful to Ryzhkov for the candy and other things sweet to the taste of wretched children still unaware of the kind of dangers they have been exposed to.

Thus our first request to you is connected with this. In the name of my people, I send a hopeful note to you, the honored president of our country! I appeal to you, as creator of a nuclear-free world, and show my respect. You have made an heroic step intended to turn the world in a new direction. It will never be forgotten. Now the time has come for you to make a new heroic step in the direction of closing the nuclear test area situated directly in our homeland, in the center of the Saryarqa, in the land of Abay.

In this connection I would like to ask you the following question. Mikhail Sergeyevich, are we the Kazakh people, or are we not? Is Kazakhstan a nation, or is it not? If we are a nation, they why do you pay no heed to our weeping, why do you forget it?

We have been waiting for a long time for you to come to Kazakhstan. We have waited before, and we have waited this year. But you have not come! Perhaps you have no taste anymore for what is on Kazakh tables. Is that so?

Honorable Mikhail Sergeyevich! It is no secret to anyone that our former rulers, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, came to Kazakhstan with extended palms saying: "Give, give!" "Give grain and meat, raw materials and metals, give wool and eggs!" they said. But Stalin did not come. He hid behind the walls of the Kremlin and only sent out his orders to "give." Today we say that the era of new thinking, of new development, is upon us. We hope now that Gorbachev will, instead of saying "give," like

former leaders, say "receive" instead. Take sovereignty! Become free economically! That is what I hope he will say.

There is a Kazakh proverb: "The hand which has received, gives." Now we will not remain debtors in the face of your most honored expressions of "receive!" We will provide all the grain, meat and raw materials we can to our country and state at mutually beneficial prices. That is the kind of people we are. The various presidents have conducted large conferences about this. Clear evidence was the festive first meeting of the chiefs of the Central Asian republics in Alma-Ata this summer arranged by our president, N.A. Nazarbayev. I think it unnecessary to say anything more about our president in this context. Comrade N.A. Nazarbayev is honestly respected not only by the Kazakh people, but by all the people living in our broad republic. They have complete confidence in him. We wish him success, as he thinks about the fate of his native land, in his energetic struggle waged tirelessly to obtain Kazakh SSR sovereignty.

Today many people are still left outside of the touted democracy promised by the high leadership. We rejoice saying that if our people gets democracy in its hands the nation can begin to speak freely and to breathe deeply. However, the best democracy in a land without order turns into the worst sort of anarchy. For five years we have been passing the time with neither state nor party democracy. We have not been living, but merely passing the time. Respect for the law has been destroyed. As a result, the nation has been flooded with every kind of dissolute wastel, egomaniacs, strikers and big-talkers. People cannot leave their houses at night. People do not work. They go to their industries and organizations, pass the time and come home. It is not freedom which predominates in the nation, but license. In the beginning, Mikhail Sergeyevich, we supported what was going on and called it the revolution of Perestroika. But Perestroika has turned out to be nothing more than a song of passing popularity. It has become unending, unyielding confusion. It would be better if Perestroika did not develop as a grief long afflicting the soul of the people. There is no meat, no milk, no clothing. The people have begun to grow weak. Who needs such a revolution?

In truth, our government has completely forgotten about such weighty questions as the up and down sides of a market economy, the friendship and fraternal feelings among the peoples, and ethics and aesthetics of relationships between nationalities. We take incidents in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Khirgizistan and Lithuania as clear evidence.

I think it my duty to tell you about all of this, Mr. President, in your capacity as first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In addition, this is not the first letter I have sent to you.

I sent a letter to you in 1987 in connection with a well-known resolution of the CPSU Central Committee about Kazakhstan. After going through various channels,

my letter reached you. In my letter I begged that the two very harsh words "Kazakh nationalism" be stricken from the resolution in question. You paid heed to my request, and the request of thousands of other Kazakh communists, to persons not in the party, and to the request of comrade N.A. Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee and republic president, in particular. The words about nationalism in the resolution were stuck out by a decision of the Politburo. A blemish was removed from the face of our people. I thank you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, for that.

However, this boon was published in the "Proceedings of the CPSU Central Committee" only. The words blackening our name, and the name of our people, were first published in all newspapers of the Soviet Union. Is it thus justice that the correction was published in the pages of one publication only?

Thus, as a result, inhabitants of many areas consider Kazakhs nationalists to this day. It is unfortunate that this view was taken of me, a veteran, in Armenia in particular. This attitude is clear to behold in the letter written by 50 Kazakh soldiers serving in the army in the Far East to the republic president and published in LENINSHIL ZHAS. It is clear that there are even cases where commanders insult Kazakhs for nationalism. Be that as it may, what do you say to kolkhoz member Rawshan Imanghaliyeva standing weeping holding the bones of her only son. She lives in Aqkol village in Zhambyl Oblast and wrote recently to QAZAQ ADEBIYETI. Does this not show degeneration in the army? How can such an army defend the people? I ask you, as president, to show some concern about these things.

As I complete my civic words directed at you, I repeat: The Kazakh people have four basic requests of you as president: 1) Help us close the Semey Test Area spewing death into the environment; 2) Be our mediator for the Aral and aid us in restoring it; 3) Take stock of earthquake damage in Eastern Kazakhstan Oblast, and by presidential action organize all union assistance to the people left out in the open there; 4) Give political and economic sovereignty to Kazakhstan. This is all we need.

Kazakhs Should Reclaim Their Heritage

91US0105A Alma-Ata LENINSHIL ZHAS in Kazakh
28 Sep 90 p 3

[Article by Professor Zhanuzaq Qasymbayev, chief of the Kazakh SSR History Department of the Abay imeni Kazakh State Pedagogical Institute: "How Much Kazakh Land Have They Robbed"]

[Text] It is wonderful that perestroyka, exchanges of views and freedom of speech gain a better foothold with each passing day. This being the case, there is not a little information in various articles published in the pages of the press from time to time making the peoples of our nation aggressive towards one another, weakening trust, and complicating relations between nationalities. What some writers have agonized and lamented about is the

broad Kazakh land. The aim of such articles published one after the other is to create animosity among the Kazakh, Russian and other peoples living together in our republic, and to rob ancestral Kazakh land. Some individual writers with poison pens even propose giving some regions of the Kazakh lands, as if they did not belong to the Kazakh people at all, to a neighboring, large union republic.

Just recently readers have found out about the content of a large article entitled "How to Restructure Our Russia" in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, protector of the interests of youth (the 18th of the present month). Foreign and Soviet readers have repeatedly rejoiced at the special works, based upon his own research, of A.I. Solzhenitsyn, Nobel Prize laureate, a leading thinker and writer of our times, now resident in the United States. We have read with much interest one of Solzhenitsyn's valuable works, an article by the great writer on Russian perestroyka offered to the All-Union Komsomol press. The writer has not forgotten Kazakhstan, and we have devoted special attention to the section entitled "On Kazakhstan." "Since the nomadic tribes pass through only once a year, we have not been giving proper attention to the problem of how to draw the boundaries of Kazakhstan when they do so."

That the writer should speak of nomadic tribes is understandable, to be sure. It is well known that up until the November Revolution Kazakhs were despised as the "Khirgiz-Kazakhs," "the Khirgiz," "the border people" and the "aboriginal savages" by Czarist rulers, and by officials of governmental administrations controlling colonialism. All the metals listed by the Mendeleyev Periodic Table were found in the vast lands stretching in the north from Kokshe, in the south extending up to Central Asia, in the East stretching from the Altay, and in the west including a portion of the Caspian Sea. The area was also rich in oil, in coal, and in ferrous and non-ferrous metals. Was not everything to be found in that rich world which drew the eye with its swaying forests and lakes with abundant fish? One would have to look repeatedly at the map of the world to find such a wonderful country. However, has not the richness of our land and the traditional hospitality of our people become a misfortune? When we hear those who now make demands saying: "this land does not belong to the Kazakhs; they do not pasture their flock in it; it does not pertain to their animal husbandry," those whom we have taken to ourselves, who live in our land in many large cities full of industrial establishments, we are amazed and look back at history.

The taking of portions of the Kazakh lands can be traced back to the emergence of Russian-Kazakh settlements in the northeast and Oral regions during the 18th and 19th centuries. But did life in the present territories of Kazakhstan begin in the 18th and 19th centuries? Not going too far back into the past, let us look at the 14th and 15th centuries, the time when the Kazakh people and the Kazakh khanate took shape. The fact that the Kazakhs

emerged as a people during that period is a known fact, and has been entirely proven by national and foreign historians.

It was no accident that division of the Kazakh people into three hordes, along with the nomadic territories and residences of the tribes and clans forming part of the hordes, did not fundamentally change, but rather preserved the geography and toponymy. The Great Horde basically comprised the Syrdariya and Zhetisu region, the Middle Horde, central Kazakhstan and northeastern Kazakhstan, the Little Horde, the Aral basin, the lower flow of the Syrdariya and the northern Caspian littoral. Looked at in terms of present territorial divisions, the Qongyrat tribe, one of the basic ethnic components of the Kazakh Khanate, lived in the Turkistan and Qaratau region, the Argyn occupied central Kazakhstan, the Ertis basin and the western part of the Zhetisu, the Kerey lived in the Ertis and Zhetisu region from the Altay-Tarbaghatay and Zaysan to the Gomi and Tobyl Rivers, the Dulat occupied the Shu, the Ile, the Talas and southern Kazakhstan. Judging from the information of the medieval author Rashid ed-Din, the Zhalayyr tribe migrated in the Karatau area, and the Alimuly, Bayuly, Zhetiru and other tribes and clans within the Little Horde. Historical-geographical information localizing these and many other Kazakh tribes is shown clearly on maps published by members of the pre-revolutionary Russian Geographical Society.

Our authors, whose knowledge of Kazakh history is limited, and who adjust the map of the Kazakh people according to their likes, make known their own deceit when they say: "Is it possible that the Kazakhs could ever have held such broad, rich territory solely through their pastoralism?" To be sure, famous Kazakh writers such as Abish Kekilbayev, Ilyas Yesenberlin, Mukhtar Maghawin and others have well characterized in their historical novels the peculiarities of the life of nomadic peoples, and the sensitivity of that life to natural disaster. We have heard many times the question: "Where did your ancestors find water for their thousands of livestock?" Supplying water to livestock was a difficult problem in the steppe areas of central, western, northern and eastern Kazakhstan, where nomadic pastoralism was the rule. To be sure, Kazakhs put special effort into solving this question in the steppe regions through collective effort. They dug special wells of from 3-10 up to 100 meters deep in desert areas. As Kazakh researchers N. Masanov, M. Tursynova and others have shown, the first question to be resolved when tribes returned each year to their summer pastures was the cleaning of old wells, and likewise the digging of new. Some 200 to 600 new wells had to be dug each year, in just the Manggystau alone. But for that reason the nomadic Kazakhs were not obligated to move in their migrations along the Ertis, Ile, Yesil, Emby, Oral and other rivers. Their migration with difficulty over hundreds of versts a season from the Russian empire in the west, into steppe areas bordering on the Khanate of Siber in the north, and the peoples of the Altay in the East, was

connected, among other things, with the need to provide their flocks with water. According to the information of distinguished researcher A. Levshin, there were 20,000 sheep, 400-500 camels and 8-9,000 horses in the hands of individual Kazakh beys.

To follow up A.I. Solzhenitsyn's ideas, until 1936 Kazakhstan was an autonomous republic, part of the Russian Federation. Later it became a union republic. It was formed from southern Siberia, the southern Oral region and steppe and central rayons. Those who gave birth to the republic and renewed it were Russians, migrant peoples and others. This naked lie completely concocted out of nothing will be nothing new to our readers. We were shocked when we read a similar, quite uncritical conclusion in an article by V.I. Kozlov in *ISTORIYA SSSR* No 1, 1990, to the effect that: "one component of the territorial space of the Kazakh people was in the hands of the Oral and Zhetisu Cossacks." In truth, were not the northeastern and western portions of Kazakhstan, the Zhetisu, the Oral and Siberia not the possessions of the Kazakhs? To give a full, open answer to this question we must in fact devote attention to what the political conditions have been for Russian and Kazakh connections, and for the establishment of urban and village life in Kazakhstan.

It is well known that during the reign of Czar Peter I attention was continually being given to the steppe of the "Khrgiz-Qaysaq" in the east, and that the czar's policy had the character of a "key and gate" system, to open a gate towards the east for him. During the first quarter of the 18th century, the situation of the Kazakh hordes was made difficult due to the need to constantly be on the defense against the attacks of the Zhongghar. It is well known that Czar Peter I sought to present himself as the one defending them from that danger. The expedition headed by prince A. Bekovich-Cherkasskiy, sent by Peter I to the Khiwa khanate via the Kazakh khanate during the years 1715-1717 failed to reach its goal. The expedition ended unsuccessfully after some research of the area around the Aral Sea.

During the years 1714-1720, Peter I turned towards the establishing of direct relations with the independent Kazakh khanate. The primary reason was that he needed natural resources to end the war with Sweden victoriously. Secondly, he had decided to erect a number of fortresses along the Ertis to guarantee the carrying out of his eastern policy. Prince M.P. Gagarin, governor of Siberia, who had achieved the 1708 establishment of Russian control over southern and western Siberia, played a leading role in carrying out the Czar's plans.

Judging by surviving sources, and even topographical data, no Kazakh families whatever and not an inch of Kazakhstan's land were part of the region under the governor's control. This fact has been forgotten for some reason by those loudly proclaiming that "the northeastern part of Kazakhstan belongs to Russian Siberia." Continuing our story, the bastions of Yamyshevsk, Zhelezinsk, Kolbasinsk, Semey, Koryakovsk (Pavlodar)

and Oskemen to be sure played a recognized role in defending the Kazakhs from the Qalmaqs during the years of the "great calamity." However, these bastions did not exist in the territories of the Siberian administration, but in regions where the Kazakh tribes migrated, on the right bank of the Ertis with its abundant waters for the Kazakh people. Something which must be mentioned is that the Siberian governor's administration (center, Tobolsk city, founded in 1587) took into consideration the fact that the new bastions were found within territories owned by Kazakh feudalists, and that this might create ill will on the part of the Kazakh sultans and khans. In 1716 the prince, M.P. Gagarin (hanged in December 1721 in Peterburg at the orders of Peter for greed), on his own authority sent Ivan Zlobin to Khan Tawke. Zlobin requested that the khan not oppose construction of new bastions by the Russian government in the Kazakh steppe.

It is true that the voluntary entry into the Russian empire of the Little Horde on October 10, 1731, and (in the 1740s) of a portion of the Middle Horde, was a key event in the history of the Kazakh people. However, after the death in 1745 of Galdan-Tseren, the famous Zhongghar general and statesman, the Zhongghar declined. The threat to Kazakhstan passed. The rulers of Russia, knowing how to use this circumstance in their own interests, strove to concentrate Russian settlers gradually in the Kazakh lands, and, in particular, to bring eastern Kazakhstan, famous for its non-ferrous metals, directly under their control. Envious eyes were cast upon mines rich in non-ferrous metals, and as early as 1747 the industries of famous factory owner Demidov and others were nationalized. In the regions of eastern Kazakhstan, the Altay and Tarbaghatay, pressure began to be exerted upon the Kazakh tribes migrating in their own lands. But destruction of the Kazakh tribes which had lived in this rich land for tens of centuries as they carried out their migrations, in the way that the European settlers completely pushed out and eliminated the inhabitants of America, the Indians, proved no easy task. The only way was colonialism. A plan was set in motion to build fort barriers, one after the other in the traditional lands of Kazakh migration. The situation of the forts newly built in the 1750s was as follows: Three barriers of forts were built in the area reaching from the Ertis to the Altay. The first comprised the lands from the Siberian redoubt to the bastion of Omby. It was called the "bitter" barrier (Golkaya liniya), due to the many salt lakes along the line's 553 versts (1 verst is 1.0668 km) of length. The second extended from the Omby bastion along the right bank of the Ertis to the Malonarym bastion. Its length was 1684 versts. It was called the Ertis Line. The third extended from the Oskemen basin along the western part of the Altay, up to the Kolyvan mines and the Kuznetsk bastion. The length of the line was 723 versts. It was called the Kolyvansk Line. Establishment of the Petropavl bastion in 1752 provided a basis for controlling Kazakh tribes migrating along the Yesil river, and for the colonization of that area. The New Yesil line, later continued with other bastions, was comprised of 9

sub-forts and 53 redoubts. Hastily constructed forts in northwestern Kazakhstan along a 540-verst front were connected to the Ertis Line. To suppress Kazakh hostility, the Czarist government concentrated 2,518 Bashqurt, two regiments of dragoons, 800 Cossack troops and one squadron of regular army troops in the New Yesim [sic] Line. During this period the Krasnogorskaya Range (the Krasnogorskaya, Verkhnoozernaya, Ilinskaya and Gubernlinskaya bastions) was constructed and the Orsk military line (Orskaya, Tanalytskaya, Urtamyshskaya bastions) developed.

The lines of bastions delimited the pastures where the Kazakhs had migrated for centuries. Tribes subject to Czarist pressure for their lands came into conflict and hostility. Oppression of the Kazakh owners of the land only then began to be carried out in a systematic manner. On the one hand, the most fertile and richest lands were taken away from the Kazakhs. On the other, farmers began to be brought in from Siberia, and from Russia proper, and settled with the purpose of providing provisions, grain in particular, for the Russian settlers who had begun to increase in numbers in the bastions and in areas nearby, and for the military garrison. In 1760 a special decision was made by the Legislative Senate on the settlement by Russians in the Buqtarma River valley below the Oskemen bastion, and further in the region up to Lake Tolewit, likewise in the valleys of the Ulba, Berezhovka, Glybokaya and other rivers feeding into the Ertis. In 1762 permission was given to the Old Believers (ruskiye starovery), who had fled from Russia to Poland on account of one-time religious persecution, to return to their homeland. Since they were supposedly unable to find a place in the broad Russian territories, permission was given to them to settle in the above-mentioned Altay region of Kazakhstan. The first Altay settlements of the "polyaks" appeared in 1764. The Settlements of Losikha, Skisovka, Shemonaykha, Yekaterininka, Bobrovka, later Malaya Ubinka, Cheremshanka, Tarkhanka and others preserve to this day their toponymy.

Those inhabiting the area, the Syban, Kerey, Karakerey, Nayman, Buranayman, subordinates of Abulfaiz sultan, and the Waq, Qypshaq and other tribes who migrated under the banner of the famous Middle Horde sultan, later khan Abylay, were in no way constrained by the bastions, and preserved their fundamental control over their territories. Abylay, who refused to obey the orders of the Russian officers, functioning as consummate diplomat and statesman, continued trade connections with the forts of Yamyshevsk and Semey, ignoring the proliferating bastions. Some authors who today interpret these historical events in terms other than colonialist pressure from the Czarist government (in eastern Kazakhstan, likewise in the north) claim that there is no specific information about the appearance of Russian settlers in Kazakh lands. What did the Czarist colonialists not do to irritate the Kazakhs? Starting in the 1740s, they settled Cossacks and imprisoned criminals in the Altay and Ertis areas. They even began to turn eastern

and northern Kazakhstan into a region of immigration in order to increase the number of Russians in the rich area.

All of this seemed little enough to the colonialists. The next goal of the Czarist government was to destroy the administrative system of the nomads in Kazakhstan, something which had established itself over the centuries, and to eliminate the customary traditional connections among the tribes and clans through installing a Russian-style government. One shameful method used by the Czarist government to draw Russian settlers into Kazakh lands was the regulations prepared in 1822 by M.M. Speranskiy and ratified by the government. These regulations, put into effect by force and violence in 1824, and during the years 1840-50, harmed thousands of Kazakhs. It caused them to abandon lands utilized by tribal collectives since time immemorial. These measures of the Czarist government, beginning with the Bayanawyl and Qaraqaraly okrugs, and carried out together with the formation of the Altay okrug, played a major role in demoralization of the Kazakh herdsmen, and in the gradually depriving them of their principal basis for life, animal husbandry. Baron Uslar, who was held for four months by Kenesary Qasymov and saw with his own eyes the circumstances of the people who had risen up against the colonialists, characterized the effect these regulations had on the fate of the Kazakh people as follows: ...[in Russian] "These regulations in effect ended completely the freedom once so common in the steppe, and had most ruinous consequences for the entire people (Zh.Q.). Uslar, Baron, "Chetyre mesyatsa v Kirgizskoy stepi ("Four Months in the Khirgiz Steppe") (OTECHESTVENNYYE ZAPISKI No 10, 1848, p 149).

These days, at a time when glasnost and the freedom to exchange views have been achieved, Kenesary Qasymov's movement is a just movement. Qasymov saw the colonialism taking shape in Kazakhstan and organized a forceful struggle for freedom to preserve the traditional life of the people, the song of the villages and the beauty of the land, natural riches and the independence of the Kazakhs. (It would seem as if we have raised a number of questions in issue No 7 of this year's ZHULDYZ.) What we have wanted to tell our readers is not about the events of the uprising, but rather about the diplomatic measures of the leader of the movement, who sensed the danger with which the Kazakh land was threatened, to preserve total Kazakh ownership of their lands, and to protect the region from new settlers.

Up until recent years we have called Kenesary an assassin, a devil, a proponent of feudalistic monarchy. Study of information contained in various archives has shown that Kenesary was utterly opposed to war, that his basic goal was preventing organization of okrug administrations, strengthening colonialism. Let us present extracts from two sources to show how the grandson of Abylay deeply sensed that the establishment of okrugs was the worst thing possible for the Kazakhs. The first is a letter sent by the sultan to the Russian emperor, and the second is a letter to prince Gorchakov, governor-general of Western Siberia. Kenesary's envoys, Zhusip

Zhanqushikov, Aghamberdi Qonysbayev, Toytyq (in one document Tantaq) Duysenov, Qoshymbay Qazanqapov and Tobyldy Tokin, Kazakhs of Bayanawyl and Aqmola okrugs, took the letter to Omby, where it was to be delivered to the governor. However, they were captured near Aqbulaq bastion and imprisoned in Omby. The envoys were later exiled to Siberia through the decision of a military court (I.M.O.A., fund 374, collection 2, item 25, pages 32-42).

The letter to the emperor stated: [in Russian] "...Having violated the previous treaty of peace, your junior commander falsely told your subordinates that if the entire Khirgiz people submitted to Russia, eight divans would be established in places under the control of my late grandfather Ablay. This is extremely unfortunate for our people..." (Ibid, page 14). The letter ends with a request to abolish the divans or okrugs.

The content of the letter sent to the governor-general was substantial, and the document is a weighty one of three pages. Here is a selection. The letter argued that the organization of the above mentioned okrugs ran counter to the interests of the Kazakh people: [in Russian] "...Wishing to be in friendly relations with your excellency, we ask of your excellency (prince Gorchakov, Zh.K.): 1. destruction of the Aktauskoje fort; 2. destruction (of the divan there) and of the Akmolinskiy divan; 3. destruction of all other institutions existing in the steppe; freeing of our people under guard (in prison, Zh.K.). (Ibid, page 16.)

In order to suppress Sultan Kenesary, and the Kazakhs who had gathered under his banner sworn to oppose colonialism, as quickly as possible, the artillery-equipped czarist punitive forces hoped to carry out a policy of Russification through strengthening an okrug administrative system.

Unable to suppress this uprising, which inflamed the Kazakh steppe and lasted for 10 years, the Czarist government made efforts to alter the demographic structure of the population of Kazakhstan. In accordance with regulations ratified by the government in 1846, distribution of land, by desyatina as land property, to Cossacks concentrated in areas taken from the Kazakhs in the rayon of the newly established okrug, and to their families, and to Russian peasants began: each staff officer was allotted 400 desyatinas; each chief officer, 200; each officer of subordinate rank, 30; each parish church, 900; and likewise 4000 for each Cossack hundred. In 1847, additional dispensations were made to new settlers: to maintain their farms each officer was given 100 rubles, and each officer of subordinate rank, 30 rubles in silver. (ZAPISI SEMIPALAT. PODOTDELA. ZAP. SIB. OTDELA RUS. GEOGR. OBSHCH.-A, No VIII, Semipal, 1914, pp 22,25 and 26) Later as the Kazakhs lost power, migrant peasants began to cast their eyes on remaining lands, and they began to pour into the fertile land like locusts, without asking anyone's permission. [in Russian] "They (the Cossacks, Zh.K.) often came without any assistance from the authorities and settled on lands hitherto utilized

by the Khirgiz (Kazakhs, Zh.K.) without any permission." (KMOA, collection 15, list 1, item 472, page 4). When the Kazakhs, seeking justice, made complaints to the Omby Oblast Court, colonialist officials defended the interests of Russian-Cossack peasants.

There were a number of lakes in Kazakhstan, in the western, northern and eastern areas in particular, with high-quality salt. Local authorities, intending to fill up the Kazakh lands with factories and mines, and putting into effect their plans to protect the interests of Russian-Cossack peasants increasing rapidly in numbers, as time went on, drove the Kazakhs from the salt lakes. On February 4, 1849, and June 23, 1860, in accordance with special "regulations" of the Chief Administration for Western Siberia, Kazakhs were strictly prohibited from grazing their livestock or migrating in the vicinity of the lakes. (Altay Region State Archive, collection 3, register 2, item 106, page 8).

In articles without any proof whatever, V. Zhukov in "In the Lenin Family," V. Kozlov in the Journal *ISTORIYA SSSR*, and USSR People's Deputy Vasilyeva in the pages of *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA*, have stirred people up by trumpeting that northeastern Kazakhstan (that is, also the Zhetisu) is not Kazakh land at all, but belongs to Russian peasants and Cossacks. Are these individuals aware of historical facts adduced above, and of thousands of others? To tell the truth of the matter, what would happen if some of our literate contemporaries would remember that both Orynbor and Omby were once portions of the Kazakh feudal state? If we take a look even at administrative-territorial maps of the two oblasts now in use, we find a few examples of the geographical-settlement toponymy of the Kazakhs. Where did these come from? Was it because fraternal Russian residents once took a warm view of neighboring pastoralists? That the steppe oblasts of Orynbor and Omby, and of Kazakhstan, were administrative centers since the 18th century is surely well-known to all literate persons, and to those acquainted with history. There are tens of thousands of our kinsmen who have preserved their native language and customs within the territories of the present Omby and Orynbor oblasts. However, they are not beating the drum calling for annexation of those oblasts by the "great country" (thus Kazakhstan is called). Let us present a piece of early evidence, out of the many we could offer: According to archival information from 1894, the number of Kazakh families living near the forest dachas of Russian noblemen, in rural areas, was 2756 households in 25 villages in the five volosts of Omby uyezd alone. Among them, 5 villages (720 families) were in Omby oblast, 6 villages (515 families) in Pokrovskiy volost, 4 villages (296 families) in Qorghon volost, 6 villages (89) in Nikolayev volost, 4 villages (411) in Chelakovskiy volost. (KOMA, collection 369, register 1, number 847, page 20).

Today the scatterings of Oral Kazakhs do not bother some Russian language-speakers of the republic at all, as they teach that "all the present Oral oblast is land of their own social group." According to the results of the 1897

first census of the Russian empire, the numbers of Oral Kazakh were: males—54,886, females, 59,280, total 114,166. There was a total of 161,514 in 1914. The total population of Oral Oblast in 1897 was 309,149, in 1914, 801,975. The number of so-called Cossacks was considerably fewer than the number of local oblast peoples (mostly Kazakh). Let us look at similar figures for Zhetisu Kazakhs: 1897, 33,755 persons, 1914, 54,350 (males and females together). The total population of Zhetisu Oblast was 663,769 in 1897, and 973,589 in 1914. (Alekseyenko, N.V., *Naseleniye dorevolutsionnogo Kazakhstana* ["Population of Pre-revolutionary Kazakhstan"], Alma-Ata, 1981, pp 55-77). The reason why we have devoted no attention to policies carried out by the colonialist administration during the years 1867-1868, in 1882, and 1891, to drive out Kazakhs and concentrate Russian and Ukrainian peasants in Kazakh land, is that the reader has already heard enough about the dangers to the fate of the Kazakhs.

The whole central idea of the thoughts of the great writer "On Kazakhstan" is very worthy of those others going sleepless as they yearn to rob the Kazakh land. He concludes that "Kazakhs are, according to the census, not even half the inhabitants of the republic." However, this sad state is not the fault of the Kazakh people. In the 1926 census, Kazakhs were more than 60 percent of the population of the autonomous republic. Stalinist night, the great patriotic war and, in particular, "the great agrarian policy of the CP," the mastery of the virgin and reclaimed lands, changed altogether the ethnic composition of the population. Our green "Saryarqa" has been destroyed. Our journalistic colleagues have raised questions about this in the pages of the press. In this regard there are other things which ought to draw the attentions of the people. A hospitable, in truth internationalist Kazakh people has flung its doors open wide, and has not been sparing of land for fraternal peoples. This situation is to be compared to that of a person who has opened his arms, offering shelter to someone seeking housing. It brings to mind situations encountered now and then whereby some one says, after things have gotten a little better, the belly has been filled with food, and a little weight has been put on: "I am the master of this place. Vacate the house; the roof is now mine."

The Declaration of Kazakh SSR State Sovereignty only recently published in the press, as an historical document, suggests new principles for the use of the riches of their lands by the peoples living in the republic, in the interests of the citizens.

One group among the inhabitants of the republic seems to have become disturbed about establishing the Kazakh language as the official language. However, this language is the language of the people who have given their name to the republic, of a people who was not sparing of provisions or of refuge in difficult days, but which has nearly been deprived of its own historical language. It is clear that through continual restraint and mutual tolerance a basis can be created for solving any question. As the proverb says: "Firm self control is like yellow gold."

Threat of Ethnic Cataclysm Seen in Kazakhstan

91US0226A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH
in Russian 19 Dec 90 p 5

[Article by IMA press correspondent Valentin Petrov:
"Kazakhstan: The Storm Approaches"]

[Text] "To the Gulag Archipelago With the Followers of Solzhenitsyn!"—Placards such as this one have frequently been encountered at recent demonstrations in Kazakhstan. Such is the reaction of native inhabitants to the well-known letter of Aleksandr Isayevich about redrawing the boundaries of Russia, which they find offensive to their sensibilities.

Kazakhstan was the first republic where mass disturbances occurred during the period of perestroika. Here, after December 1986, the process of "turning the screws" began in earnest. As a result social unrest sharply diminished. The unresolved problems, however, have not disappeared, and they are now reasserting themselves with new force.

It is clear that the outbreaks of December were not anti-Russian. But the measures that were taken by the republic leadership in response to them spurred the growth of nationalism. Not only were those who were directly involved in the events subjected to repressive measures, but those who responded sympathetically to these events. In the VUZ's [higher educational institutions] quotas were established for accepting Kazakhs. There are numberless other "distortions" in national and social policy for which we are now obliged to pay the price in full.

This fall I left Kazakhstan with a heavy sense of foreboding. It is tragic how people fail to comprehend, or refuse to comprehend, the direction in which the situation is developing.

At a meeting of informal or unaffiliated democrats, a representative of the organization Alash suddenly declared to a woman: "Russian swine! Go back to Russia!" It is indicative of the situation that not a single Kazakh present stopped him. I heard one Russian say: "We fed these Asians, taught them, lifted them up out of neediness, and look at the gratitude we get!" Mutually unjust recriminations and aggressiveness are becoming usual occurrences.

Russians are in the habit of behaving in a patronizing manner towards the native population, regarding them as "little brothers," which cannot please them. Let us not forget that the Kazakhs became a national minority in their republic. Hunger, which followed collectivization, took hundreds of thousands of lives, and half a million people were forced to emigrate.

It is necessary to be mindful as well, however, of the fact that most of the Russians in the republic have lived there many years over two and three generations. There are descendants of Kazakhs who founded Fort Vernyy (now Alma-Ata) as well as of settlers sent by Stolypin at the

start of the century to cultivate the virgin lands. In the north of the republic they form a majority of the population.

The Kazakhstan "informals" have not managed to avoid a split along the usual lines between nationalistic organizations and Interfront. The latter declared in its policy documents that one of its objectives was to establish self-defense units, and although in registering the organization this point was noticeably softened, the same sentiments persist. Today it is primarily the Germans who are leaving Kazakhstan, while the Russians are preparing to resist possible encroachment. Meanwhile, a Kazakh movement is developing in Uralsk and Ust-Kamenogorsk. Will these areas in the near future become a new Karabakh?

An analysis of the situation makes it possible to identify two basic lines of confrontation in the republic: Kazakhs versus the Caucasians, and Kazakhs versus Uzbeks. There are other points of conflict, such as the issue of Uyghur autonomy, for example, but they are not so serious.

There are more than a hundred thousand emigres in the republic from the Caucasus, especially from the Northern Caucasus. During the Stalin years the republic was a place of exile for "guilty peoples," especially the Chechens and Ingush. Some of them remained in Kazakhstan, and then in recent years there has been a new influx of migrants from the Northern Caucasus, driven by unemployment there. These are people of another way of life that is more mobile economically. They are becoming members of entrepreneurial groups engaging in commerce. Their connection with corrupt circles to whom the Kazakh community is forced to pay tribute or protection money naturally does not endear them to the native inhabitants, nor do the large sums of money earned by some of their members.

Apart from that, the Caucasian immigrants are very emotional and hot-tempered, which draws them into frequent altercations and fights. In 1990 there were several clashes on this soil. Residents of Dzhambul'skiy Rayon in Alma-Ata Oblast even passed a resolution at one of their meetings demanding the immediate deportation from the republic of all the Ingush.

Rather tense relations are developing between the Kazakhs and the Uzbeks, the most numerous of the Central Asian peoples. Some Uzbeks accuse the Kazakhs of not following strictly enough the traditions of a nomadic people. There is a saying in Uzbekistan: "If you want to become a Russian, first become a Kazakh." Ideas of pan-Turkism, which have never died out in Asia, are supported by new political figures who would like to form a Turkish state with the Uzbeks playing a leading role.

The consequences of a mass migration by the Karakalpak population from an ecological poverty zone are likewise unpredictable.

I do not wish to be a prophet of bad tidings, but I fear that in the spring serious social upheavals [kataklizmy] may erupt in the republic. The most explosive area in my opinion will be the south of the republic where Kazakhs make up the majority of the population. The problem of lands being arbitrarily seized will become aggravated. (All will recall the tragic situation that developed in Osha.) The northern oblasts may declare their intention to secede from Kazakhstan. It is possible that some other occasion will be found for disturbances.

Much will depend on the considered policy of the republic leadership and on the positions taken by the leaders of the various social movements. Not long ago a majority of the informal groups in Kazakhstan supported a government proposal for all factions to refrain temporarily from public meetings and demonstrations. But how long will this agreement last? Unfortunately, new independent organizations, similar in spirit to the above-mentioned Alash, lack experience in civilized political struggle and are not in the habit of compromising.

Right now schools are being established in the republic with instruction in the medium of the Kazakh language. Where space is not available, in Alma-Ata, for example, existing school buildings are being partitioned into Russian and Kazakh sections, and a chain-link fence runs down the middle of the playground. It will be tragic if the children of these different nationalities, reared behind fences and bars, cannot surmount the wall of distrust.

Kirghiz Government Alters Oblast Names, Divisions

91US0267A *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA*
in Russian 16 Dec 90 p 1

["Law of the Kirghiz SSR on Improvements in the Oblast Division of the Kirghiz SSR and the Formation of New Oblasts"—SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA headline]

[Text] In order to insure unity in the administrative-territorial arrangements in the republic and improve state management and local self-management, and also noting that numerous reorganizations of oblast divisions have been made in the republic on a subjective basis without taking into consideration the interests of the communities that have been formed historically on territories with their economic and cultural centers, the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet resolves as follows:

I. To form the following:

1. Chuyskiy Oblast, made up of Alamedinskiy, Issyk-Atinskiy, Kalininskiy, Kantskiy, Keminskiy, Moskovskiy, Panfilovskiy, Sokulukskiy, and Chuyskiy Rayons and the cities of Kara-Balta and Tokmak, with the center at Frunze City.

2. Dzhahal-Abad Oblast, made up of Ala-Bukinskiy, Bazar-Korgonskiy, Dzhan-Dzholinskiy, Leninskiy,

Suzakskiy, Toguz-Torouskiy, Toktogulskiy, and Chatkalskiy Rayons and the cities of Dzhahal-Abad, Kara-Kul, Kok-Yangak, Mayli-Say, and Tash-Kumyr, with the center at Dzhahal-Abad.

II. To restore the following:

1. Naryn Oblast, made up of Ak-Talinskiy, At-Bashinskiy, Dzhungalskiy, Kochkorskiy, and Tyan-Shanskiy Rayons, with the center at Naryn.

2. Talas Oblast, made up of Kirovskiy, Leninpolskiy, Manasskiy, and Talasskiy Rayons and Talas City, with the center at Talas.

III. To make the following change to the Constitution of the Kirghiz SSR by setting Article 77 in the following edition:

"Article 77. The Kirghiz SSR is made up of Dzhahal-Abad, Issyk-Kul, Naryn, Osh, Talas, and Chuyskiy Oblasts and the city of Frunze."

IV. To assign the president of the Kirghiz SSR, Comrade A. Akayev, to set up an organizational committee to form Chuyskiy and Dzhahal-Abad Oblasts and to restore Naryn and Talas Oblasts.

A. Akayev, president,
Kirghiz SSR
Frunze City, 14 December 1990

Law on Kirghizia Sovereignty Day

91P50084A *Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA*
in Russian 30 Dec 90 p 1

[Law on Kyrgyzstan Republic Day]

[Text] Considering the historic significance of the adoption of the declaration on state sovereignty of the Kyrgyzstan Republic, the Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyzstan Republic resolves: to proclaim December 15, the day the declaration on state sovereignty of the Kyrgyzstan Republic was adopted, Kyrgyzstan Republic Day, and to celebrate it every year as a Kyrgyzstan Republic state public holiday.

A. Akayev, president,
Kyrgyzstan Republic
Frunze, 15 December 1990

Tajik Communist Party Statutes Published

91US0071A *Dushanbe KOMMUNIST*
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 18 Oct 90 pp 1-2

[Text] The Tajik Communist Party is a political organization, voluntarily uniting communists within its ranks for the fulfillment of programmatic goals based on common human values and the communist ideal. Creatively developing the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin, utilizing the achievements of progressive social thinking, supporting internationalism, and defending friendship of the peoples, its goal is to create humane, democratic

socialism in the republic, to ensure conditions for the free, universal development of man.

The Tajik Communist Party expresses and defends the interests of the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and other social strata devoted to the socialist choice, and strives for civil harmony and the consolidation of all nations and nationalities living or working in the republic.

The Tajik Communist Party is a component part of the CPSU, independent in drafting its own programmatic and normative documents based on the fundamental programmatic and statutory principles of the CPSU, in resolving political, organizational, cadre, structural, publishing, financial and economic and other problems, in carrying out party policy in the sphere of state building and the republic's socioeconomic and cultural development. The Tajik Communist Party realizes ties to other, including foreign parties and social movements.

The Tajik Communist Party bases its work on the Programs and Statutes of the CPSU, on its own programmatic documents, and on these Statutes, and all its organizations function within the framework of Soviet law and the constitutions of the Tajik SSR and the USSR.

I. Members of the Tajik Communist Party, Their Rights and Responsibilities

1. A citizen of the USSR, 18 years of age, who acknowledges the programmatic documents and fulfills the statutes of the CPSU and the Tajik Communist Party, working in one of the primary party organizations and materially supporting the party, may be a member of the Tajik Communist Party. A member of the Tajik Communist Party is simultaneously a member of the CPSU.

2. All party members have equal rights. A member of the Tajik Communist Party has the right: to advance and freely discuss questions about internal and external party policy or intraparty life, to participate in decision-making, to enjoy the political support and protection of the party organization in his public activity, to elect and be elected to party bodies, to receive information about their work, to make an assessment of or to criticize any party body or any communist, to address statements and suggestions to any party authority and receive an answer from it, and to participate in the work of a party body when his suggestion or a question of his activity or behavior is being discussed.

A member of the Tajik Communist Party has the right to participate in the work of public organizations and movements whose activity is structured in accordance with the constitutions of the Tajik SSR and USSR and with Soviet laws, and which does not contradict the programmatic goals of the Tajik Communist Party.

A communist cannot be a member of other parties.

3. A member of the Tajik Communist Party is obliged to raise his political and cultural level, to propagandize the

party's ideas, to struggle to achieve its programmatic goals and to ensure its vanguard position in society, to strengthen friendship of the peoples, to consistently implement the party's political line in labor collectives and among the population, to fulfill party resolutions, to pay monthly party membership dues, to serve as an example in labor, and to observe the laws and norms of social morality.

4. Acceptance of a member of the Tajik Communist Party is conducted individually upon application by the prospective member. The decision to accept a party member is made by a meeting of the primary party organization and is final. At the discretion of the primary party organization, a trial period of up to 1 year, as well as the guarantee of two communists, may be established for a person joining the party. The decision of the primary party organization to accept a party member is registered with the Tajik Communist Party gorkom or raykom where, on the basis of his application and a questionnaire, a party card is written out for the new member. In the event that his place of work or residence has no party organization, the procedure for acceptance into the party is determined by the bureau of the party raykom or gorkom.

Former CPSU members who were expelled or drummed out of the party may be accepted into the party again on general grounds, on the subsequent approval of the party meeting's decision by the party raykom or gorkom bureau.

The Tajik Communist Party uses the same procedure for issuing the party card and for registering party members, as the CPSU.

At his wish and with the consent of the primary organization, a communist may be listed on the party registration according to his place of work, study, or residence.

A communist, having been active in the party at least 30 years, may be awarded the honorary title: "Veteran of the CPSU" on a decision by the primary party organization.

If a communist cannot fully participate in party life for reasons of health or age, on the basis of his personal application, the primary party organization then has the right to release him from regular work and the payment of membership dues.

5. Membership in the Tajik Communist Party ends on the initiative of the primary party organization or on a proposal by a higher party body as a consequence of expulsion of a party member from the Tajik Communist Party for actions and behavior incompatible with the requirements of the Statutes of the Tajik Communist Party.

A communist, convicted by a court for a criminal offense, is expelled from the Tajik Communist Party after his sentence goes into legal effect. Membership in the Tajik Communist Party also ends upon a party

member's application for voluntary withdrawal from its ranks, which is examined by the primary party organization.

Expulsion of a member of an elected party body from the party is resolved at the plenum of the corresponding party committee, taking into account the opinion of the primary party organization.

When accepting a member of the Tajik Communist Party, expelling someone from the party, or ending a membership due to a personal application, the decision is considered effective if more than one-half of the communists registered in the corresponding organization voted for it.

For violation of party discipline or the norms of social morality, the party may apply measures of party upbringing and influence in the form of notices and reprimands given to a party member.

A person expelled from the Tajik Communist Party or who has received a penalty has the right to submit an appeal to the party control bodies. The appeal is to be examined within a period of no more than two months from the day of its receipt. The results of examination are reported to the primary party organization and to the person who submitted the appeal.

II. Intra-Party Democracy

6. The Tajik Communist Party lives and functions on the basis of ideological community, party comradeship, and the principle of democratic centralism, which ensures self-management, the combination of the interests of the party and of individual communists, the power of the party masses, and conscious discipline in party life.

The free expression of opinions, different views, the discussion of platforms, and open criticism or self-criticism are ensured in the party. Within the framework of individual organizations and the republic party organization on the whole, discussions and referendums may be held on topical issues of social and party life in the republic and in the country on the initiative of the leading and executive bodies, as well as on a demand by party organizations uniting no less than one-third of the members of the corresponding organization, of the oblast organization, or of the Dushanbe city party organization.

7. All party organizations, beginning with the primary, participate in drafting party policy. They are independent in the arrangement of their internal life and activities. Their decisions, made within the framework of the authorities granted by the Statutes and not contradicting the party's programmatic goals, cannot be revoked by a higher body, with the exception of decisions on personal matters. In the event of disagreements among any of these bodies, the right to resolve the disputed issue is given to the primary party organizations, directly to the communists, or a referendum is held.

8. The work of the republic party organizations and party bodies is based on the principles of collectivism and personal responsibility, ruling out subjectivity, one-man rule and regionalism.

The leading party bodies are the general meeting, conferences, and congresses. They are competent if attended by more than one-half, and during reports and elections, by at least two-thirds of the members of the party organization or of the elected delegates. The leading party bodies elect the executive bodies (bureau, committee) and control bodies (auditing or control commissions).

For the broad involvement of communists in performing party work as non-staff workers by way of public activity, the party bodies form permanent or temporary commissions and elect a nonstaff secretary of the party committee.

The primary party organizations may create clubs and councils of supporters of the Tajik Communist Party from among non-party members.

9. The organizations and elected bodies of the Tajik Communist Party work openly and, in accordance with party resolutions, ensure the openness of party meetings, conferences, congresses, meetings of executive and control bodies, the participation of the party press in them, the publication of drafts of documents, meeting records, resolutions, and other materials. The party committees and bureaus must report to the communists no less than once a year and must systematically inform the higher party bodies about their activity. A communist has the right to attend the meetings of the bureau or party committee of his primary organization. Members of an elected party body have free access to the meetings of the bodies subordinate to them, as well as the right to utilize documents found at the disposal of the party body and its apparatus.

10. The leading executive and control bodies (besides the meeting) of the Tajik Communist Party are elected. They are elected through secret vote. Any number of candidates may be included on the ballot for the secret vote. During the elections, a party member has the right to nominate candidates without restriction, including himself. The candidate who collects more than one-half the votes of the party members participating in the voting at the meeting, conference, congress, or plenum of the party committee, auditing or control commission is considered elected.

Delegates to rayon, city, and oblast conferences, to the Tajik Communist Party congress, and to the all-union conferences and congresses of the CPSU are elected with the mandatory nomination of candidates by the primary party organizations, as a rule, through the direct vote of the communists.

The corresponding party committee determines the procedure for the election of party committees and control

bodies and of delegates to the conferences and congresses on the basis of the decisions of the primary party organizations.

The primary party organizations have the right to submit suggestions for candidacies in the higher party bodies, which are examined by the conference or congress forming said bodies. The party committees and auditing or control commissions may also be elected via the direct delegation of representatives by lower-ranking organizations, which have the right to recall their own representatives.

11. Members of elected bodies in the party at the level of raykom or higher may be elected to the same post no more than two terms in succession. A party member cannot be on more than two party committees or auditing or control commissions. The membership of the party executive or control bodies can be renewed or re-elected in full before the expiration of their terms. This matter is examined on the demand of party organizations, uniting no less than one-third of the members of the corresponding organizations, or on the application by an individual or by all members of the elected body for voluntary retirement. Between congresses and conferences, the membership of an elected body may be renewed directly at plenums on the grounds of recommendations made by the primary party organizations.

Party committee secretaries at all levels and the chairmen of auditing or control commissions are elected, simultaneously being elected members of these bodies, at the corresponding meetings, conferences and congress, or on the discretion of delegates to the plenums of party committees or meetings of auditing or control commissions. They are accountable to the corresponding party committee or auditing or control commission, and may be registered with any party organization. During the election of party committee secretaries and chairmen of auditing or control commissions in conferences or congresses, the procedure for their subsequent dismissal and election in the period between conferences or congresses is determined. Election to membership in an elected body is allowed for communists who are not on the registration of the given party organization.

12. Party committees and auditing or control commissions are responsible to the party organizations which formed them. Each member of an elected body reports on his work to the party organization which elected or recommended him.

13. In making decisions, the party organizations and their bodies should consider all points of view. The resolution passed by the majority is mandatory for all. The minority has the right to support its position in the party meetings, conferences, congresses, and meetings of executive and control bodies and in the party mass information media, to give co-reports, to record a particular opinion in the minutes, and to demand the repeated examination of debatable issues in their own organization or in higher bodies.

In party committees, auditing or control commissions, and in their bureaus and presidiums, in the event of the appearance of disagreements, the draft of the decision is submitted for repeated discussion and is passed by a majority of no less than two-thirds of the votes.

The decisions of congresses, conferences and meetings are mandatory for the party organizations. In the preparatory stage, the decisions of committees and bureaus are discussed in the party organizations affected by them, and are mandatory after being passed.

14. During their terms of authority, the elected bodies of the Tajik Communist Party create a working apparatus subordinate to them, which basically performs information and analytical, forecasting, sociological, and consulting services. The party apparatus is formed on the recommendations of the primary party organizations. Labor legislation applies to the employees of the party apparatus.

15. Party organizations and committees have the right to publish newspapers and journals, bulletins, and propagandistic, reference and other materials with their own funds or jointly with other organizations, to form the appropriate editorial boards, as well as to create television and radio broadcasting studios. The party mass information media are bodies of the party organizations and committees, and their leaders are elected at the corresponding party meeting, conference, congress, or plenum of the party committee. The republic party information media are obligated to publish statements and addresses on the demand of the oblast, city or rayon party organization, and the local press must publish the corresponding documents of the primary organizations.

III. Organizational Structure of the Tajik Communist Party

16. The Tajik Communist Party is structured according to territorial and industrial features. The primary organizations, territorially united and created according to the communists' places of work, study, or residence, form the foundation of the party. The structure of the Tajik Communist Party also includes rayon, city and oblast party organizations.

Councils of party organization secretaries, party clubs, theoretical seminars, discussion centers, councils of party veterans, and other forms for uniting communists according to their interests and problems may be created and operate on the initiative of communists. Not being primary party organizations and being based on the programmatic formulations of the Tajik Communist Party, they discuss various issues, draft their own positions on them, and submit proposals and drafts for the consideration of party committees at any level.

The creation of factions with their own internal discipline is not permitted in the Tajik Communist Party, which does not restrict the rights of communists to unite around platforms in the course of discussions.

Primary Party Organizations

17. The primary party organizations are created, given the presence of at least three communists, on a decision by their constituent meeting and are registered by the corresponding party raykom or gorkom within a period of 10 days.

Up to 50 party members may form party organizations on a decision by a general meeting of the party group. More than 50 party members may form shop party organizations (in shops, sections, farms, brigades, etc.), which may be granted the rights of primary party organizations on matters related to membership in the Tajik Communist Party and the election of delegates to rayon, city and oblast party conferences and the congress of the Tajik Communist Party.

On a decision of the central committee and obkom of the Tajik Communist Party, party organizations with more than 500 members may be granted the rights of party raykoms in matters of registering communists.

Taking into account the specific tasks and conditions of their work, the primary party organizations independently handle matters of accepting and revoking membership in the Tajik Communist Party, and determine their own structure, directions, and methods of work, political actions, financial and administrative activity, and structural interrelations with Soviet and public organizations.

The higher body of the primary (shop) party organization is the party meeting, which is held at least once every three months.

In large party organizations, numbering more than 300 communists, the general party meeting is convened as necessary at time periods established by the party committee, or convened on the demand of several shop party organizations.

The primary party organizations structure their interrelations among each other on a comradely basis, offering mutual moral support and material assistance, which is implemented via the higher party body.

The primary party organizations propagandize and implement party resolutions, realize the ideological, political and organizational functions of the party in labor collectives and in territories, influence the solution of economic and social problems, and support social justice.

The primary party organizations have the right to work out draft documents during preparation for party congresses, conferences, and plenums of party committees, and to express their opinions about the decisions of any party body, which must provide a substantive answer. They may submit proposals to recall the members of party bodies at all levels, if said members are on their registration or were recommended by them for said bodies.

The decision to eliminate a primary party organization is made by the general meeting of the given organization, in the event that it halts its activity or, if its actions contradict the programmatic documents and statutes of the CPSU and Tajik Communist Party, this decision is made by the party gorkom or raykom. In the event of disagreement among the communists, this question is examined by the appropriate control commission for the obkom or by the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee.

18. For the conduct of current work, the meeting (conference) of the primary (shop) party organization elects a party bureau (committee) and its secretary for a term of two-three years, as well as an auditing or control commission, on the discretion of the communists.

In primary and shop party organizations numbering fewer than 15 communists, the party organization secretary and his deputy are elected annually, and in party groups, the party group organization is elected annually.

Rayon, City, and Oblast Organizations of the Tajik Communist Party

19. The rayon and city party organizations, directly uniting the primary organizations, are the supporting structural link of the party.

The rayon or city party conference elects a rayon or city party committee for five years, as well as an auditing or control commission. An extraordinary party conference may be convened on a decision by the party committee, on a proposal by the corresponding auditing or control commission, or on the demand of party organizations uniting at least one-third of the organizations' members.

A rayon or city party committee, taking into account the opinions of the primary organizations, elects the raykom or gorkom bureau at its plenum. The party committee plenums are held as necessary, but not less than twice a year.

The party raykoms and gorkoms perform the registration of communists, register the primary party organizations, coordinate their activity and, in addition, take steps to improve their qualitative composition and to strengthen party ranks, organize work with them to implement party policy and decisions in labor collectives and in citizens' places of residence, advance specific socioeconomic, cultural and other problems for the examination of society and the bodies of power, and contribute to solving these problems. They study and disseminate the best experience of party work.

20. Oblast party organizations conduct work within the bounds of the oblast to implement party policy and ensure the fulfillment of the decisions and resolutions of higher party bodies, accepted by them.

The oblast party conference elects a party committee, as well as an auditing and control commission, for a term of five years. Extraordinary conferences are convened on a decision by the committee, on a proposal by the auditing

or control commission, or on the demand of party organizations combining at least one-third of the overall number of members of this organization

The plenums of party committees are convened as necessary, but not less than twice a year. Taking the opinions of the party organizations into account, the conferences and plenums develop and propose programs to the bodies of state power and to the population for solving political, national, social, economic, ecological, and cultural and moral problems. They also consider questions of intraparty life, cadre work, the party organization budget, and publishing activity.

The oblast party committees elect bureaus at the plenums, independently determine the structure of their own organization, and grant the largest primary party organizations (above 500 communists) the rights of party raykoms in matters of registering communists.

21. The control commission of the rayon, city, or oblast party organization elects the commission presidium. The control commissions monitor the fulfillment of the resolutions of the leading party bodies, resolve problems related to the observance by communists of party discipline and the norms of social morality, defend the honor and dignity of party members, examine their appeals, hold accountable those guilty of abuses or of suppressing criticism, and audit the fulfillment of the party budget and the economic activity of party institutions. The control commission is accountable to the body which elected it and operates independently according to a resolution approved by the rayon, city, or oblast party conferences.

22. The auditing commissions of rayon, city, or oblast party organizations monitor the observance by the corresponding party committees and primary party organizations of established procedures for the conduct of business, their work to examine the letters, complaints and statements sent by working people to the party organizations and committees, the proper fulfillment of party budgets, including payments and the receipt and recording of party membership dues, and the financial and administrative activity of enterprises and institutions.

23. The rayon, city, or oblast party committee may create party commissions for the implementation of control functions, which are guided in their work by a resolution approved by a plenum of the corresponding party committee.

IV. Higher and Central Bodies of the Tajik Communist Party

24. The higher body of the Tajik Communist Party is the congress. Regular congresses are convened by the Central Committee of the Tajik Communist Party no less than once every five years. The decision by the Central Committee to convene a congress, its agenda, and the norm of representation must be announced no later than

three months before the congress. The Central Committee publishes draft documents on the basic issues to be examined at the congress.

An extraordinary congress of the Tajik Communist Party may be convened by the Central Committee on its own initiative, on the suggestion of the Tajik Communist Party Auditing or Control Commission, or on the demand of the oblast, city, or rayon party organizations combining at least one-third of the overall number of communists in the republic. In the event that the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee refuses to satisfy this demand, the communists have the right to create an organizational committee which enjoys the rights of the party Central Committee to convene an extraordinary congress.

The norm of representation and the procedure for electing delegates to the congress are determined on the basis of suggestions from the party organizations and committees of the Tajik Communist Party.

25. The fundamental decisions of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, concerning the Tajik Communist Party, are examined with the participation of its authorized representatives. In the event of disagreement with a decision made by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee has the right, in rejecting said decision, to request an examination of the disputed questions by a CPSU Central Committee plenum or by a joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and TsKK.

26. The Tajik Communist Party Congress:

Hears the accounts and reports of the Central Committee, of the Auditing or Control Commission, and of other bodies and persons elected by the congress, passes resolutions, and evaluates their work;

Passes the programmatic documents and the Statutes of the Tajik Communist Party, and reviews and amends them;

Determines the line of the Communist Party in the area of party building, ideological activity, and internal and external policy;

Elects the Central Committee and the Auditing or Control Commission of the Tajik Communist Party;

Elects members of the Central Committee and the Auditing or Control Commission of the Tajik Communist Party on the basis of suggestions from the primary party organizations, according to a quota established by the Central Committee;

Elects the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee first secretary, simultaneously electing him a member of the Central Committee and a member of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee Bureau;

Examines the question of halting the activity of the Tajik Communist Party;

Approves the status of a member of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee.

27. In the period between congresses, the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee may convene a republic party conference for the discussion of urgent matters in the policy and practical work of the Tajik Communist Party.

A conference is authorized to hear the reports of the Central Committee and the Auditing or Control Commission of the Tajik Communist Party concerning their work, partially (up to one-third over the period between congresses) to re-elect their members, to make other decisions which are mandatory for the Communist Party within the context of programmatic documents, and to amend the Statutes of the Tajik Communist Party.

28. In the period between congresses and conferences, the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee:

Organizes the implementation of decisions made by the Tajik Communist Party congresses and conferences;

According to the procedure for legislative initiative, submits proposals on issues of socioeconomic and economic development and state building to sessions of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet;

Directs the activity of party groups (factions of communists) of the Tajik Communist Party in the representative bodies of the republic;

Drafts and carries out the cadre policy of the Tajik Communist Party;

Creates party institutions and enterprises and controls their activity;

Approves the structure and staff of the Central Committee apparatus and the budget of the Tajik Communist Party;

Elects the editors-in-chief of the printed organs of the Tajik Communist Party;

Creates the party control commission of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee for the fulfillment of control functions, which is guided in its work by the statutes of the Tajik Communist Party and of the CPSU and by a resolution approved by the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee Plenum;

Determines the procedure for electing delegates to the congress and to the executive and control bodies of the Tajik Communist Party;

Creates permanent and temporary commissions or work groups on the basic directions of its work. Commissions are formed at a plenum from among the members of the Central Committee, as well as from other communists, who are approved as advisors. The permanent commissions are headed by secretaries of the Central Committee or by members of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee Bureau;

Interacts with sociopolitical organizations in the republic and represents the Tajik Communist Party in relations with foreign parties.

29. For solving political and organizational problems in periods between plenums, the Central Committee elects the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee Bureau, whose number of members is determined by a plenum of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee. The first secretaries of obkoms and of the Dushanbe Gorkom of the Tajik Communist Party are members of the Central Committee Bureau.

The Tajik Communist Party Central Committee first secretary directs the work of the Central Committee Bureau.

The Tajik Communist Party Central Committee Bureau sends decisions to the party organizations in its name. The Central Committee Bureau submits decisions on the most important political issues for discussion in the primary party organizations and subsequent approval by a plenum of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee.

The Central Committee Bureau annually reports on its activity to a plenum of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee.

The Central Committee elects the secretariat of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee, which organizes the fulfillment in the Communist Party of the decisions made by the congresses and conferences of the Central Committee or its Bureau and which directs the work of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee apparatus.

30. The Auditing Commission of the Tajik Communist Party is guided in its work by the Statutes of the Tajik Communist Party.

The Auditing Commission of the Tajik Communist Party audits the observance of established procedure for the conduct of business, work to examine the letters, statements and complaints of the working people to the central bodies of the Tajik Communist Party, the proper fulfillment of the party budget, including payments and the receipt and recording of party membership dues, as well as the financial and management activity of Tajik Communist Party Central Committee institutions and enterprises.

31. The Tajik Communist Party Central Committee holds no less than two plenary conferences annually.

Members of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee may participate in the work of meetings of the Auditing or Control Commission of the Tajik Communist Party, and members of the Auditing or Control Commission may participate in the work of Tajik Communist Party Central Committee plenums with the right to a consultative vote.

A party member cannot simultaneously be a member of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee and of the Tajik Communist Party Auditing or Control Commission.

V. Communists in Soviets, State Bodies, and Public Associations

32. Party organizations and committees, not permitting the confusion of functions with state and economic bodies, implement the party's political line through the communists who work within them.

33. The Tajik Communist Party struggles for political leadership in the republic through free elections to the soviets of people's deputies and through other forms of expression of the will of Soviet citizens. Party organizations draft and publish their own pre-election platforms, recommend communists for nomination as candidates for people's deputy, and assist candidates in organizing an election campaign.

The party organizations may enter into pre-election agreements with other sociopolitical organizations and formations, operating on the basis and in accordance with the Constitution, to support the noncommunist candidate deputies nominated by them.

34. At sessions of soviets of people's deputies, the communists elected to them may be combined during the term of the soviets into party groups (factions of communists) for the coordination of their activity and the practical implementation of the will and orders of the voters. The creation by communists in the soviets of groups or factions, independent of the leading party bodies, yet acting in the name of the Tajik Communist Party, is not permitted.

Party groups (factions of communists) interact with the corresponding party committees, receive aid and support from them, and take their decisions and recommendations into account.

For current work, the party groups (factions) may elect bureaus or chairmen.

35. The Tajik Communist Party cooperates with social forces that support the positions of democracy and social justice. It structures its relations with trade unions and other public organizations and mass movements on the basis of political cooperation and respect for other points of view.

At the congresses and conferences convened by public organizations, party groups (factions of communists) may be created, similar to the same groups (factions) in the soviets.

36. In work with youth, the party bodies and primary party organizations rely on the Tajik Komsomol, cooperate with other youth organizations of a socialist orientation, offer the utmost cooperation for their activity, and enlist them in the drafting and implementation of the party's youth policy. The interrelations of party and Komsomol organizations are

structured on the principles of political partnership, ideological community, recognition of the organizational independence of the Komsomol, and mutual respect and trust. The Tajik Communist Party views the Tajik Komsomol as the closest reserve for replenishing its own ranks.

Members of the elected bodies of youth organizations have the right to participate in the examination of youth policy questions in the corresponding party committees.

37. The primary party organizations and party committees may recommend communists and non-party members for specific areas of state, economic, and social activity. Using political methods, they contribute to their election or appointment to the corresponding posts, offer them support, hear the reports of communists about their work, and publicize the conclusions and recommendations made in this regard.

38. The organizations of the Tajik Communist Party interact with the party organizations of the Armed Forces, located in the republic's territory. The communists of these organizations may elect and be elected to the elected bodies of the republic party organizations. Delegates to rayon, city, and oblast conferences and to the Tajik Communist Party congress are elected in the party organizations of military units and associations according to the procedure and norm of representation, determined by the Central Committee, obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms of the Tajik Communist Party.

VI. Monetary Funds and Property of the Tajik Communist Party

39. The activity of the Tajik Communist Party and its organizations, as an inseparable part of the CPSU, is supported by financial, material and technical resources at the expense of party incomes.

The monetary funds of the Tajik Communist Party are formed from the party membership dues, incomes from publishing, production, and economic activity, voluntary dues from communists and individual citizens, and other receipts (transfers from republic enterprises, organizations, and institutions), not contradicting existing legislation. The monetary funds and basic inventories of the Tajik Communist Party are indivisible. In the event that the Tajik Communist Party ceases its activity, the procedure for transfer of property is determined by the congress.

The monthly membership dues for party members are established in the following amounts:

With incomes of:	
Up to 70 rubles—	10 kopeks
71-100 rubles—	20 kopeks
101-150 rubles—	30 kopeks
151-250 rubles—	1 percent
Above 250 rubles—	2 percent.

Working communist pensioners pay party membership dues from their pensions and from their salaries separately.

Communist who work in the Komsomol pay membership dues to the Komsomol treasury, at the same time paying a separate fee to the party organization as follows: those with incomes of up to 150 rubles pay 20 kopeks, and above 150 rubles—50 kopeks.

Entry fees when a member joins the party are paid in the amount of two percent of his monthly salary.

40. The budget of the Tajik Communist Party, its structure, the amounts of deductions to it from the incomes of local party organizations, and amounts of subsidies for it in the unified CPSU budget, as well as the report on the fulfillment of the party budget, are approved by a plenum of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee and are published for the information of communists.

Funds for maintaining the party organization control commissions are allocated by the joint plenums of the corresponding party committees and control commissions.

All party organizations are independent in the disposal of their own budgets, in the solution of structural, staff, and production and economic problems, and in the creation, reorganization and abolishment of periodical publications. Their budgets and reports on budget fulfillment are approved by plenums of the party committees. The profitable economic activity of party committees, not contradicting the interests of political work, is encouraged.

Material support, the transfer of property to party organizations, and collective contributions to the party budget are permitted.

41. The Tajik Communist Party is co-owner of CPSU property, as party-wide property. Buildings, installations, equipment, inventory, cultural and educational and health-related property, monetary funds, enterprises, and party publishing facilities with their periodical publications and typographical equipment, as well as other property necessary for the party's work, are objects of the right of ownership by the Tajik Communist Party.

The party committees perform the practical management (possession, use, disposal) of the property of the party organizations; the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee, the party committees, and also the enterprises, institutions, and organizations of the Tajik Communist Party enjoy the rights of a legal entity and may delegate these rights to their structural subdivisions. The primary party organizations may enjoy the rights of a legal entity in accordance with existing legislation.

For financing the activity of the primary party organizations, up to 50 percent of the funds from the sum of membership dues received is sent to them.

For resolving questions of financing the work of party organizations and of the distribution and redistribution of monetary resources in gorkoms, raykoms, and party committees with the rights of raykoms, financial commissions are created involving the participation of secretaries of the primary party organizations.

The party committees and control commissions annually report to the communists on the status of the party budget and the expenditure of resources.

VII. Location of the Executive and Control Bodies of the Tajik Communist Party

42. The headquarters of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee and Auditing (Control) Commission is located in the city of Dushanbe.

Khayeyev Appeal for Unity, Stability in Tajik SSR

91US0249A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 21 Dec 90 p 1

["Speech by I. Khayeyev, chairman of the Tajik SSR Council of Ministers (Voseyskiy national-territorial district, Tajik SSR)"; place and date not given]

[Text] Respected comrades! Does it not seem to you that the pluralism of opinion and public opinions, which we rightly attribute to the achievements of the democratization of the life of the country, have recently begun to increasingly approach the point of absurdity? Yes, of course, the truth is born from debate, but only on condition that the discussions are constructive and directed at a search for and improvement of various solutions to urgent problems.

What is the main reason that the good intentions which we all approved and voted for have not given any results? And what are the solutions to the situation that has arisen?

In my opinion, there has not been a real division of legislative, executive, and judicial power at all levels, beginning with the Union and ending with the city, rayon, and rural soviets. Moreover, today the soviets are replacing the executive organs and taking upon themselves functions that are not stipulated by the Constitution. This has practically paralyzed the administration of the country and the republics as well as the executive committees of the local soviets. If examples are needed, I, like each person sitting in this audience, can cite many of them. I will mention one: Is it proper for the committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the commissions, at the invitation of numerous officials, to examine the issue of providing sewing enterprises with furniture and knitted goods factories with yarn instead of taking care of legislative activity?

At the level of the republics and the local soviets the situation is still worse. I will say bluntly that it is simply impossible to work. I understand that legislative activity is taking place at the level of the USSR Supreme Soviet

and in the republics as well. But what are the local soviets supposed to be doing? Simply distribute resources, apartments, and similar things. And as a result there is a struggle between the executive committees and the soviets.

This issue was raised back in September, and it must be finally resolved somehow.

Our proposal is that there is a need to ensure strict observation of the provisions of the Constitution and ensure that the soviets at all levels interfere in the activity of the executive and administrative power only in the event that adopted laws are not being carried out. In the opposite event it is our deep conviction that there cannot be a strong executive authority.

Despite numerous declarations, there has not been any division of functions along the vertical, particularly between the republics and the center. This is precisely the reason for the "war of laws" and the conflict over sovereignties. The autonomy declared by the republics increasingly comes into conflict with the inertia of the center, which does not wish to understand that sovereignty of the republics is an objective reality. No one is prepared to turn from this path.

Of course some conflicts exist not only between the center and the republics but between the republics themselves. And this should not be feared. We must search for ways to resolve existing disputes and opportunities to solve them by way of negotiations. We were convinced of this in the course of concluding agreements and contracts with fraternal republics for 1991. Therefore we propose that property and the function of administering it along the vertical be divided up as quickly as possible. We understand that this process requires a certain amount of time.

A very difficult 1991 awaits us all. The breakdown of economic ties that has occurred and the absence of agreements is leading to a final collapse of the economy. Almost all the enterprises of light and local industry are on the verge of a shutdown here at home and across the entire country. There is a shortage of consumer goods and hundreds of thousands of people may be left without work and pay. Based on this, we believe that an economic agreement for 1991 between the Union and the republics, the draft of which needs to be prepared, should be signed before the end of this congress. The president should personally head the work on its signing and later organize the strictest control over its implementation. The fate of the plan, the budget, the economy of the country as a whole in general, and, most importantly, of normalization of the consumer market, depends fully on this.

We certainly cannot agree with the proposal to conduct a national referendum on the question of ownership of land across the entire country. That problem should be decided with regard for the specific characteristics of each republic and even of individual regions. For example, in our republic with its irrigation-style agriculture, private ownership of the land may lead to a fraternal war. The same may be said about the allotment of garden and kitchen-garden plots to all who desire them. That, unfortunately, is impossible. The problem is that we cannot even allot plots for construction of individual houses to all who want them: The free land simply does not exist. In general, it is time to halt the adoption of normative acts which extend across the whole country without taking into account the characteristics of the territories.

The establishment in individual republics of various levels of retail prices for goods is leading to unrestrained speculation, to the forced closing of borders, and to the limitation of market opportunities. This is where the central power should demonstrate firmness, and all the republics and regions should support its efforts. And we call upon our colleagues from all the sovereign republics to do this.

The inconsistency of the decisions on foreign economic activities is inflicting great damage on the economy of the republic and the country. Hasty decisions are being made which do not stimulate the interest of the enterprises and republics in increasing export opportunities. Good rulings on the independent sale of production over and above the plan or on broadening border trade were practically nullified by a decree of the Union government. What kind of problems can a republic resolve when it has received a quota for exchange operations in the amount of 0.02 percent of the volume of commodity circulation, or a total of R1 million. Months and a ruling by the highest authorities are required to receive a license for sale of production over and above the plan.

There are, however, instances where the government of a republic has been unable to obtain a license and some member of a cooperative receives one without any special efforts. Naturally we do not understand this. We insist on a significant broadening of the rights of the republics for the use of production over and above the plan and an increase in quotas for export. That will help to resolve many of our problems.

In conclusion I wish to call upon everyone, independent of his political convictions, to abandon his personal ambitions and join forces to stabilize the situation in the country. This is precisely what the people expect of us and the USSR people's deputies.

Nationality Composition of Rural Population By Republics [Text]

91UN0050A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 39, Sep 90
pp 15-16

[Table: "USSR Nationalities: Rural Population (According to Data from 1989 Census)"]

	USSR	RSFSR	Ukrainian SSR	Belorussian SSR	Uzbek SSR	Kazakh SSR	Georgian SSR	Azerbaijan SSR
Abazians	19,808	19,647	17	13	36	38	40	2
Abkhaz	54,699	1,127	107	24	25	65	53,237	22
Avartsy	414,855	368,132	546	68	102	1,169	3,672	40,270
Austrians	79	46	6	—	5	8	5	1
Aguly	12,396	11,987	9	3	84	35	9	87
Adygey	72,216	71,932	81	40	26	57	34	7
Azerbaijani	3,379,976	98,556	7,724	1,217	11,066	50,779	231,941	2,885,919
Albanians	2,350	50	2,248	1	2	21	—	—
Aleuts	435	410	12	—	2	3	—	—
Altaysy	57,147	56,818	40	6	22	190	7	4
Americans	52	13	3	1	1	1	25	—
English	47	19	15	1	4	2	—	—
Arabs	2,302	132	18	1	1,893	6	5	3
Armenians	1,393,307	155,742	7,344	897	1,573	4,166	176,695	94,357
Assyrians	4,560	912	53	3	10	73	1,055	9
Afghans	22,036	59	19,494	4	375	31	1	3
Balkars	35,197	31,411	59	11	237	1,638	72	84
Bashkirs	707,855	682,817	1,141	233	5,855	14,877	62	72
Belorussians	3,499,791	242,169	90,966	3,038,372	4,337	70,156	2,033	1,088
Beludzhi	26,491	76	10	1	3	14	—	1
Bulgarians	192,470	5,933	134,061	113	370	3,262	72	7
Buryats	243,043	242,219	123	20	223	185	23	6
Hungarians	102,589	1,687	100,199	36	18	262	29	2
Vepsy	6,336	6,258	34	17	2	12	5	1
Vietnamese	31	20	1	2	4	5	—	—
Gagauzy	117,024	2,785	23,193	41	38	374	50	8
Dutch	172	103	1	2	—	20	9	—
Greeks	118,777	30,749	30,193	151	720	13,702	40,984	37
Georgians	1,802,905	20,139	2,358	374	934	2,205	1,765,973	9,851
Darginians	253,644	250,195	349	36	201	704	111	135
Dolgany	5,373	5,300	10	4	15	23	4	1
Dungane	51,916	106	73	15	520	25,622	7	1
Jews	16,623	8,666	4,080	1,145	716	651	110	56
Jews, Gori	831	626	5	6	28	61	—	84
Jews, Georgian	283	188	8	—	15	4	55	1
Jews, Central Asian	295	80	1	—	113	42	—	33
Izhory	303	237	1	—	1	1	—	1
Ingush	139,821	134,174	156	42	61	5,156	29	8

	USSR	RSFSR	Ukrainian SSR	Belorussian SSR	Uzbek SSR	Kazakh SSR	Georgian SSR	Azerbaijan SSR
Spaniards	149	86	41	2	—	13	2	—
Italians	147	36	46	1	34	29	—	—
Itelmeny	1,525	1,507	1	—	9	4	1	—
Karbadinians	216,433	215,173	114	32	554	225	55	32
Kazakhs	4,985,232	400,456	1,757	602	487,867	4,028,310	771	418
Kalmyks	87,978	83,335	133	29	133	278	15	3
Karaimy	142	19	62	—	13	5	1	1
Karakalpaks	195,223	1,619	61	31	190,975	451	17	10
Karachayevs	104,682	101,382	72	5	54	1,247	7	6
Karelians	49,512	48,416	342	247	45	198	10	—
Kety	894	891	—	—	—	3	—	—
Kirghiz	1,968,724	7,257	2,244	49	153,886	6,324	67	23
Chinese	2,394	1,020	82	9	121	1,006	14	3
Komi	174,275	172,486	786	169	115	346	20	2
Komi-Permyaks	90,618	88,613	870	104	26	797	30	1
Koreans	77,304	16,252	2,016	69	37,063	16,338	50	2
Koryaks	6,464	6,378	12	1	54	5	4	2
Crimeans	190	33	60	—	58	9	1	11
Cubans	144	54	43	—	23	10	3	—
Kumyks	152,709	151,467	284	33	205	444	33	34
Kurds	92,441	2,967	59	11	1,262	20,887	516	10,506
Laktsy	40,190	38,891	85	20	357	138	51	345
Letts	573,060	11,702	994	633	155	819	95	14
Lezghinians	242,526	143,976	577	118	339	742	187	94,012
Livy	75	10	1	—	2	1	—	—
Lithuanians	1,070,029	19,321	1,622	3,303	224	3,095	192	131
Mansi	4,540	4,500	4	8	5	14	—	—
Mariytsy	391,432	381,777	2,369	248	516	5,823	69	47
Moldavians	2,146,113	49,823	216,469	1,505	2,306	13,423	455	312
Mordvinians	530,243	512,885	4,481	549	956	9,121	77	16
Nanaytsy	7,240	7,220	5	1	3	6	2	1
Peoples of India and Pakistan	57	28	10	—	4	6	6	—
Nganasans	918	915	1	—	1	—	—	—
Negidaltzy	372	362	1	—	6	1	—	—
Germans	963,191	391,469	11,003	1,103	4,805	487,715	272	54
Nentsy	28,472	28,350	34	18	25	20	—	1
Nivkhi	2,290	2,281	—	—	—	5	4	—
Nogaytsy	60,762	60,426	145	10	17	50	10	50
Oroki	31	27	—	—	—	3	—	—
Orochi	471	469	—	—	—	1	—	—
Osetinians	205,725	135,986	650	87	470	611	67,082	40
Persians	14,515	686	32	5	6,928	1,845	28	521
Poles	464,434	17,894	71,011	217,085	197	32,843	135	20
Romanians	103,922	2,181	99,721	46	20	414	13	1

NATIONALITY ISSUES

	USSR	RSFSR	Ukrainian SSR	Belorussian SSR	Uzbek SSR	Kazakh SSR	Georgian SSR	Azerbaijan SSR
Russians	31,669,404	27,917,945	1,412,073	177,678	85,848	1,404,311	46,697	19,803
Rutulsy	13,970	13,750	4	3	8	30	29	140
Saami	1,136	1,118	3	2	2	5	—	—
Selkupy	2,678	2,664	3	7	2	2	—	—
Serbs	640	447	79	18	4	75	1	—
Slovaks	1,363	108	1,138	10	17	49	2	2
Tabasarany	61,575	60,726	287	25	118	129	14	28
Tajiks	3,022,303	6,787	849	165	632,245	19,350	201	62
Talyshi	19,088	27	—	—	1	105	5	18,945
Tatars	2,058,232	1,889,112	11,363	1,818	55,875	75,038	672	571
Tatars, Crimean	84,414	10,200	31,175	15	39,762	2,340	151	24
Taty	1,844	574	10	4	41	43	5	1,133
Tofalary	627	625	—	—	—	—	—	—
Tuvinians	140,646	140,549	5	7	12	42	—	3
Turks	160,007	7,180	33	19	74,378	41,434	854	16,781
Turkmens	1,817,524	17,090	505	119	99,384	1,003	73	72
Udiny	5,427	262	16	5	19	19	70	5,022
Udmurts	382,356	370,675	2,478	358	413	7,614	39	10
Udegeytsy	1,236	1,187	2	27	—	3	—	—
Uzbeks	11,528,064	22,938	3,482	619	9,822,449	208,272	191	235
Uygurs	158,193	475	24	3	17,900	121,894	3	7
Ukrainians	16,495,099	960,707	14,845,828	56,949	14,851	311,416	7,727	2,779
Ulchi	2,310	2,296	1	2	3	5	1	—
Finns	19,388	13,238	183	67	40	285	6	6
French	50	22	10	3	—	5	2	1
Khakasy	45,592	45,176	68	13	46	160	4	3
Khalkha-Mongolians	136	58	12	9	4	41	1	—
Khanty	15,693	15,647	16	4	3	15	1	—
Croats	173	108	33	4	—	7	3	1
Tsakhury	15,719	5,007	16	2	2	6	1	10,679
Gypsies	93,507	63,767	13,999	2,384	4,467	1,669	560	6
Cherkesy	32,668	32,424	49	10	38	79	19	3
Czechs	5,195	985	3,359	62	7	483	2	—
Chechens	689,275	658,403	490	66	164	28,432	106	18
Chuvantsy	677	648	5	4	3	8	3	—
Chuvash	905,799	890,058	4,570	737	1,251	6,939	143	37
Chukchi	13,008	12,998	2	—	—	3	2	1
Shortsy	4,359	4,173	10	3	33	100	5	1
Evenki	23,891	23,813	20	4	18	20	8	—
Eveny	12,830	12,797	5	7	6	9	—	—
Entsy	119	117	1	—	1	—	—	—
Eskimoes	1,320	1,316	1	—	1	1	—	—
Estonians	410,249	15,213	756	119	97	1,014	1,130	38
Yukagiry	705	698	—	3	—	3	1	—
Yakuts	275,195	274,911	101	26	38	57	2	5

	USSR	RSFSR	Ukrainian SSR	Belorussian SSR	Uzbek SSR	Kazakh SSR	Georgian SSR	Azerbaijan SSR
Japanese	153	131	—	1	14	5	—	—
Other nationalities	5,646	771	160	9	69	77	4,105	86
Nationality not indicated	933	799	25	7	16	40	1	11
TOTAL	98,016,248	39,062,867	17,174,268	3,510,429	11,769,114	7,061,882	2,409,489	3,215,293

	Lithuanian SSR	Moldavian SSR	Latvian SSR	Kirghiz SSR	Tajik SSR	Armenian SSR	Turkmen SSR	Estonian SSR
Abazians	—	2	2	5	12	—	—	—
Abkhaz	—	7	18	12	13	24	17	1
Avartsy	1	28	27	724	48	18	44	6
Austrians	—	6	1	—	1	—	—	—
Aguly	—	6	47	122	—	3	4	—
Adygey	4	5	4	9	5	2	2	9
Azerbaijani	153	745	375	10,873	438	77,721	2,342	127
Albanians	—	35	1	—	—	—	1	—
Aleuts	—	—	—	7	1	—	—	—
Altaytsy	—	5	4	39	7	—	4	1
—	—	7	1	—	—	—	—	1
English	—	4	1	—	—	—	—	—
Arabs	—	6	—	57	179	—	2	—
Armenians	130	439	206	1,617	506	948,836	702	97
Assyrians	—	19	—	1	1	2,420	2	2
Afghans	—	—	—	42	1,109	—	918	—
Balkars	—	12	5	1,590	18	36	24	—
Bashkirs	28	120	103	914	909	24	661	39
Belorussians	9,326	4,165	30,203	1,942	1,602	170	992	2,270
Beludzhi	—	7	—	2	1	—	26,376	—
Bulgarians	24	48,211	47	218	93	11	29	19
Buryats	3	73	20	64	45	9	22	8
Hungarians	36	95	152	7	2	2	2	60
Vepsey	1	—	—	1	—	—	2	3
Vietnamese	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Gagauzy	21	90,401	35	7	6	—	60	5
Dutch	—	—	1	33	—	3	—	—
Greeks	16	74	26	1,121	35	951	2	16
Georgians	74	156	160	387	59	135	55	45
Darginians	3	16	16	1,695	38	—	142	3
Doigany	—	—	2	10	2	1	1	—
Dungane	—	1	—	25,568	3	—	—	—
Jews	—	432	345	150	57	15	29	67
Jews, Gori	5	14	—	2	—	—	—	—
Jews, Georgian	—	10	1	1	—	—	—	—
Jews, Central Asian	—	1	—	1	11	2	11	—
Izhory	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	60
Ingush	9	7	14	138	7	4	14	1

	Lithuanian SSR	Moldavian SSR	Latvian SSR	Kirghiz SSR	Tajik SSR	Armenian SSR	Turkmen SSR	Estonian SSR
Spaniards	—	1	1	1	1	—	—	—
Italians	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—
Itelmeny	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—
Karbadinians	1	4	15	76	96	24	28	4
Kazakhs	71	445	149	20,826	6,527	15	36,980	38
Kalmyks	6	7	10	3,975	25	18	9	2
Karaimy	11	15	1	1	11	2	—	—
Karakalpaks	2	3	1	39	43	4	1,966	1
Karachayevs	7	33	4	1,860	2	1	—	2
Karelians	24	27	61	12	3	—	5	122
Kety	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kirghiz	4	45	31	1,744,472	56,164	30	138	10
Chinese	—	4	1	126	2	4	2	—
Komi	24	125	66	84	26	—	1	25
Komi-Permyaks	4	19	39	90	16	2	5	2
Koreans	4	42	32	4,087	976	2	351	20
Koryaks	—	—	—	4	2	1	1	—
Crimeans	—	16	1	—	1	—	—	—
Cubans	—	—	3	8	—	—	—	—
Kumyks	—	7	21	82	33	10	50	6
Kurds	—	—	2	11,088	4	43,154	1,983	—
Laktsy	—	5	15	85	88	3	104	3
Letts	1,179	80	556,534	97	50	31	128	549
Lezghinians	12	53	103	2,096	54	14	231	12
Livy	—	—	58	—	2	1	—	—
Lithuanians	1,025,089	320	16,151	98	57	5	30	391
Mansi	—	—	—	—	1	8	—	—
Mariytsy	33	91	87	95	122	4	107	44
Moldavians	316	1,858,802	1,152	674	95	52	578	151
Mordvinians	51	212	170	1,086	400	38	81	120
Nanaytsy	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—
Peoples of India and Pakistan	1	—	—	—	1	—	1	—
Nganasans	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Negidaltzy	—	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
Germans	576	2,826	1,115	58,667	2,157	41	449	939
Nentsy	1	—	3	—	15	—	1	4
Nivkhi	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Nogaytsy	—	1	—	32	9	1	11	—
Oroki	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—
Orochi	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
Osetinians	18	38	37	164	333	22	169	18
Persians	—	8	3	24	32	7	4,396	—
Poles	109,049	982	14,257	450	49	64	20	378
Romanians	131	586	746	30	2	6	10	15

	Lithuanian SSR	Moldavian SSR	Latvian SSR	Kirghiz SSR	Tajik SSR	Armenian SSR	Turkmen SSR	Estonian SSR
Russians	35,339	78,327	135,990	275,509	23,734	7,612	10,412	38,126
Rutulsy	—	2	—	1	1	2	—	—
Saami	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	4
Selkupy	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Serbs	—	6	—	3	1	—	4	2
Slovaks	1	—	12	14	2	6	1	1
Tabasarany	3	7	4	168	19	8	38	1
Tajiks	11	181	60	25,088	2,336,089	7	1,190	18
Talyshi	—	1	—	—	—	—	4	—
Tatars	948	445	576	11,990	6,518	54	2,943	309
Tatars, Crimean	11	29	13	158	517	2	17	—
Taty	—	15	—	2	1	4	9	3
Tofalary	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
Tuvinians	—	4	—	16	3	1	4	—
Turks	2	2	—	18,566	701	3	51	3
Turkmens	7	111	39	310	18,557	8	1,680,213	33
Udiny	—	9	—	1	2	2	—	—
Udmurts	22	173	106	304	87	5	32	40
Udegeytsy	—	16	—	—	1	—	—	—
Uzbeks	58	350	138	343,584	971,998	32	153,609	119
Uygurs	—	6	2	17,665	77	—	137	—
Ukrainians	4,572	221,342	15,829	39,249	5,158	737	2,009	5,946
Ulchi	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—
Finns	19	25	89	34	6	—	1	5,389
French	—	2	1	—	—	3	—	1
Khakasy	1	14	2	89	9	—	6	1
Khalkha-Mongolians	—	—	—	11	—	—	—	—
Khanty	1	—	3	2	—	—	—	1
Croats	—	15	2	—	—	—	—	—
Tsakhury	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	4
Gypsies	270	3,624	1,353	364	941	8	4	91
Cherkesy	—	2	9	24	9	—	1	1
Czechs	3	259	11	14	—	—	2	8
Chechens	7	20	33	1,434	22	42	25	13
Chuvantsy	—	—	—	—	4	1	1	—
Chuvash	92	240	257	647	387	14	266	161
Chukchi	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—
Shortsy	—	2	—	28	2	—	1	1
Evenki	—	1	2	3	1	—	1	—
Eveny	—	3	—	1	1	1	—	—
Entsy	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Eskimoos	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—
Estonians	51	47	805	130	12	18	85	390,734
Yukagiry	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Yakuts	4	8	7	20	10	—	2	4

	Lithuanian SSR	Mejdavian SSR	Latvian SSR	Kirghiz SSR	Tajik SSR	Armenian SSR	Turkmen SSR	Estonian SSR
Japanese	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	—
Other nationalities	5	19	8	1	2	8	195	131
Nationality not indicated	933	1	17	7	—	5	4	—
TOTAL	1,187,970	2,315,240	778,041	2,633,220	3,437,498	1,082,535	1,931,569	446,833

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Kabardin

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["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Kederdei or Adyge**.

According to the 1989 census, there are more than 394,000 Kabardin in the USSR.

Most Kabardin live in the Kabardino-Balkar ASSR. A separate group consists of the so-called "Orthodox Circassians," who live in the city of Mozdok and its environs. They are the descendants of serfs who fled to join the Russians in the 18th-19th centuries and adopted the Orthodox faith. The territory inhabited by the Kabardin is divided into steppe, foothill, and mountain parts.

In the 13th-14th centuries, the ancestors of the Kabardin separated themselves from the general Adyg group and moved from the Kuban area to the left bank of the Terek, where they founded Greater Kabarda and, subsequently, from the left to the right bank, which became the Small Kabarda.

The Kabard or Kabardino-Circassian language belongs to the Adygo-Abkhaz branch of the Caucasian language family. It is subdivided into a number of dialects: Baksan (the dialect of Greater Kabarda), Beslenei, and Kuban. There also are separate dialects such as Malka, Small Kabarda, and Mozdok. The Baksan dialect forms the basis of the contemporary literary language of the Kabardin and the Circassians.

All Adygei peoples of the Northern Caucasus (Kabardin, Circassians, and Adyge) have a common origin and historical destinies. Specific features within this community are manifested in the culture of the Kabardin and the Circassians.

The Kabardin occupations are combinations of cattle breeding with farming, in a variety of forms. Their herds grazed on a year-round basis, in the summer in the mountain pastures and in the winter in the steppes. At birthing time efforts were made to keep the livestock near the settlements, after which they were driven to the mountains. As the summer heat increased, the herds were driven ever higher to areas where they remained until the beginning of September. With the beginning of

autumn the animals were once again driven back to the settlements where, by then, the grass had grown; in the winter, they were driven to the steppe pastures. Horse breeding became highly developed. Kabardin horses were known far beyond the Caucasus. A number of holidays were related to horse breeding. Farming among the Kabardin has a long history. Essentially, their farming methods were based on the land rotation system, according to which a plot was farmed for 6 to 12 years, after which it was "left to rest" for 8 to 10 years. Millet was the prevalent crop. The Kabardin engaged extensively in apiculture and the raising of chickens and turkeys. They made their clothing and shoes at home. Only the famous Kabardin felt cloaks enjoyed great demand by the neighboring Cossacks.

The Kabardin settlements were located essentially in the steppe part and were quite different from their mountain homes. The settlements consisted of the farmsteads of the feudal lords and of the members of the community around them. In the middle of the 19th century 116 Kabardin settlements were consolidated into 39 large settlements. The frames of the houses were made of woven lathes of walnut timber, lined with clay. They were quite spacious. Gradually, the Kabardin adopted the Cossack method of building with adobe bricks with non-leaking roofs and big stoves. In turn, the Kabardin clothing—quilted and Circassian coats, Circassian fur caps with cloth lining, and simple-cut cloth trousers, became the national dress of the Cossacks. Women's clothes was made of expensive fabrics, such as silk, and decorated with lace and pendants. Rich jewelry was a mandatory element of a woman's dress. The Kabardin nobility preferred red clothing and leather corsets for women. These corsets were put on small girls, to meet the then considered ideal of beauty: a slim waist and a flat chest.

The Kabardin were given state autonomy under the Soviet system.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Kalmyks

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["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Khalmg**.

According to the 1989 census, there were 174,528 Kalmyks.

The Kalmyk language belongs to the western division of the Mongolic languages and, until the recent past, consisted of the Derbet, Torgout, and Don-"Buzav." The Derbet dialect became the base of the Kalmyk literary language.

Kalmyks are more or less densely settled in the Kalmyk ASSR, on the right bank of the Volga and the north-western coast of the Caspian Sea, as well as in Astrakhan, Rostov, and Volgograd Oblasts, Stavropol Kray, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and Western Siberia. Abroad, individual groups of Kalmyks may be found in the United States, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, France, etc.

To this day the origin of the Kalmyks has not been thoroughly studied. The Mongol "Secret Tale" chronicles refer to the Kalmyks as the Oirat.

In the 16th-17th centuries, the Kalmyks consisted of four main tribes: Derbet, Torgout, Khosheut, and Elet. All of these are military terms indicating subdivisions of Mongolian society rather than tribal names.

The Oirat occupied the northeastern areas of Mongolia and participated in the military operations of the Genghisids. As of the 16th century, however, they began to be subjected to attacks by the Khalkha-Mongols and the Chinese. Some Oirat began to leave their settled lands and in 1594-1597 Kho-Urlyuk led the Derbet, Torgout, and Khosheut into lands under Russian rule. Russian documents describe these people as Kalmyks. It is assumed that the term "Kalmyk" appeared among the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and was subsequently adopted by the Russians and by the Kalmyks themselves.

At the beginning of the 17th century, the Kalmyks reached the Don. In 1808-1809, the voluntary move of the Kalmyks into Russia was officially accepted. However, the process of Kalmyk resettlement in Russian lands lasted an entire century. They occupied areas not only in the steppes along the Volga but also along both banks of the Don, from the Urals to Stavropol and from the Kuma River to the northwestern shore of the Caspian. At that time, these places were very sparsely populated by individual groups of Nogai, Turkmens, Kazakhs, and Tatars. The Kalmyks applied virtually no pressure on the local population. Gradually, these clans merged with the Kalmyks.

The Kalmyks participated in all the wars waged by Russia and in all peasant uprisings. The Kalmyks actively fought in Peter the Great's Persian campaign. They occupied Paris as part of the Russian forces.

The intensive settling of Kalmyk lands with farmers from Central Russia began in the 18th century. Displeased feudal lords, headed by Ubushi-Khan moved some Kalmyks to Central Asia. The remaining Kalmyks, so-called "Buzava," joined the Cossacks. At the beginning of the 20th century most Kalmyks had concentrated

within Astrakhan Guberniya, where their lands were subdivided into the smaller ulus, corresponding to the Russian volosts. The governor of Astrakhan was "trustee of the Kalmyk people." The ulus was headed by a noyon. Many of them were awarded princely titles. The ulus were divided into aymaks, ruled by zaysang. The free members of the communities and the free population accounted for most of the society.

The Kalmyk were nomad cattle breeders. The Kalmyk livestock, consisting of local breeds—sheep, horses, camels, and cows—were distinguished by their exceptional endurance and ability to gain weight quickly. A large number of farms developed rapidly in the Kalmyk steppe where the settled farmers and the livestock breeders met reciprocal economic demands. People without livestock became Buddhist clergy or hired themselves out for various jobs. A large number of Kalmyks worked the salt mines and in the fishing enterprises along the Volga.

The Kalmyks professed Lamaism. A small part of the Kalmyks accepted Christianity.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Karachai

91UN0541A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 40, Oct 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Karachayly**. Known to their neighbors by a number of other names, the most common of which are **Alan**, as they are also known to the Megreli.

According to the 1989 census, there were 156,140 Karachai living in the USSR.

The Karachai or Karachai-Balkar language belongs to the Kypchak division of the northwestern group of Turkic languages. The Karachai language also includes a number of elements common to the Ossetian language.

Most of the Karachai live in the Karachayevskiy, Malo-Karachayevskiy, Zelenchukskiy, Ust-Dzhegutinskii, Prikubanskiy, and other rayons in the Karachayevo-Cherkess Autonomous Oblast.

The origin of the Karachai is linked to the Huns, Bolgars, Kypchak-Polovtsy, and Khazars. The Karachai and related Balkars took shape on a territory which, prior to the Mongolian invasion, was occupied by the ancestors of the Ossetians—the Alans. The Alan element could not fail to influence the language and culture of the Karachai. Some Karachai families are known to trace their origins to neighboring ethnic groups, including Russians.

The Karachai economy was based on livestock grazing. They raised sheep, goats, cattle, and horses. The Karachai sheep breed was one of the best known. The

sheep were noted not only for their size but also their especially tasty meat and milk. Cattle was used, along with donkeys, as tractive force.

Most of the cattle were kept on a year-round basis in natural pastures. In the summer they were driven to communal pastures in the mountains; in the autumn and winter the animals grazed near the settlements. The families of the shepherds joined them in the summer pastures. They lived in caves and huts made of stone.

Usually small families joined the large cattle owners in "camp associations." Communal customs of joint work were widespread, such as shearing the sheep, hay mowing, etc. The rich cattle breeders frequently hired shepherds from among their neighbors, the Svan or the Racha, whom they paid in cattle.

The Karachai livestock breeders traded very actively with the Transcaucasus and the foothill areas of the Northern Caucasus to which they supplied, in addition to cattle, meat and dairy products, and a variety of goods, such as sheepskins, rawhides, felt cloaks, strips of felt, and home-woven cloth.

The Karachai settlements were large, consisting of different districts inhabited by the individual clans. The structures were frame with gabled roofs with grass growing on top. The heavy roof demanded massive walls. The cultivated land and irrigated grass areas were located around the residential districts. Frame buildings in the Northern Caucasus may be found only among Balkars in the Baksan Gorge.

The traditional food of the Karachai cannot be imagined without ayran, which is fermented milk consumed as soup, tea or water. This was followed by cheese, cream, butter, and sour cream, added to which were barley, wheat or corn cakes. The clothing worn by the Balkar and Karachai is the same as the Circassians and the Kabardin: Caucasian fur caps, felt caps in summer, Circassian coats, felt cloaks and hoods, cloth trousers, and chabys—dressed leather shoes.

Most Karachai were free members of communities. The taubi or feudal lords accounted for no more than one percent of the total population.

Sunni Islam was the dominant Karachai religion. ✦

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Karaim

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p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Karayla**. The origin of this name may be traced to a name given to a religious sect (within Judaism) which appeared in Asia Minor in the 8th century.

There are no precise data on the number of Karaim throughout the world. Soviet population censuses have shown a systematic decline in their numbers: from 1959 to 1989 their number declined by one-half (from 5,727 to 2,602).

Today isolated groups of Karaim live in the Crimea, in Lithuania, in the southern oblasts of the Ukraine, and in a number of large cities, including Moscow, Leningrad, and Krasnodar. Small Karaim groups live in Poland. Assimilation processes among this small ethnic group with a long history are so intensive that they are on the brink of vanishing from the country's ethnic map.

The Karaim language belongs to the Kypchak subgroup of the Turkic group of the Altai language family and has retained some archaic elements. Three dialects may be distinguished in the spoken language: Crimean, Galician, and Trakai. The Karaim folklore retains elements reflecting their historical ties with the Khazars. In the 50s-60s [sic], gradually the Karaim adopted the Russian language. The religious doctrine of the Karaim is Karaimism, which is a variety of Judaism. It is believed that this ethnonym of religious origin means, translated from ancient Hebrew, "readers" ("readers of the Torah").

The ethnic origins of the Karaim and the stages of their ethnic history are more or less known. It has been established, in particular, that they are the descendants of Turkic-speaking tribes which became part of the Khazar Khannate in the 8th-9th centuries and, after its collapse, made their definitive move to the Crimea.

Since the times of the Crimean Khannate (15th-18th centuries), the Karaim held strong positions in the social structure of Crimean society. In particular, they were in charge of the mint.

By the end of the 14th century, as a result of the campaign mounted by Lithuanian Prince Vitovt (in 1397) in the Crimea, some Karaim, several hundred families, were resettled in Trakai and along the Lithuanian border. Subsequently, a group of Karaim settled in the new lands in Western Ukraine (Galich, Lutsk) and in some Polish areas.

Following the unification of Crimea with Russia (1783) the resettlement of the Karaim within the Russian Empire continued. "We were sorry to see the caravans of fleeing Karaim blocking the horizon," sadly sighed a poet who was quite right, for, separated from the Crimea, which had become their homeland, the Karaim began rapidly to adopt the culture of the population around them: Lithuanian in Lithuania and Russian in the various parts of Russia.

At the present time virtually all Karaim in the Soviet Union live in cities. Correspondingly, they have converted from agriculture to urban professions.

Nonetheless, the famous Trakai cucumbers, grown by skillful truck gardeners in a Karaim kolkhoz, not far from the Lithuanian capital, and the special technology

used in preserving them have long crossed the Karaim "ethnic" borders and, along with the special method used in the making of the Korean kimche, are in great demand not only among the Karaim but also among consumers of other ethnic groups.

At the present time, the open and broad manifestation of the increased national self-awareness of many ethnic groups in the USSR, related to perestroika, have to a certain extent affected the Karaim as well. This is confirmed, in particular, by the fact that from 1970 to 1989 nearly double the number of Karaim named as their language the native language of their ethnic group.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Karakalpaks

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["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Karakalpak** or **Kalpak**. That is also the name by which they are known to their neighbors.

According to the 1989 census, there are 423,436 Karakalpaks living in the USSR.

The Karakalpak language is part of the Kypchak-Nogai subgroup of Kypchak languages, which belong to the western division of the Turkic languages.

The Karakalpaks constitute the main population of the Karakalpak ASSR, which includes the eastern part of the Khorezm Oasis, the Amudarya Delta, the southern part of the Aral Sea region, the eastern part of the Ustyurt Plateau, and part of the Kyzylkum Desert, which is adjacent to the Khorezm Oasis. A small number of Karakalpaks live in Turkmenia and Uzbekistan, where they mix quite actively with the local population.

A characteristic feature of the Karakalpaks is the preservation of vestiges of their old tribal system. This system is distinguished by a division among all families and tribes into two large branches, Arys ("shafts"): Arys On-Tort Uru, consisting of 14 clans, and Arys Konyrat. The Arys On-Tort Uru occupied the land along the right bank of the Amudarya and its confluent Kegeyli, or today's Chimbayskiy and Keygeyliyskiy Rayons, where agriculture and, partially, animal husbandry, have long been prospering. The Arys Konyrat were settled in the northern part of the delta of the Amu River, along the banks of the Aral Sea: Muynakskiy, Takhtakupyrskiy, and Kungradskiy Rayons and Aral Island. Here cattle breeding and fishing were the main occupations. The Arys On-Tort Uru consisted of the following clans and tribes: Ktay, Kypsha, Kenegess, and Mangyt. The Arys Konyrat were divided into Shulluk and Zhaungyr. There were eight clans within the Shulluk: Ashamayly, Koldaly, Kostamgaly, Balgaly, Kandekli, Karamoyyn, Kyyat, and

Muyten. The Zhaungyr consisted of seven clans. Each clan was divided into smaller groups.

The clan and tribal names of the Karakalpaks may be traced to the ancient names of Asian aborigine peoples and large ethnic groups. This confirms the complex history of the development of the Karakalpaks as a single nationality. In the past, the Aral peoples, the Apasiak, and Augasi, who were part of the Sako-Massaget confederation of ancient tribes, were the foundation of the Karakalpak ethnic group. The Huns who came into this territory, followed by the Turks in the 6th-13th centuries, participated in the establishment of the early Middle Age peoples—the Pecheneg and Oguz. They formed the ethnic environment within which the Karakalpaks began to take shape. At the start of the 10th century the Oguz and Khazars united, expelling the Western Pechenegs to the southern Russian steppes. The Pechenegs occupied the land from the Khazar Khannate to Byzantium. The Eastern Pechenegs, who remained around the Aral Sea, united with the Oguz and, subsequently, always took the side of these Turks. In the 11th century the Kypchak conquered the Oguz and Karakalpaks—"black caps"—appeared in Kiev Rus as border guards. As members of the Kypchak alliance, the Karakalpaks thus acquired their national name and language. In the 12th century, the Karakalpaks were conquered by the Mongols. Since then they have included a number of clans of Mongolian origin. In the 15th-16th centuries they were part of the Nogay Khannate. In the 16th century they were under the Bukhara Khannate. By then the Karakalpaks were already engaged in extensive farming—crop growing and livestock breeding—combining a semi-nomad with a settled way of life. Until the 19th century the Karakalpaks were under the rule of the Khiva khans and subject to restrictions against which the working people mutinied. In 1873, after Russia conquered the Khiva Khannate, most of the Karakalpak lands and their population became part of Russia. After a number of reorganizations, the Amudarya section of Syrdarya Oblast in Turkestan Kray was established. The Karakalpak Autonomous Oblast was established in 1925, subsequently reorganized into an autonomous republic.

Under the Soviet system, because of the development of the single cotton crop and the drying of the Aral, the Karakalpak economy found itself in a state of crisis.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Karelians

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["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-description: **Karyalat** or **Karyalazht**.

According to the 1989 census, there were 131,357 Karelians in the USSR.

The Karelian language belongs to the Baltic-Finnish group of the Fino-Ugric branch of the Ural language family. The Karelian language is subdivided into three main dialects: Karelian, Livvi, and Lydik. The language of the Upper Volga Karelians has three separate dialects: Northern, Middle Karelian, and Upper Volga Karelian.

The Karelians inhabit Kemskiy, Segezhskiy, Belomorskiy, Medvezhyegorskiy, Kondopozhskiy, Sortavalskiy, and Olonetskiy Rayons, Karelian ASSR. The Tver Karelians inhabit Likhoslavl'skiy, Rameshkovskiy, Spirovskiy, Makhastikhinskiy, and Vesyegonskiy Rayons, Tver Oblast. Some Karelians live in Novgorod, Yaroslavl, Kaluga, and Vologda Oblasts. Abroad, Karelians may be found in Finland.

In the opinion of most researchers, the distant ancestors of the Karelians were the Neolithic population of the northwestern part of Eastern Europe, followed by the population which settled around Lake Ladoga, in the first centuries A.D. For a long time these people preserved their stone and bone tools and it was only at the beginning of the Christian era that objects made of iron, coming from the south, appeared.

In the 9th century a population known in Russian sources as the "Korela" inhabited the Karelian Isthmus. Today's Karelian territory was settled by these people to the north and west of Lake Ladoga and north of the present Karelian territory. The Onega area, north of Svir, was inhabited by two tribes known from chronicles as the "Vesi"—the Lyudi and Livvi who, subsequently, became part of the Karelian people.

Karelians were mentioned as early as 874 in the Scandinavian "Egil-Sage."

In the 12th century, Karelia became part of the Novgorod state. Since then Karelians fought jointly with the Russians their common enemy—the Swedes.

In the 14th-15th centuries, the Novgorod feudal nobility undertook the conquest of the Karelian lands. In turn, this led to a Karelian migration. The Karelians settled in a vast territory. Part of Karelia was taken over by the Solovetskiy Monastery.

An intensive process in the establishment of the Karelian people began between the 12th and 15th centuries. The Karelian groups established contacts with the local Vetsi and gradually occupied lands close to the White Sea, the Gulf of Bothnia, and north of the Olonets Isthmus. This new nation pushed out from their areas the Sam and spread to the north and the south. At the start of the 17th century, following the Polish-Swedish intervention, the Karelian Isthmus and the banks of the Gulf of Finland were occupied by Swedes, which led to a mass migration of the Karelians to the Tver, Yaroslavl, Kaluga, and Novgorod lands. These settlers became the Tver, Valday, and Medyn Karelians and, subsequently, many of them merged with the Karelian population.

Iron foundries, which played a major role in supplying the Russian troops with weapons, were built in Karelia in the 18th century. Today's Petrozavodsk arose on the site of the former Petrovskaya Sloboda. By the Nystad Peace Treaty of 1721 the Swedes returned Karelia to the Russian state.

For a long time Karelians have practiced farming. They cultivated extensive rye, millet, and barley crops. Hemp and flax were among the industrial crops they grew. They engaged in truck gardening, growing cabbages, potatoes, radishes, onions, and others. The Karelian town houses were vast, including residential and livestock premises, with threshing barns and grain and hay storage bins. Baths were found everywhere as a mandatory element of any Karelian farmstead. The Karelians wore the ordinary North Russian type clothing.

The official Karelian religion was Orthodoxy.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Kazakhs

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["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Kazakh**, which is what they are called by their neighbors. In the past the Kazakhs were known as "Kirghiz-Kaysak" or "Kirghiz-Kazak."

According to the 1989 census more than 8 million Kazakhs live in the USSR.

The Kazakh language belongs to the northwestern or Kypchak group of Turkic languages within which, together with the languages of the Karakalpak and Nogai, it forms the Kypchak-Nogai subgroup.

Kazakhs account for approximately one-third of the population of the Kazakh Republic. Outside the USSR, there are Kazakhs in the People's Republic of China, about half a million, living in the Sinkiang-Uygur autonomous region and in Tsinghai and Kansu Provinces; about 50,000 Kazakhs live in Mongolia.

The Kazakhs are members of the aboriginal population of the territory in which they are settled. According to researchers, their distant ancestors were local tribes dating from the Bronze Age. In the third-second centuries B.C. a tribal union was formed on the territory of Southern Kazakhstan, which broke up during the sixth century A.D. At that time, the western part of Kazakhstan was settled by the Savromat and, at the beginning of the Christian era, the Alan. Remnants of these tribes could be found later as well, by the time that the Kazakh ethnos began to take shape, consisting of the Sak and Usun. The Huns and their neighbors also participated in this process. Between the sixth and eighth centuries, most of the Kazakh's ancestors were under the rule of the Turkic Khannate. In the eighth and ninth centuries, the

khannate was replaced by the Tyurgesh and Karluk Khagannates. In the ninth-10th centuries, the Kazakh tribes were part of the Oguz union. By the end of the 10th century the power was in the hands of the Karakhanid Dynasty. In the 12th century the Karakhanids were defeated by the Kidan—the Tungus-Manchurians—who also participated in the forming of the Kazakh ethnos. Later, Timuchin pushed the remnants of the defeated Ulus, Merki, Kerei, and Nayman to the territory where the Kazakh ancestors, whose names may be found in the names given to many Kazakh tribes, had settled. In the 13th century, the entire territory of Kazakhstan became part of the Golden Horde. However, the conquerors rapidly assimilated with the Kypchaks and merged with the local population. After the Golden Horde's defeat in the hands of Timur, it broke down into independent khannates—Nogai and Uzbek—within which Turkic-speaking tribes united. Following the period of feudal wars, the Kazakh Khannate was formed at the turn of the 16th century. It was also in the 16th century that the three Kazakh zhuz ("hordes") were formed: the Elder, Central, and Lesser Kazakh zhuz which despite all the efforts of the khans to subordinate them to the central power, were able to preserve their complete autonomy until they became part of Russia.

The village communities retained the features of a patriarchal-tribal democracy. Under these circumstances, the tribute paid was in the nature of work. The rulers of different ranks—beys or elders—were chosen by the community. Starting with the 17th century, the Kazakh Khannates waged an uneven struggle against the Dzhungar who were devastating the area. At the turn of the 18th century, the Russians had already built the Omsk, Zhelezinsk, and Semipalatinsk fortifications and established the Irtysh defense line. In 1730 the Lesser zhuz asked for Russian help. In 1735 the Russians founded Orenburg. In 1740, during the Dzhungar attacks, the Central zhuz accepted Russian citizenship. The Elder zhuz fell under the rule of the Tashkent beks and the Kokand Khannate after the defeat of the Dzhungars in 1758. At the turn of the 19th century the khans lost their power in the Central and Lesser zhuz. At that time masses of Elder zhuz Kazakhs began to take Russian citizenship. The unification of Southern Kazakhstan, on the territory of which the first Cossack camps appeared following the founding of Verny Fort (today's Alma-Ata), began in the 1840s. By the end of the 1860s the Russian governmental system was introduced in Kazakhstan. In 1920 the Kirghiz (Kazakh) Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic was founded as part of the RSFSR, and in 1936 was made a Union republic.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Kerek

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p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: Ankalakku. They are known to the Chukchi as Kerekit.

The 1989 census does not include the Kerek. No more than a few Kerek families remain in the area of the Bering Sea in Chukotka.

The Kerek language has been studied little, for few people remain today who are more or less familiar with it. According to the specialists, the Kerek language belongs to the same group as the language of the Chukchi and the Koryaks. However, within a more general global classification of languages it has no analogue.

In the past the Kerek were settled along the shores of the Bering Sea, from Northern Kamchatka to Southern Chukotka.

The Kerek economy was linked to the sea and fishing was their primary occupation. The Kerek fished in the estuaries of rivers falling into the Bering Sea, the Anabyr Estuary, the Olyutor Bay, and the lagoons, catching sockeye, pink, chinook, chum, and golets salmon, Pacific navaga, smelt, whitefish, broad whitefish, and uyka. In the sea they caught halibut and plaice. All of these fish or the uyka alone, were immediately dry-cured or smoked and strung on grass-woven rope. Sockeye and chum salmon were also preserved and kept in pits or curing chambers. The fish was used to feed not only people but their dogs as well. The catching was done with nets woven with whale or reindeer guts.

The second most important occupation was bird trapping. The Kerek had no rival in this occupation. A number of bird markets could be found in the Kerek settlements. Thus, birds were trapped in inaccessible limestone rocks on Barykov, Otvesnyy, Sinop, Basov, Gangut, and Navarin Capes, by the estuary of the Pik River, on Khatyr, Rubikon, Opukinskiy, and Yandal-Umen Capes, and in Dezhnev and Kerek Bays. The birds were taken to the bird markets. The most widespread catch was that of guillemot. The trapping of nesting guillemot required daring and inordinate skills. The trapper made a net with whale guts, approximately three meters by two, tied a stick on a long string and tied one end of the net to the stick. He then selected a site on the face of the rock and cast the net downward. The moment the net opened, he began to pull it upward in the vicinity of the birds sitting on their eggs. The guillemots left their nests, frightened by the unfamiliar object, and stuck their heads in the net. In one throw the trapper could catch several dozen birds. The Kerek were familiar with another type of trapping involving nooses with straps attached to a pole. At midnight they dropped a man down the rock in the sites where the cormorants sat and the trapper trapped the birds one after the other, stuffing them in bags which the people pulled up. The Kerek knew how to spread nets on the water so that the bird would get its feet entangled and removed them with the help of rods. The Kerek had nets used to trap the birds and "spider web" nets made of fine straps with little balls at their ends, which they cast upward on the flying flocks.

That is how they caught eider ducks. They also used arrows with different arrowheads. The Kerek treated poultry meat to last the entire season. They made little bags from the skins of the guillemots, stuffing them with egg yolks. The carcasses were bottle-shaped. They were boiled. The bird intestines were used to make a kind of sausage, stuffed with egg yolks. The Kerek hunted sea animals with harpoons with a rotating end. The harpoon was of a complex design. All parts were tied with a strap and tied to the boat. When the hunter hit the animal with a harpoon, one of the sharp ends remained inside the animal's body and turned in such a way that the animal could not free itself. A particular weapon used by the Kerek was the "bear stick," which was similar to the North American Indian tomahawks.

Over the past century the Kerek literally "dissolved" within the Chukchi. Reindeer growers hired entire Kerek settlements who worked for them as shepherds. The descendants of Kerek and Chukchi considered themselves Chukchi.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Ket

91UN0541A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 43, Oct 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] The Ket do not have a single self-designation. The spokesmen for the individual groups describe themselves according to the river along which they live or the territory they inhabit.

The word "Ket" means person. It was adopted sometime in the 1920s and by now it has become quite firmly established. In the past, the Ket were known by a variety of names, such as "Yenisey Ostyaks" or "Yenisei."

The linguistic exclusivity of the Ket had been noted a long time ago. However, a way of life similar to the Ob-Ugor and the Selkup, led to the name which included the old name given to the Khanti—Ostyaki.

The language of the Ket does not resemble any of the known language families. Several common features shared by the Ket language with the languages of the Tibetan peoples have now been established. The origins of that language nonetheless remain unclear.

According to the 1989 census, there were 1,113 Ket in the USSR.

The Ket occupy a huge territory north of Krasnoyarsk. Most of them are concentrated in Turukhanskiy Rayon, along the tributaries of the Yenisey: Yeloguy, Surgutikha, Pakulikha, and Kureyka. Kellog is the main settlement of the Yeloguy Ket and Serkovo of the Kurei. Small Ket groups may be found in the Russian settlements Vorogovo, Sumarokov, Bakhta, Lebed, Mirnoye, Kangatovo, Alinskoye, Vereshchagino, and others.

In the recent past the Ket divided themselves into coastal and forest. To a certain extent, this reflected their economic features. In the past, by the time of the Russians' arrival, the Ket occupied a much larger territory and were the main population of "lands" in Central Siberia, such as Arinskaya and Kachinskaya. However, with the arrival of substantial numbers of Turkic-speaking people from the south, the Ket either mixed with the newcomers or else moved to the northern areas. However, here as well they established relations with the Tungus-speaking aborigines in the area, the ancestors of the Selkup, the forest Nenets, and the Ent, who were far more numerous. Such contacts as well diluted the Ket population.

The Ket had long been foot hunters and fishermen. By the turn of the century they kept in some of their farms a small number of pack reindeer who made traveling easier. The Ket lived in groups of several families. Toward the end of the summer they ended their fishing season, during which they used seines and woven traps in fishing on the Yenisey and its tributaries, and went deeper into the tayga to fish the small lakes where they made preparations for their first autumn season. Here they trapped woodgrouse and set their small fishing nets. With the advent of the first frosts they went deeper into the forests, sailing against the current in big covered boats called *ilimki*. In the autumn camps they set up tents and then gradually moved into dugouts, and collected walnuts and berries. When snow began to fall, the hunters caught squirrels. The hunters carried everything they needed in elk skin hides. With the advent of the severe colds the people settled in their camps. It was then that the shamans practiced, and people visited their neighbors, in the course of which only those who had been born during the warm season—spring and summer—were allowed to tell stories. When the weather warmed up and the days became longer, the Ket with their families went deeper into the tayga. Old and young carried all their possessions with them. It is thus that they reached their old grazing areas, where they set their birch tents and started hunting on the soft snow, without dogs.

To this day the Ket are outstanding hunters and fishermen.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Kirghiz

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["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Kyrgyz**. In the past they were known as Karakirgiz or Pre-Stone and Post-Stone Kirgiz. The Chinese name for the Kirghiz is "Burut."

According to the 1989 census, 2,528,946 Kirghiz live in the USSR.

The Kirghiz language belongs to the northwestern group of Turkic languages.

The overwhelming majority of Kirghiz live in the Kirghiz SSR. Alternating with them in the Chuya and Talass Valleys in the Issyk-Kul Depression and Osh Oblast, live Russians and Ukrainians. In addition to them, more than half a million Uzbeks, 70,000 Tatars, 30,000 Kazakhs and Tadzhiks, along with Dungan, Germans, Chechen, and others inhabit Kirghiz territory. Kirghiz may be found in Fergana and Andizhan Oblasts, in Murgabskiy Rayon, Gorno-Badakhshan Oblast, Kazakhstan, and Turkmeniya.

The origin of the Kirghiz is related to the Tan-Hun mentioned in Chinese chronicles. Expelled from northwestern Mongolia by the Huns, these people moved to the Minusinsk Depression where they began to mix with the Dinlin in the fifth-sixth centuries A.D. The Kirghiz settled between the Yenisey and Lake Baykal and in southern Turkestan where, together with China, they fought the Turk-Oguz. In the eighth century, the Kirghiz waged a fierce fight against the Uygur while maintaining friendly relations with the Tyan-Shan Karluk tribes. After defeating the Uygur, the Kirghiz moved into Mongolian territory advancing in a southeasterly direction and reached the western Tyan-Shan. The Minusinsk Depression and present-day Tuva were the places where the Kirghiz achieved their military and political unity. The temporary supremacy of the Kirghiz in Mongolia ended in the 10th century and passed into the hands of the Kidan. Genghis Khan tried to involve the Kirghiz in his campaigns. However they refused, after which they were defeated by Dzhuchi and taken over by Tuloy, who was the younger son of Genghis Khan. Nothing is known about the history of the Kirghiz in the 14th and 15th centuries. In the 16th century they were already mentioned as living in Tyan-Shan. In the 16th and 17th centuries the Kirghiz fought the Mongolian khans and the Kalmyk and Uzbek feudal lords. At that time the Kirghiz established four principalities along the Yenisey: Tuba, Yezer, Altyr, and Altyasar. The simple members of the community willingly adopted Russian citizenship, which guaranteed them a peaceful life. The ruling feudal class, unwilling to give up its power, fought the Russian nobility. At the turn of the 18th century, more than 2,500 Kirghiz families were pushed out of Southern Siberia by the Kalmyks. Those who remained merged with today's Khakas and Tuva. By the end of the 18th century, the Tyan-Shan Kirghiz, who had been removed from Pamir, Alay, and Fergana, found themselves under Kalmyk rule. Once no Kalmyks remained on Dzhungar territory, the Kirghiz returned to the Tyan-Shan. By the end of the 18th century the Kirghiz accepted the rule of the Kokand feudal lords, which marked the completion of the establishment of the Khannate in the 1830s. After a number of uprisings against the Kokand rulers, the Kirghiz tribes were granted Russian citizenship. Kirghizia joined Russia in the 1860s-1870s. The tsarist government introduced elective rule among the Kirghiz who retained their clan divisions.

Traditionally, the Kirghiz were nomad and semi-nomad livestock breeders. They bred horses, camels, and sheep and, to a lesser extent, cattle. Farming developed relatively late and has always played an auxiliary role. The Kirghiz developed an outstanding cattle-breeding standard. They knew how to rotate pastureland and were able to heal animals and successfully engaged in selection work.

The Kirghiz lived in nomad tents. All their crafts were related to animal husbandry.

The official religion of the Kirghiz is Sunni Islam.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Komi

91UN0541A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 45, Nov 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Komi-Mort**. Former designation: Zyryan. A group of Komi inhabiting the middle reaches of the Pechora and the Izhma, referred to themselves as "Izva Tas." This group was also referred to as "Izhemtsy."

According to the 1989 census, there are 345,000 Komi in the USSR.

The language spoken by the Komi is similar to the languages of the Komi Permyaks and the Udmurt. It belongs to the Permian group of the Finno-Ugric division of the Uralic languages. The contemporary Komi language may be divided into the following basic dialects: Pechora, Udora, and Verkhnevychegod.

The Komi inhabit the northeastern sector of the European part of the country, in the Komi Republic, which is located between the Arkhangelsk, Perm, Kirov, and Tyumen Oblasts. Komi is a country of forests. Here the low mountain ridges of the Northern Urals and Timan, known as the Pair, are covered with thick tayga, through which cut the Vychehda, Pechora, Mezen, Vashka, Sysola, and Luza Rivers and their tributaries.

This area was settled a long time ago. During the Mesolithic Age it was already inhabited by hunters who, in the second millennium B.C., had settled in the huge areas from the Bolshaya Zemlya tundra to the Kama and Vyatka. This ancient population became part of the Komi ancestors who had moved north, precisely from the Kama and Vyatka, where they had developed as a separate group which, subsequently, became the ancestors of the Komi Permyaks and the Udmurt. For a while all of them remained as a single people living along the Kama. In the first millennium B.C. this population began to move to the Vychehda Basin, where the tribes united, forming the "Vychehda Perm." The Vychehda Perm could be considered the ancestors of today's Komi. From this area they moved further to the northwest, to

the Vashk and Mezen Rivers and to the east. In the course of their migrations they came across other Uralic-language speaking related ethnic groups, the "Yugra," "Gogulich" (Vogul-Mansi), "Pechora," "Samoyed," and others. In the 14th century, the influence of Christianity spread in the Vychegda area. Stefaniy, the Ustyuga monk, who subsequently became known as Stefaniy of Perm, was the first missionary in the area. The Moscow Metropolitan See established the Perm parish, the first bishop of which, precisely, was Stefaniy of Perm. Following the unification of Novgorod with Moscow, the Vychegda and Vyma lands became officially attached to the Russian state. The intensive migration into this area of the population coming from the central parts of the country began in the 16th century. At the same time, the Komi began to move to the new northern areas, along the Izhm and the lower reaches of the Pechora. In the 17th century, the Old Believer faith began to spread in the Komi area and some Komi trace their origins to the Russian Old Believers. In the 17th century, the entire Komi territory was divided into three parts: Luzskaya Permitsa, whose center was Solvychevodsk; Vymskiy Uyezd, whose center was Yarinsk; and the free settlements of Ust-Tsilma and Izhma, in Pustozerskiy Uyezd.

The principal Komi occupation was hunting and fishing. The numerous lakes and clean rivers supplied the population with fish. Hunters hunted game for meat and furs. Elk, reindeer, and bears were hunted for meat. The most popular fur game was squirrel. In the past, sable could be found here as well. Woodgrouse, black grouse, and hazel-grouse were hunted among the pines. Partridge hunting was widespread. In the spring and autumn waterfowl was hunted as well.

Agriculture was developed among the Komi in the southern areas. It appeared mainly under the influence of the Russian population. Rye and barley were cultivated. At a very early age, Komi developed cattle herds which grazed in the rich flood meadows. The northern groups of the Komi-Izhm engaged in reindeer breeding, driving the reindeer into Nenets lands in the summer.

The Komi religious beliefs were a mixture of Eastern Orthodoxy and pagan cults.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Komi Permyaks

91UN0541A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 46, Nov 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Komi Mort, Komi Oter, Komi Otir.** Previously known as Permyaks.

According to the 1989 census, there are 152,060 Komi Permyaks in the USSR.

The Komi Permyak language is a distinct dia. . . . the Komi language and, with it and with the Udmurt language, belongs to the Permian group of the Sino-Ugric branch of the Uralic language family. The Komi Permyaks inhabit the territory of the Komi Permyak Autonomous Okrug, Perm Oblast. Outside that area they may be found along the Yazva, which is a tributary of the Vishera—the Yazva Komi Permyaks—and in Afanasyevskiy Rayon, Kirov Oblast, inhabited by the Zyuzda Komi Permyaks. Komi Permyak groups may be found also in Novosibirsk Oblast.

Modern archaeology singles out three centers which could be related to the establishment of three peoples speaking the languages of the Permian group: the Chepsy basin, for the Udmurt; the basin of the Upper Kama, for the Komi Permyaks; and the basin of the Vychegda, for the Komi. The Komi Permyaks developed along the Kama River from the local aborigine population and the Vychegda population.

Unlike their northern cousins, the Komi Permyaks have long engaged in farming. They raised horses, cows, sheep, and pigs and they hunted in the tayga and fished.

Komi Permyak ties with the Slavs may be traced to the 12th century. The name "Perm" was given to the Russian population who, possibly, borrowed it from their Finnic-speaking neighbors. The first description of the Great Perm, as a separate area inhabited by a separate people, was provided by the monk Yepifaniy, the biographer of Stefaniy of Perm, in the 15th century. After the spreading of Christianity in Vychegda Perm, it reached the Kama area where the monk Iona baptized the Permyaks in the year 1463. Since that time Moscow's influence increased steadily, and Perm was divided into uyezds: Permiskiy or Cherdynskiy, with the city of Cherdyn as its center; Usolskiy, with Usolye as its capital, and Kaygorodskiy. After the unification of the Kazhan Khannate with Russia, the shortest route across the Urals crossed the Permyak lands.

The Stroganov industry, involving salt production, grazing, and fishing, appeared here in the 17th century.

A substantial part of the Permyaks became serfs. In the 18th century, industry began to develop in the Urals, assigned by the government to the Komi Permyaks. The Komi Permyaks assumed difficult duties in transporting salt, iron, and pig iron.

The Komi Permyaks cultivated essentially rye, oats, and barley. Vegetables were limited to cabbage, turnips, onions, and radishes. Livestock breeding—horses, cows, and coarse-wool sheep—was a supplement to farming.

Hunting was of great help until a widespread timber industry developed in the area. In the northern areas, a large number of fur game was hunted, the most widespread among which were squirrels, followed by foxes, martens, otters, etc. Among the larger animals, elks were hunted. Bear hunting was extremely rare. Bird hunting was of the greatest importance in supplying meat to the

family. Woodgrouse, black grouse, hazel-grouse, and partridges were hunted in the pine forests, and geese, ducks, and other waterfowl were hunted as well. Fishing was a tangible supplement to the economy. It was not of a commercial nature but the families had adequate amounts of fish. In the past all timberland was divided among the individual settlements.

The Komi Permyaks lived in small settlements of 50 to 60 families. There were numerous new small settlements and population moves. The scarce land did not allow the building of large villages. The settlements themselves were frequently built on river promontories. They were always linked to a river or a watershed and along routes.

Officially, the Komi Permyaks were Eastern Orthodox.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Koreans

91UN0541A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 47, Nov 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Their self-designation—**Choson Saram**—comes from Choson, which is the name of the state formation which existed as early as the middle of the first millennium B.C. on the territory of southern Manchuria and northern Korea. The self-designation of the Koreans in the USSR is **Koryosaram** (people of the Koryo country). There are about 65 million Koreans throughout the world. According to the 1989 census, there are 438,650 Koreans in the Soviet Union.

The Korean language is considered unrelated to other languages. We distinguish in ordinary speech among the following dialects: northeastern, southeastern, northwestern, southwestern, and Chejudo. The literary language developed on the basis of the Korean phonetic script which appeared in the middle of the 15th century. The Koreans of Central Asia and Kazakhstan speak a northeastern dialect in which, unlike the northeastern dialect spoken in Korea itself, we can note certain peculiarities, including borrowings from the Russian, Uzbek, and Kazakh languages.

Three groups of tribes played an important role in the origins of the Korean people: the Altay, Paleo-Asiatic, and Austronesian, in which the Protoaltay tribes play a decisive role. It is believed that by the turn of the 10th century the ethnic consolidation processes had been completed and the Koreans had become a unified ethnic group.

The Korean resettlement throughout the world took place during different periods of their history and is related to the systematic worsening of their economic and sociopolitical situation.

Koreans began to migrate to Russia starting with the middle of the 19th century. In 1863, 13 Korean families

showed up in Yuzhno-Ussuriyskiy Kray. On the eve of World War I, there were 64,000 Koreans in Russia, inhabiting essentially the Russian Far East. They lived in Korean villages or mixed with the Russian population. The Russian Far East became essentially the second homeland of the Korean migrants.

After the October Revolution, special departments in charge of Korean lands were set up under the Far Eastern Revolutionary Committee, which was created in November 1922, and under the guberniya and uyezd executive committees. They worked extensively to provide conditions for the development of the Korean national culture and language.

In the mid-1920s, Koreans began to migrate to Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The first Korean agricultural association was created in 1924, not far from Tashkent.

The repressions at the end of the 1930s halted the course of the normal development of Korean national culture and national language: their schools were closed, the teaching of the language was ended, and the training of cadres was reduced to a minimum. The publication of books, newspapers, and journals and radio broadcasting were stopped.

The real danger of losing its identity threatened the Korean population which was scattered not only among the different republics of the USSR but was also "reassigned" to oblasts and rayons within some republics, as a result of which they were deprived of the possibility to have intensive intranational contacts.

The sad results of assimilation processes were noted, in particular, in postwar population censuses in the USSR: In 1959 79.3 percent of all Koreans listed as their native language that of their nationality; in 1970, 68.6 percent, and in 1979, 55 percent; in 1989 the number of individuals speaking their native Korean language was less than one-half of the Korean population—49.4 percent.

The initial steps taken by the Korean societies in Uzbekistan and Tadzhikistan and the national-cultural center in Kazakhstan confirm the serious intention and readiness on the part of Soviet Koreans to revive their national culture and national self-awareness.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Koryaks

91UN0541A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 48, Nov 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] The different groups of Koryaks have different self-designations. The reindeer breeders call themselves **Chauchu**, which means "rich in reindeer," while the settled Koryaks designate themselves as **Nymylgyn**, or "residents." This word is the origin of the term Nymylan which showed up in official documents subsequently, in

1929-1930. However, it was not accepted and the Koryaks returned to the old name, familiar since the 17th century. The term "Koryaks" means "reindeer people."

According to the 1989 census there were slightly over 9,000 Koryaks in the USSR.

Along with the Chukot, Kerek, and Itelmen, the Koryak language belongs to a group known as the Chukotan-Kamchatka dialect. Researchers have singled out within it a number of dialects: Chavchoven, Kamen, Apuka, Paren, Itkan, Alyutor, Karaga, Palan, and Kerek. Some linguists believe Kerek and Alyutor to be separate languages.

Essentially, the Koryaks live in Kamchatka and the Koryak Autonomous Okrug.

For quite some time the Koryaks have been divided into reindeer breeders and settled. The reindeer breeders consist mainly of the Alyutor Koryaks who account for as much as one-half of all Koryaks. The reindeer breeders were familiar with breeding a particular tundra type. The method they used to raise the animals was similar to that of the Chukot. The reindeer were grazed without the help of dogs. The nomad routes were shorter compared to elsewhere in the Arctic. Usually a herd consisted of no more than 2,000 head. Such a herd was owned by a single reindeer breeder or had several owners and thus could justify hiring a sufficient number of shepherds, which was about seven. The head of such a reindeer breeder group was the most experienced person or, rather, a person who had "reindeer luck," and who, in the opinion of the other breeders, enjoyed the favors of the spirits. Views that reindeer breeding as practiced by the Koryaks was primitive are groundless. On the contrary, the knowledge of the Koryak reindeer breeders was quite substantial. To begin with, every shepherd had a perfect knowledge of the physiology of the animals. He was able to treat all sick reindeer, to organize a grazing system, to select the animals for slaughter, to work in selection, etc. In summer, the Koryaks grazed the reindeer in the mountain pastures. This method was quite typical of the north and demanded particular skill. Each spring the reindeer breeders separated the pregnant females from the other animals and the two separate herds were driven to the summer pasture grounds. The families remained behind, in the fishing grounds, and awaited the return of the herds. In the autumn, after a celebration, the reindeer breeders moved with their families into their winter grounds. Such migrations made it necessary to keep a large number of pack reindeer. Among the reindeer breeders all celebrations were tied to the most important landmarks in the economic cycle. Most ceremonies as well had something to do with the reindeer.

Fishing was the second most important occupation of the Koryaks. To a certain extent it was practiced both by the reindeer breeders and the settled Koryaks as their main occupation. The Koryaks were familiar only with

river and coastal fishing. They mostly fished for migrating salmon schools: chum, pink, sockeye, coho, chinook, and Siberian char. They also fished for small char and Atlantic navaga, ulka, tench, grayling, and whitefish. Most of the fish was immediately dry-cured. Racks could be found near each summer camp, on which redfish was dried. Along the coast the fish were caught with stationary nets, landing nets, and other similar attachments. Char was caught with fishing rods under the ice.

Traditionally, the settled Koryaks lived in originally constructed earthen huts entered through the roof; the reindeer breeders lived in movable housing with cone-shaped roofs.

The Koryaks were shamanists, professing religious beliefs related to their occupations and other.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Krymchaks

91UN0541A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 50, Dec 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-designation: **Krymchak**. They are also known as Crimean Jews-Talmudists or Crimean Tatar Jews.

According to the 1989 census, there was a decrease in the number of Krymchaks from 3,000 in 1979 to 1,448, i.e., by more than one-half.

The history of the appearance of the ancestors of the Krymchaks in the Crimea and the areas, period, and condition of their settling is lost in the fog of oral and written legends.

The first Judaic communities were founded in the Crimea during the period of the Hellenic Diaspora, during which, as part of the Greek colonists, Jews began to develop the northern coast of the Black Sea.

The first written confirmations of the existence of Jews in the Crimea may be traced to the middle of the first century A.D. According to inscriptions of the first and third centuries A.D., by that time Jews already had established their synagogues, cemeteries, and municipal institutions in the Crimea.

There is no subsequent written information about the Crimean Jews for a period of several centuries; once again they are mentioned in the seventh century in a narration on the migration of the Jews from Byzantium where they were the victims of fierce religious persecution.

By the end of the 15th century the number of Crimean Jews increased as a result of the arrival in the peninsula of Jews exiled from Kiev and Lithuania.

As a result of this, three distinct groups developed among the Crimean Jews, one of which practiced the Babylonian liturgy while the other two, respectively, the Roman and the Ashkenazi.

Some medieval and later documents, such as the edicts of the Crimean khans of 1595 and 1728, issued to the Karasubazar Krymchaks contain a rather extensive list of benefits, including freeing them from special duties, taxes, and trade duties, instructing all Tatar administrators, including officials of the khan's court, not to levy any taxes on the Krymchaks, not to commit violence on them, and not to confiscate their land, including land in the vicinity of Karasubazar.

The Crimean Jews had to pay to the Crimean Tatars who ruled the Crimea a rather peculiar tax for the numerous reductions in taxes and benefits: engage in assimilation processes. While retaining their profound devotion to Judaism, for many centuries of joint existence, the Krymchaks ended up by adopting many features of the Crimean Tatar way of life: settlements, housing, clothing, and many other features of material and spiritual culture. It is no accident that occasionally the Krymchaks were known as Crimean Tatar or, even more simply, as Tatar Jews.

Their marriage ceremonies were quite complex. They began two to three days prior to the betrothal ceremony itself, with solemnly taking the bride's dowry to the house of the groom. At dawn the marital cortege went first to the house of the groom and, subsequently, to that of the bride, from which the bride was accompanied to the home of the groom and where, at dawn, all participants in the ceremony marched to the yard of the synagogue where the betrothal ceremony was performed. The newlyweds remained in their room for seven days and no outsider was allowed in.

The absence of conditions for maintaining and developing their national culture, language, way of life, and customs are encouraging the Krymchaks, like some other Jewish population groups, to leave the USSR.

Krymchak believers practice Judaism.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Kryz

91UN0541A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 49, Dec 90
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] The name **Kryz** comes from the name of the village in which they live. They are part of the so-called Shahdag group which inhabits the northeastern part of Azerbaijan. Kryz live in the vicinity of Shahdag Mountain.

According to the 1989 census, some 2,000 Kryz live in the USSR.

The Kryz language holds a place apart in the Lezgin subgroup of the Dagestan group of North-Caucasic languages.

The Kryz live in the alpine area in a high mountainous rayon. Such areas are famous for their splendid high mountain pastures and hay growing areas, which have determined the occupation of this ethnic group.

The Kryz are engaged in animal husbandry: they breed Lezgin sheep, horses, and cows. As everywhere in the high mountain areas, the Kryz apply the cattle driving system. In summer the cattle are driven to the high mountain pastures not far from the settlements; in winter, they are driven to the flatlands of the Republic. Along with the herds, a significant portion of the adult population leaves the settlements. The men graze the cattle and shear and milk the sheep. The women milk the cows and prepare dairy products.

Among the Kryz farming is considered a secondary occupation. The shortage of land makes it necessary to practice terrace farming, which involves a great deal of labor. They cultivate wheat and barley. Farming is practiced by men only. The small fields exclude the use of machinery and demand a great deal of manual labor. Nonetheless, the Kryz are unable to grow sufficient grain for themselves, for which reason the grain must be imported from republic's valleys. Truck gardening is embryonic.

In the past, the Kryz wove rough woolen fabrics. Today all that remains of the cottage industries is the making of two- and one-sided rugs and socks made of rough wool.

Like all Shahdag settlements, the Kryz settlements consist of two-story homes made of raw bricks. The houses are built on terraces, one above the other. The streets are narrow, allowing with difficulty the passing of two pack horses. Unlike the other Shahdags, the Kryz also have settlements in the plain areas, where their homes are built of the same unfired bricks. However, here they are built at substantial distances from each other and are surrounded by greenery. The Kryz in the plains are engaged essentially in truck gardening.

The clothing of the Kryz is almost identical to that of the Azerbaijanis. Here the women retain the traditional elements of the national costume: cloth breeches, long jackets and short vests, short caftans, aprons, caps, and shawls.

Like that of all cattle breeders, Kryz food generally consists of dairy products and meat. Unlike the Azerbaijanis, the Kryz broil their meat directly on the ashes, without skewers; they also make bozartma, from dried meat which they prepare in summer.

In the past the Kryz had large families. They also lived in "suburbs," or small settlements connected to the main settlement where most of the family's relatives lived.

Kryz holidays were particularly picturesque. All major events in a person's life were solemnly celebrated. The

uncle on the maternal side was assigned a special role. It was he who provided his niece's dowry and gifts to nephews at their wedding. In preparing for her marriage, the bride had to make her own rugs, horse blanket, small saddle rug, socks, etc. The marriage ceremony lasted several days and included contests.

The Kyz official religion was Sunni Islam.

SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: The Kumyk

91UN0663B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 51, Dec 90 p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] They call themselves **kumuk**. Their neighbors have different names for them: the Dargins call them "Dzhandar" or "Dirkalanti"—plainsmen; the Avars call them "Larigal."

The 1989 census registered 282,178 Kumyks in the USSR.

The Kumyk language belongs to the Turkic group of the Altaic language family and consists of three dialects: Khasavyurt, Buynak, and Kaytak. The differences in the dialects gradually disappear as the literary language spreads.

The Kumyks live on the plains of Dagestan—in Khasavyurtovskiy, Babayurtovskiy, Kizilyurtovskiy, Buynakskiy, Kayakentskiy, and Kaytagiskiy rayons. They also live in Makhachkala and its environs, Derbent, Chegen-Ingush, and North Osetia.

Formation of the Kumyks dates back to the second half of the first millennium A.D. The indigeneous population of the plains of Dagestan made up their ethnic base. However, an equally important component of the formation of this ethnic group was the arrival of the Turkic language groups, the strongest of which were the Kypchaks (Polovtsians). Their language was also adopted by the mixed population. The predominant role of the local element is confirmed by anthropological data and by analysis of the cultural peculiarities of the Kumyks.

In the second half of the 19th century, the Kumyks were ruled by feudal lords—beks, chankas, and sala-uzdens. But there also were free communes—uzdens. The peasants paid various taxes to the nobility, who owned much land and livestock. Between 1865 and 1867, serfdom was

abolished among the Kumyks, and feudal rule was replaced by state administration. After the annexation of Dagestan to Russia, the productive forces developed at an accelerated pace, and the economy converted to capitalism.

The Kumyks have engaged in farming since ancient times. They knew the three-field system and artificial irrigation. However, they did not fertilize and used the most primitive plows, harrows, and so forth.

The Kumyks have had collective forms of labor for a long time. Neighbors would gather together for weeding, harvesting, or threshing. The peasants united for joint use of draft animals and agricultural implements. The Kumyks also engaged in gardening, vegetable farming, and viniculture.

Among other domestic animals, they raised buffalo and practiced range livestock breeding.

The Kumyk settlements were of a horizontal, plains type. Houses were constructed in two or 1 1/2 stories on a high foundation. Single-story structures were also built. All the rooms, for the most part, stretched out in one row. Rugs, copperware, and weapons, which were hung in the guestroom, were traditional decoration in Kumyk houses.

The usual clothing of men consisted of a shirt and tapered trousers. They wore a quilted or long-waisted coat over that. Sheepskin coats as well as purchased felt boots were popular. The most popular type of footwear for the Kumyks was light slippers and leather galoshes. High boots served as festive footwear. Papakhas [tall hats] were sewn from sheepskin. The women wore dresses of expensive silk cloth and gorgeous ornamentations.

The favorite food of the Kumyks is khinkal, a type of dumpling with meat, and also meat, lentin, and milk soups.

The neighborly commune played the main role among the Kumyks. Families were large, and patriarchal relations left their mark on all social life.

The official religion of the Kumyks is Sunni Islam. Relations between people were determined by adat [unwritten law]. A large amount of bride-money was paid for brides. Boys and girls were forbidden to meet at celebrations. Meetings were permitted only near wells or at public works.

Under the Soviets, the Kumyks developed their own literary language.

Mid-Year USSR Crime, Punishment Figures for 1990

91UN0711A Moscow *EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN*
in Russian No 46, Nov 90 p 13

[Unattributed article: "The Law Is Harsh..."]

[Text] Judging from statistical data (see Table 1), rumors that law enforcement agencies are giving up in the face of rampant crime, are unfounded. In the first six months of

the year, the number of people convicted increased by almost one-fourth, which noticeably surpasses the overall increase in violations of the law. Today it is difficult to judge how such an answer by the state will suit the "criminal world" and other clever fellows from the "shadow economy." However, as letters from readers and a study of public opinion show, active measures of retribution are fully supported by the population.

Table 1. Convictions in the Country in the First 6 Months of 1990

	1st 6 Months of 1989		1st 6 Months of 1990		
	in thousands	in percentage of total	in thousands	in percentage of total	in percentage of 1st 6 months of 1989
Total convicted	328.4	100.0	402.1	100.0	123.9
including for:					
theft of state and public property	43.8	13.3	56.0	13.9	129.9
of that amount, thefts in especially large amounts	0.66	0.2	0.71	0.2	108.6
petty theft	7.0	2.1	7.6	1.9	110.4
premeditated murder and attempted murder	6.1	1.9	7.6	1.9	124.6
premeditated aggravated assault	12.4	3.8	15.0	3.7	121.9
rape and attempted rape	8.0	2.4	10.3	2.6	129.8
larceny of personal property	59.0	18.0	73.5	18.3	126.5
theft of personal property	15.8	4.8	21.0	5.2	134.8
robbery to seize personal property	4.5	1.4	6.9	1.7	153.7
speculation	5.5	1.7	6.7	1.7	121.5
bribery	0.4	0.1	0.6	0.2	138.8
hooliganism	30.2	9.2	36.6	9.1	122.0
violations of traffic safety rules in transportation	21.0	6.4	26.0	6.5	125.4
crimes associated with drugs	5.8	1.8	7.9	2.0	137.5

Judicial statistics also have clearly reflected the changes in the internal structure of crime. The number of people convicted for violations of the law involving encroachment on state and personal property and attempting to make money by criminal means has increased. The law has become more severe with respect to bribe takers, speculators, drug dealers, and embezzlers. It is significant that the courts today are giving criminals harsher sentences (see Table 2).

Table 2. Punishment Given Criminals

Punishment	1st 6 Months of 1989	1st 6 Months of 1990
Imprisonment	35,300	37,400
Suspended prison sentence with mandatory labor	6,500	7,400
Corrective labor	24,100	22,000
Probation	7,400	7,300
Deferment of sentence	13,200	13,600

Table 2. Punishment Given Criminals (Continued)

Punishment	1st 6 Months of 1989	1st 6 Months of 1990
Fine	12,900	11,700
Other punishment	600	600

In addition, additional punishment measures were imposed in the first six months of 1990: deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or to engage in specific activities—44,400 people convicted (39,900 in first six months of 1989); confiscation of property—52,700 people convicted (41,200 in first six months of 1989).

Murder Rate Figures from 1985 to 1989 Compared

91UN0711B Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 51, Dec 90 p 24

[Article by Aleksey Chernyshev: "Figures You Do Not Want To Believe..."]

[Text] Yes, people are being murdered in our country. They are being murdered in public places, at home, for selfish motives, out of jealousy, in interethnic conflicts, using plain weapons and firearms, in an intoxicated state, and in a sober state. Lately, the murders are becoming increasingly brutal. Last year, the level of crimes against persons (premeditated murders, aggravated assaults, rapes) was the highest in the last decade.

Table 1. Dynamics of Premeditated Murders by Union Republics

Republic	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
RSFSR	12,160	9,437	9,194	10,572	13,543
Ukraine	2,061	1,757	1,785	2,016	2,589
Belorussia	469	339	335	390	567
Uzbekistan	685	597	581	780	1,021
Kazakhstan	1,461	1,127	1,226	1,202	1,549
Georgia	269	253	232	227	309
Azerbaijan	273	292	254	258	338
Armenia	66	60	59	90	111
Moldova	260	217	195	222	267
Lithuania	143	140	125	143	155
Latvia	150	104	107	111	178
Estonia	79	75	70	78	89
Kirghizia	253	147	203	234	291
Turkmenia	229	169	159	233	293
Tajikistan	118	89	100	125	127

This year, the number of grave crimes likewise broke the record of the 1980's: in 10 months of 1990 there were 88,000 crimes against persons recorded. This is 12 percent more than during the same period last year. This sort of an increase is taking place in all republics, and most intensively in Kirghizia (60.5 percent), Lithuania (28.7 percent), and Uzbekistan (19.1 percent).

Among the total number of crimes, premeditated murders and attempted murders attract attention above all.

More than 20,500 of them have been recorded. Aggravated assaults are close to murders, since so-called aggravated assaults with a fatal outcome also pertain to them. There were 48,000 of these cases. In addition, law enforcement agencies received 19,300 statements about rape.

The increase in murders and attempted murders for sexual reasons is causing special concern, jumping 12 percent this year.

Table 2. Murders Committed by Individual Categories of Persons

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Total murders	18,718	14,848	14,651	16,710	21,467
In a state of intoxication	11,481	8,495	8,967	9,398	11,904
By people with a previous conviction	5,811	4,861	6,050	5,398	7,071
By a group of persons	1,072	761	687	946	1,328

However, in the words of Genrikh Minkovskiy, doctor of juridical sciences and chief of the department of criminal policy and criminal law of the Academy of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, criminal law science is fairly calmly assessing the situation from the standpoint of its unprecedented nature—after all, in the 1950's and early 1960's there were bursts of an increase in murders of up to 30 percent a year. What is more, back in 1986, at the time of an overall euphoria regarding a decrease in crime, scientists warned that we could expect a sudden leap in crime by 1988. Another thing is much more frightful—the qualitative characteristics of crime have changed: murders today are being committed with particular brutality, so-called brutality of the end in itself; moreover, the number of female murderers is increasing.

In Genrikh Minkovskiy's opinion, internal affairs agencies should not give in to considerations of the moment and equal treatment in questions of arrest and detention: in 1987, grave crimes declined one-third. Demonstrating humaneness, bodies of the Procurator's Office and also of the Internal Affairs Administration decreased arrests and detentions by a factor of 2.5. As a result, we received tens of thousands of grave crimes which would not have been committed if the suspects would have been taken into custody.

As far as the present situation is concerned, according to scientists' prognoses, crime will increase until 1992, and the rate of its increase is now already beginning to decline.

Problems in Combating Speculation Discussed

91UN0765A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Jan 91
Union Edition p 6

[Interview with Mikhail Shestopalov, chief of the Moscow branch of the Administration for Combating Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation, by V. Reshetnikov; place and date not given: "Detailed for IZVESTIYA: Hard Times For the UBKhSS"]

[Text] Banking manipulations; machinations with checks, credit cards, and stocks; creation of shell stockholders societies; illegal credits; and embezzlement with the help of computers—this is the spectrum of the new crimes that have come down on the service engaged in "combating embezzlement of socialist property and speculation." IZVESTIYA asked Mikhail Shestopalov, chief of the Moscow branch—the largest city service in the system—of the UBKhSS [Administration for Combating Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation] to tell us about their work in this new operational environment.

[Shestopalov] Our service has lately increased its effectiveness strictly by implementing certain organizational measures. The proof of this, no matter how paradoxical it sounds...is in the higher crime figures, for the type of crimes we are dealing with, that now appear in the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] statistical reports. Unlike the criminal investigations divisions, we register only completed cases. Keeping that in mind, in 1990, the

Moscow UBKhSS uncovered twice as many grave crimes as in 1989. We uncovered 1.7 more cases in the category of large-scale and extra-large-scale embezzlement; 61 percent more cases of violations of hard currency regulations; and we prevented 88 percent more cases of bribery. This is an unprecedented increase in the activities of our city service.

On the other hand, however, the UBKhSS organs today are simply unable to cope with the increasing workload. We are facing a fast increase in the number of cases of abuse in the system of food distribution and trade, in the banking and credit system, and in the cooperative business. More and more often we come across six digit figures in criminal embezzlement cases. One such case, for instance, involved the embezzlement of 20 million rubles [R], accomplished through a series of money transfers from one account to another between cooperatives and enterprises. A director of one of the Moscow rayon branches of the USSR Sberbank [Savings Bank] and her deputy received a R500,000 bribe to approve a R10 million loan guaranteed by fictitious work contracts. Two million rubles out of that sum ended up being embezzled by representatives of non-existing cooperatives. From one group caught on violations of hard currency trade regulations, we confiscated 1,497 emeralds with a total weight of 112 carats, six sapphires with a total weight of 8.3 carats, and R700,000 in cash and valuables. I think these examples demonstrate convincingly that the muddy waters of economic chaos make it easier for criminals to find a big "catch."

Besides, we are also involved in such things as supervision of the movement of goods within the consumer market, and the distribution of humanitarian aid.

[Reshetnikov] It looks like the UBKhSS organs are going through hard times.

[Shestopalov] Our officers, unhappy with work conditions, either retire or go to other, better paid jobs. It is hard to keep people when—and this happens quite often—a cooperative or a joint enterprise offers them salaries that are ten times higher than what we can pay.

The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, aware that the situation with the UBKhSS organs needs to be changed immediately, sent its proposals to the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers. Alas, we still do not have the answer.

[Reshetnikov] If it is not a secret, what is the substance of these proposals?

[Shestopalov] Naturally, they concentrate first of all on improving working conditions for UBKhSS officers. The controller should not have a lower salary than the controlled. This is an axiom. The staffing of the service should be appropriate for the task it is charged with. There are no specific figures in the proposals such as what kind of annual budget the service needs. We

propose to clearly define the task and then determine the necessary budget. This is the way it is done all over the world.

[Reshetnikov] But now the KGB has also gotten involved in combating economic crime. Why should the taxpayers maintain two services charged with identical tasks?

[Shestopalov] The KGB involvement is temporary. As soon as the BKhSS organs (or "economic police" as this kind of service is called in civilized countries) start working as they should under the new conditions, the KGB will withdraw and return to its main tasks. Everybody should stay within their professional field...

[Reshetnikov] You have not used the term "economic sabotage" yet. Frankly, I was counting on catching you in that and asking for an explanation of its meaning.

[Shestopalov] I cannot do that because the legislature has not given it a definition yet. Therefore I use a more familiar term: "economic crime."

[Reshetnikov] One of the high ranking officials of the KGB's public liaison service told our correspondent that the words "economic sabotage" had not been originally coined in the corridors of Lubyanka. The authorship belongs to the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies. The KGB only carries it out. Nevertheless, there is an almost involuntary desire to draw a historic parallel. The struggle against "economic sabotage" reminds one of the struggle against the "wreckers"...

[Shestopalov] It is not for me to judge whether these are appropriately chosen words. So far neither we, nor the KGB have discovered any instances of deliberate actions directed at economic disorganization, with the purpose of undermining our constitutional system. My opinion is as follows: The national economy is unbalanced, and this creates favorable conditions for abuse. The KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs are now involved in control over horizontal economic ties because we are, probably, the only organs that have maintained our administrative structure and our ability to do our work. In addition, the KGB has experience in supervising barter and other types of foreign trade operations, which is very important right now. Therefore, not only are the UBKhSS organs sharing their experience with the KGB, but we are also learning a lot from the KGB.

[Reshetnikov] Yes, but your colleagues are asking for special powers now...

[Shestopalov] Right now, when the chekists discover some transgressions in the consumer market, they call the UBKhSS officers to the scene. They themselves do not have the power to conduct an inspection, since they are investigative organs, and only within those articles of the criminal code that belong to their competency. The KGB has not yet received legislative confirmation of its new powers, while the tasks it has been charged with are quite substantial. We sometimes joke: Would it not be

good to subordinate both the KGB and the UBKhSS to the workers control commissions since they—unlike us—have extremely wide powers. Including the power to close a trade enterprise for the duration of an inspection.

[Reshetnikov] You know, this desire of the control organs to put themselves above the law makes one seriously worry.

[Shestopalov] Well, we are first and foremost state organs. And every state has a right to protect its internal market from abuses by all means available to it. We are not inventing anything new. Those economic police officers from Western countries whom I have had a chance to meet are surprised by the criticism directed here at the state actions in combating speculation. You are now, they say, on the level of the FRG in 1949. That country had enacted strict anti-speculation measures then. Other, now flourishing, Western countries also had antispeculation laws during the period of economic depression. And with the same formulation as we have: for buying up and reselling. These harsh articles disappeared from their criminal code after the internal market was saturated with goods. It was then that the speculator (or, if we use a different word, "trader" [commerçant]) became a respectable figure in society, moving goods to the consumer.

State Security Officer Details Mishaps in Career

91UF0317A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 9 Jan 91 First Edition p 4

[Selections from notes by alias Dmitriy Petrovich Korbov, honored state security associate, with introduction by V. Kondakov under the rubric "Our Articles": "Neither Shots Nor Chases"]

[Text] [Caption to photograph] A portrait of the man whose notes we are offering a small part of to the reader today could have been in this row of postage stamps on the envelope. He is alive and well and used to be in the ranks of the Chekists. But intelligence officers have strict rules. The time has not yet come to open up.

[Introduction by V. Kondakov] You have to agree that it is not that often that you meet a person and hear him say:

"Intelligence officer. That is my profession."

You are surprised even more by the fact that outwardly Dmitriy Petrovich Korbov (his name has been changed for obvious reasons) does not seem like an intelligence officer at all: he is good-natured, kind-hearted, and unhurried. He seems more like a minister or a successful businessman.

Indeed, in his "second" life D. Korbov was in fact a better-than-average businessman. As a screen for illegal work, that is, a "cover," he had quite a respectable business in the country where he resided: he was president of a joint-stock company which yielded high dividends. During the day D. Korbov studied the stock

reports and visited trading firms, banks, warehouses, and customs offices. But he devoted his evenings to processing and summarizing secret information.

However, everything is intertwined in an intelligence officer's work, so that it is difficult to distinguish where business begins and ends and where the performance of his specialization does. The cause which he served was in first place, naturally; his entire life abroad was subordinate to it.

What would you like to ask an intelligence officer who returned from "over there"? I, brought up on Stirlitz, kept trying to get the heroic stories from Dmitriy Petrovich. Something in the spirit of Yulian Semenov, what the reading public is so keen on. In response Dmitriy Petrovich spread his hands so modestly and with a guilty smile said:

"There were no heroic stories. Thank the Lord! Otherwise I would not be sitting here with you at this desk."

"No chases, no attempts on your life?"

"Precisely nothing. All that is only in novels and films which—I do not mean to offend the authors—have little in common with reality. In life it is much simpler and much more complicated. For we go abroad without weapons. And certainly without poisons, of course. The basic rule is do not stand out."

"Does that mean in a cloak, but without a dagger?"

"Exactly. Foreign intelligence is a difficult and dangerous job. A job, and not the adventures of supermen. But if you want to understand what the workdays of an intelligence officer are made up of, page through my notes."

D. Korbov's manuscript was not intended for the press, and so it does not shine with style. And we certainly will not demand literary elegance from him, since he has an altogether different profession. Dmitriy Petrovich wrote a documentary report on various conflicts in which he found himself during his illegal work abroad. He wrote for the edification of his young intelligence officer colleagues.

It only remains for me to add that Dmitriy Petrovich is a veteran of the front. In the harsh days of the battle near Moscow, he was attached to Marshal Zhukov's staff, and he considers that time the most heroic and significant in his life. Which, however, in no way diminishes his work in foreign intelligence.

[Notes by Dmitriy Petrovich Korbov]

A Defective Briefcase

To my surprise and joy, the person sent from the Center to meet me was a comrade with whom I had studied at the special school. We wanted to throw ourselves into an embrace and kiss, but the strict discipline of intelligence compelled us to restrain ourselves. When we came up

alongside each other, without appearing to know him I said, "Password!". Smiling, he gave it. I gave the response. After that we set out along a predetermined route to talk business. Georgiy passed on greetings from comrades and informed me that everything was fine at my home, and then said that he had brought a new passport and film with the legend. The passport and the legend were in an envelope in his pocket, and he was going to give them to me before we parted.

"But where is the briefcase?" I asked. "Center reported that the documents would be in a secret compartment built into the briefcase."

Georgiy answered that the hiding place in the briefcase was defective and he was forced to bring the documents in an envelope. My comrade insisted that I take them:

"Why are you being so stubborn? Put the envelope in your pocket and hide it somewhere in the hotel. Do it, please, I beg you. If you refuse, I will really get it. Do you really want to let old classmate down?"

I took the envelope with the documents from him and put it in the inside pocket of my jacket. We agreed to meet the next day and parted.

Along the way I caught a taxi to get to the hotel. An old man in glasses was sitting behind the wheel. A small Peugeot jumped out in front of us at one of the intersections. It appeared so unexpectedly that my driver could not stop. The Peugeot flipped over and started burning. I lost consciousness for a moment. The driver regained consciousness first and helped me get out of the smashed car. We ran to the crowd of gawkers around the burning Peugeot. I managed to lose myself among the people. I found a small fountain, washed up, straightened my clothes, and hurried on. I bought some plaster at the drugstore, patched up the scratches, and went off to the hotel. In my room I familiarized myself with the new passport and the "biography" on the film, which I then burned.

The next day I met Georgiy and told him about what had happened. He was very surprised and anxious. It was a good thing that everything worked out. For I could have died or been seriously injured. Then they would have taken me to an emergency station. Each of them has a gendarme post which is supposed to establish the identity of the victim and make a report on what happened. If I had lost my memory or been injured, the gendarme would have begun to look into my pockets to find documents and, needless to say, he would have found the passport of the country of destination in one of them and in the other—a passport of a different country. My photograph was in both documents, but the information was completely different. And it would have been a complete fiasco with all the consequences.

But if I had been carrying the briefcase with the hidden compartment, it would have insured me against failure: even if the gendarme had looked inside it, he would not have been able to find the second passport.

After that incident I never violated instructions and orders received from Center again.

I Forgot My Last Name

I was ordered to go to a European country immediately and carry out an operation there to exchange my passport and then take a plane to another city to meet with a secret agent.

After I received my new passport, I was on my way to the airport and on the run, as they say, familiarized myself with the set-up information and went straight to the ticket office. As I approached the counter, I handed the document to the girl. She put it in front of her, but then the phone rang and the girl began to talk animatedly with her girlfriend. After she finished talking, she asked whose name she should make the ticket out in. But I was thinking of something else at the time and completely forgot my new name: it simply flew out of my head. The girl repeated the question, but I did not know what to answer. There was nothing left to do but pretend to be insulted.

"Miss, that is not exactly proper on your part. My passport is right in front of you, but instead of looking at it, you ask me my name. Are you really too lazy to look at the document?"

She began to apologize and hurriedly opened the passport. Throwing a quick glance at it, I read my new name and memorized it.

Bitter Chocolate

I had accumulated some films with pictures of important documents. This information had to be delivered to Center immediately. The meeting with the Center representative was set in one of the neighboring countries where I was supposed to go. My wife proposed to conceal the films inside a bar of chocolate and in that way carry them across the border. I agreed with her.

The single sleeping compartment which I occupied immediately began to resemble the long-inhabited room of a carefree businessman: on the little table was an opened bottle of Scotch whiskey, soda water, a box of candy, sandwiches, Havana cigars, and right there in the open three bars of chocolate. Magazines and newspapers were lying all over the floor.

Next morning the train came up to the border station. There was a knock at the door: "Passport control!" In about 10 minutes they knocked again. An officer in a carefully ironed gray uniform came in. He greeted me and introduced himself as a customs officer. The officer carefully looked round the compartment and after saying "Thank you," began to back toward the door. But instead of leaving, he suddenly took a step forward and, pointing toward the chocolate lying on the table, asked who it belonged to. It felt like someone had just poured boiling water over me: what was this—a fiasco or some kind of misunderstanding? I shrugged my shoulders and

got indignant: I do not understand what you are talking about, and what has chocolate to do with it anyway? Without explaining anything the customs officer again asked: Is that my chocolate? I answered: this is a single compartment and so everything that is in it belongs to me. Including the chocolate. What is so criminal about carrying three bars of chocolate? The customs officer said that he should confiscate those bars since it was prohibited to bring chocolate into the country:

"That is the law, and it is not subject to discussion!"

The situation was becoming threatening. I tried delay in order to find some solution to the crisis. I certainly could not with my own hands simply hand over the bar containing the secret materials. I turned to the customs officer with even greater indignation:

"How is it that you, who consider your country hospitable and cultured, have reached the point where you take chocolate away? Is it really contraband? So think, who needs three bars? Do you really think I could skim much fat off that?"

He answered: "I, of course, understand that three bars of chocolate are of no value as a commodity, but as samples of a commodity they are of value. So I am obliged to confiscate them. And it seems strange to me that you, a respectable man, are haggling over such trifles!"

What was left for me to do? My shirt was wet from excitement. What a fiasco! And suddenly intense nervous strain suggested a way out:

"All right, you can have your way."

The customs officer put out his hand. I gave him the first bar, and then the second. Then I stopped for a second and after pouring myself a shot of whiskey, I took the third bar of chocolate and tore off a piece of the wrapper from the side without the film. I drank the shot down in one draught and broke off a piece of chocolate and put it in my mouth.

"So do you understand now why I carry chocolate? I am used to snacking on it when I drink whiskey."

The customs officer smiled broadly: "Oh, sir! You should have just said so right off. I would have told you to break the bar, since that way, already started, that is to say, you can bring it across the border."

He left the compartment. I sank onto the bench, more dead than alive, as they say.

The Forced Hundred-Meter Race

The report stated: "You must go to the capital of the neighboring state and on Tuesday at 2000 hours, local time, go to meet the representative of Center." The meeting place was indicated, and the distinguishing features of Petr, the courier. I was supposed to receive 60,000 dollars and new documents from him.

This happened in early fall, and it was still quite warm. Little tables with large umbrellas stood in front of the cafe where the meeting was to take place. After choosing a suitable place, I instructed my wife to keep the square under observation, arranging with her for signals in the event that she noticed someone showing suspicious interest in us.

At the designated day and hour, I set off for the display window of a sporting goods store. I met Petr there and he proposed we go around the corner where his car was. We got in the back seat. At the wheel was an experienced driver who knew the city well. Petr and I began to discuss business in an undertone while the driver drove the car and watched everything on the sides or behind us carefully.

After about 10 minutes he suddenly became upset, and turned to us and said: "We are being followed!" It was like a clap of thunder on a sunny day. I asked him to turn the rearview mirror in my direction and began to study the "tail." There was no doubt: two cars with agents in uniforms were following us. To convince myself for certain, I insisted on driving to the cafe where my wife had remained as observer. We drove past slowly and I clearly saw that she was giving the agreed-upon danger sign.

How could it be? After I consulted with Petr and the driver, we decided that I really had just one way out—jump out of the car somewhere near an open courtyard and hide.

That is what we did. The driver quickly turned the corner and stopped the car sharply right in front of the courtyard. I quickly threw myself into the space between the gate and the ground. I ran across the yard at lightning speed. If there had been a referee there, he undoubtedly would have recorded my personal best for the 100 meters. I do not know what happened to the car.

I ran out onto a large square, spotted the only available taxi there, got in, and ordered the driver to take me to the Central Market. There I changed taxis and went to a different address in a different part of the city. So, after transferring from one car to the other, I was convinced that everything was all right: there was no "tail" on me.

The money-transfer operation had to be repeated.

Bent Keys

I had the fortune to meet and quickly set up business contact with a man who had access to important information. John—that was his pseudonym—was an energetic, bold, and decisive fellow, but at the same time a fellow with a slightly adventurous cast of character. He had to restrain himself all the time. For me John's indispensable quality was his ability to get people to trust him and to establish friendly relations with them quickly.

Once he said that he had access to his boss's safe. After John was supplied with a Minox camera, we managed to begin photographing documents without particular difficulty. Over several months John made film copies of all the interesting materials which were in the boss's safe, and I sent these materials to Center. Then came a breathing-space in the work. John began to seek new objects which might be of interest to us. I did not hurry him.

But then one time he came in an extremely agitated state and began telling me, breathlessly, that a big deal was falling into our laps: a special room had been set aside where John worked and a large safe was put there. Top secret materials which were of indisputable interest to us were being kept in it. John managed to find out about it in the cafeteria, where he drank coffee with a friend from his home region who worked in the secret room.

Getting more and more excited, John proposed breaking the lock to the safe during duty time at work and stealing all the documents kept in it. I had some trouble restraining him from such adventurous and rash plans. I warned him very harshly that he should not undertake any steps without my knowledge and consent.

I informed Center about all this in detail, and they ordered me to study the possibilities of learning the contents of the secret safe.

In speaking of his friend, John said that they had once been very close and their families often got together. Recently they had begun seeing each other more rarely. Needless to say, I advised John to reestablish the former friendship and visit the secret room more often when there were no outsiders present.

The trust began to grow, and soon it got to the point where sometimes when the boss called the friend to his office, the friend would leave the keys on the desk and ask John not to leave the room until he returned. During one of these calls John made molds of the keys to the entrance door and the safe. I sealed them up carefully and sent them to Center.

After roughly a month we received two keys. They were red for some reason, but I did not attach any significance to that. That was a mistake! John and I began to prepare for the operation. We settled on the following: he was to take the materials away in a briefcase and hand them over to me. I, in turn, would immediately go home, photograph the papers, and come back right away.

Finally the day for which we had been preparing long and persistently arrived. At the appointed time I waited for John impatiently, sitting in a car with the motor running. But minute after minute passed and John for some reason did not appear. I began to get worried. Finally he came running—pale, confused, and all a-tremble.

"What happened?"

John sank into the car and gestured for me to take off. When we had driven away from the meeting place, he gradually calmed down and his speech came back to him. He even smiled:

"We almost got caught!"

And here is what he told me. After putting on rubber gloves, John opened the door of the secret room, went in, and then locked the door. Then he put the key into the safe and began to turn it. And suddenly, to his horror, the key began to bend. Seeing that it was about to break, John removed it from the lock with great difficulty and immediately ran to me. The fellow was very frightened. He asked why I had put him under the gun. I explained to him that obviously there had been some mix-up with the keys and asked him to return them.

It turned out later that by mistake Center had sent me the soft metal dies for making the keys. The comrades begged forgiveness and, of course, the person to blame received the appropriate punishment.

Later reliable keys were made and John and I successfully photographed materials from the secret safe over the course of several years.

Borodino Bread

After I finished my business in Vienna, I decided to return to my country of residence by the noon train. I got a lower bed in a double compartment.

Suddenly a group of panting people ran up to the car. I heard—just my luck!—the Russian language. They began to carry things into the compartment. All I could do was be glad that my traveling companion in the compartment would be a fellow countryman. An insuperable desire arose in me to begin talking with him in Russian, but, alas, that was strictly forbidden.

The people accompanying the man left and the train started off. I stood in the corridor for a while, giving my traveling companion time to put his things away and make himself a little more comfortable. I entered the compartment and saw a young man quite elegantly dressed. His name was Ivan Ivanovich Romanov. He said that he was going to work at the Soviet consulate in the country where I was living under illegal status.

Looking around, I noticed that the compartment was stuffed with things. Large vinyl suitcases stood on the baggage shelf and on the floor under the little table. Some kind of parcels, boxes, and baskets lay around. As they say, there was no place for an apple to fall.

I stood up from my seat to get cigarettes from the pocket of my trenchcoat, and suddenly I clearly smelled the fragrance of rye bread. It is difficult for me to express in words the condition which came over me. For some reason my head began to spin, and I grabbed for the doorframe to avoid falling. I, of course, could not explain to my neighbor that the smell of black bread had made me dizzy. I said that there was a somewhat strange but

quite pleasant smell in the compartment which had made my head begin to spin. It resembled the smell of bread, but, in my opinion, with something added.

My traveling companion began to smile and explained: It really was the smell of bread. But it was black bread which he had stuffed in three suitcases for the embassy associates. I expressed extreme surprise that he was carrying bread across the border: there was certainly no problem with bread in the country he was going to. My neighbor smiled at my naivete and answered that he would forgive my lack of information in this matter. He said that I was not Russian and so I did not know about remarkable black bread. He explained that this bread was the best delicacy for Russians working abroad. I had to "confess" that I had never tried black bread, so I could not judge its taste qualities.

My traveling companion crawled up to the top shelf and extracted a Borodino loaf for me as a gift. Forgetting the niceties, I stuffed my mouth full of black bread. Seeing my zeal, my traveling companion smiled and kept saying:

"Eat, eat, eat all you want!"

Full, I began to talk about what people eat in different countries. I was "forced" to confess that I liked Russian bread. And my traveling companion kept pressing and trying to prove that it was the best in the world and I should unconditionally agree with that.

Then little by little my neighbor turned the conversation to me, and I began to explain who I was and what I did. In accordance with the "legend," I told him that by nationality I was Armenian and lived in one of the countries of Central Europe. My neighbor was interested to know whether I had relatives in Armenia. I managed to avoid the question. Then the talk turned to political themes. My traveling companion began to angrily revile the capitalist countries. He kept lavishing praise on the Soviet Union. I did not begin to raise objections to him, and I even assented in some things, believing that that was not dangerous to me.

The next morning we arrived at our destination. Associates of the Soviet embassy were meeting my neighbor at the station. I said goodbye in the car and left before him; I went on about my business.

Several years passed after that travel incident. My lengthy work assignment abroad finally came to an end. I returned to Moscow with my wife and began the measured life of a Soviet office worker.

Once, returning from work, I saw coming out of a ministry entrance—who would have thought it!—my traveling companion of long ago in the train compartment. He ran up to me and hugged me and began to assure me heatedly that he was very glad to see me in Moscow.

At first, I must confess, I was dismayed, but then I took myself in hand and answered that I had come on

business to conclude agreements with Soviet trade firms. He repeated that he was glad we had met and that he would try to properly introduce me to Moscow. For starters he invited me to the Aragvi Restaurant to try Georgian food. I refused after pleading that I was flying home that day. My acquaintance was grieved. He asked what hotel I was staying in. I named the National, because businessmen usually stay there. He said that he would accompany me there and, brooking no objection, he beckoned a taxi.

On the way I thought of a way out of the situation. When we arrived at the hotel, I said that to my great regret I could not invite a guest to my room, since a woman was waiting for me there. He smiled in understanding, clapped me on the shoulder, and bid farewell.

It was just as if a stone had fallen from my shoulders. In any case I went into the hotel and went up to the restaurant to kill some time. Plates with bread stood on the little tables. I took a slice of black bread and absent-mindedly began to chew it. It was strange: its taste was nothing like it was in a foreign country.

[Caption to drawings] In Prison Rudolph Abel Drew Russia

Perhaps these prints would not deserve the attention of the broad public if the unusual signature of the artist were not under them, the signature of R. Abel. It turns out that the legendary Soviet intelligence officer, whose steely endurance astounded even enemies, was in the depth of his heart a lyric poet. In order to understand what reveries visited him in the American prison where he spent many years before he was exchanged for the pilot Powers shot down near Sverdlovsk, it is enough to become familiar with the subjects of his drawings. As a rule they show a Russian landscape: a winter forest, a hut lost in the snow. Or Moscow—invariably romantic, covered in a light, dreamy mist.

Rudolph Abel gave these prints to his comrade in battle and friend Dmitriy Petrovich Korbov, and he offered them to SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. They are being published for the first time.

Arbitration Procedures in Moldova Detailed

Draft Law Published

91UN0731A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA in Russian 27 Nov 90 pp 2-3

[Draft Law of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic on the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service]

[Text] This law, in accordance with the Moldovan SSR Constitution, defines the organization and operating procedures of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service, as well as its objectives and powers.

Section 1. General Provisions

Article 1. The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service is an agency for the resolution of disputes that arise in the economic sphere and in the process of its management, an agency ensuring legality in these areas through legal means, and promoting the optimal functioning of the state's economic system.

Article 2. Legislation Concerning the Organization, Operating Procedures and Authority of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service

The organization, operating procedures and authority of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are determined by the Moldovan SSR Constitution, this law and other Moldovan SSR legislative acts.

The procedures for the hearing of economic disputes are established by the Code on Arbitration Procedures in the Moldovan SSR.

Article 3. Objectives of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service

The objectives of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are:

- ensuring the protection of the rights and law-protected interests of the enterprises, organizations and other subjects of economic relations;
- promoting, through legal means, the observance of legality in the sphere of economic relations;
- preventing violations of legality in economic activities;
- drawing up proposals aimed at the improvement of economic legislation.

Article 4. Basic Operating Principles of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service

The basic operating principles of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are:

- the invariable observance of legality;
- independence in the examination of economic disputes, and subordination only to the law;
- glasnost in the arbitration process.

Article 5. The Powers of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service:

- hears cases involving disputes: that arise in the economic sphere and in the process of its management between state, cooperative and public enterprises and organizations and other subjects of economic relations, as well as between bodies of state authority and administration, that in accordance with legislative acts may be parties to the arbitration process [henceforth referred to, as a rule, as enterprises and organizations];

- hears appeals that acts by bodies of state authority and state administration, cooperative and other public bodies, as well as enterprises and organizations be declared invalid;
- implements measures for preventing violations of legality in economic activities;
- develops proposals for the improvement of legislation;
- issues explanations concerning the application of legislation regulating economic activities and procedures for the hearing of economic disputes.

Article 6. The Language in Which Proceedings Are Conducted in the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service

Proceedings in the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are conducted in accordance with Moldovan SSR on the functioning of languages within the republic.

Section 2. Organization of the Activities of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service

Article 7. Guidance of the Activities of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service carries out its activities under the guidance of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service regularly reports on its activities to the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet and Presidium of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 8. The Moldovan SSR Chief Arbiter

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service is headed by the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter.

The chief arbiter directs the activities of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service and organizes its work; promulgates, within the limits of his authority, orders and other acts; assigns duties among the deputy chief arbiters; approves provisions concerning structural subdivisions; appoints and dismisses employees, with the exception of those employees who, in accordance with this law, are appointed and dismissed through other procedures; adopts measures to reward and penalize employees of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service; and also performs other functions stipulated by legislative acts regulating the activities of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service.

The chief arbiter bears responsibility for the performance of tasks assigned to the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service.

Article 9. Appointment of the Moldovan SSR Chief Arbiter and His Deputies

The Moldovan SSR chief arbiter is appointed by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.

The Moldovan SSR chief arbiter has deputies, including a first deputy.

Moldovan SSR deputy chief arbiters are appointed by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet on the basis of a representation by the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter.

The term of service of the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter and Moldovan SSR deputy chief arbiters is 10 years.

Article 10. Rights and Powers of the Moldovan SSR Chief Arbiter and the Moldovan SSR Deputy Chief Arbiters

In their activities, the Moldovan SSR chief Arbiter and his deputies exercise the rights and powers granted to the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service, including those established by Articles 12 and 14 of this law.

Article 11. The Moldovan SSR Chief Arbiter's Right of Legislative Initiative

The Moldovan SSR chief arbiter has the right of legislative initiative in the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 12. The Arbiter

The arbiter is a person who hears economic disputes and ensures restoration of the violated rights and legitimate interests of the parties.

The arbiter carries out work to prevent violations of legality in the sphere of economic relations, studies and generalizes arbitration practice, takes part in drawing up proposals for improving legislation, and publicizes economic legislation.

The arbiter possesses the powers necessary for carrying out his work that are defined by this law and other Moldovan SSR legislative acts.

The arbiter's demands made within the limits of the arbitration service's powers are binding on the enterprises and organizations, as well as the officials, to whom these demands are directed.

Article 13. The Appointment of an Arbiter

An arbiter of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service is appointed by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet and, during the period between its sessions by the Presidium of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet on the basis of a representation by the Moldovan SSR Chief Arbiter, for a 10-year period.

A citizen of the Moldovan SSR who has reached 25 years of age and has a higher legal education and at least three years of practical work may be an arbiter.

Article 14. The Arbiter's Independence and Immunity

In the hearing of cases an arbiter is independent and subject only to the law. Interference in the arbiter's work is prohibited.

The mass media have no right in their published items to prejudge the results of arbitration proceedings in a specific case before a decision has been made.

An arbiter may not have criminal charges brought against him or be arrested without the consent of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet or, during the period between sessions, the Presidium of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 15. The Presidium of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service

A presidium is formed within the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service.

The activities of the Presidium of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are carried out in accordance with this law and, on issues not specified in it, according to procedures determined by the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter.

In the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service the presidium consists of the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter (chairman), his first deputy and other deputies, as well as other officials of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service.

The personnel of the Presidium of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are approved by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet on the basis of a representation by the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter.

In its regular meetings, the Presidium of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service considers the basic issues in the activity of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service, discusses questions of the selection, assignment and training of personnel, and hears reports by the arbiters and executives of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service's structural subdivisions.

The presidium's decisions are implemented, as a rule, by orders of the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter. In the event of disagreements between the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter and the presidium, the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter carries out his own decision, reporting to the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet on the disagreements that have arisen. For their part, the members of the presidium may report their opinion to the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.

Article 16. Structure, Numerical Size and Staffing

The structure and number of employees of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are approved by the Presidium of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet on the basis of a representation by the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter.

The staffing of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service is approved by the chief arbiter.

Section 3. The Hearing of Cases

Article 17. The Authority of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service in the Hearing of Economic Disputes

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service hears all disputes between the subjects of economic relations

according to procedures defined by Moldovan SSR legislative acts and interstate treaties and agreements concluded by the Moldovan SSR.

Article 18. The Right to Appeal to the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service

Enterprises and organizations have the right to appeal to the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service for the protection of their rights and their interests protected by law.

Article 19. Arbitration

The hearing and resolution of disputes are carried out in arbitration proceedings consisting of the presiding arbiter and the parties or their representatives. The decision is made by the arbiter and the parties or their representatives on the basis of a discussion of all the circumstances of the case in an arbitration session. The arbiter promotes the achievement of agreement between the parties.

In cases in which agreement has not been reached between the parties or their representatives, or the agreement is not in accord with legislation or the materials of the case, or a case is heard without the participation of one or both parties or their representatives, the decision is made by the arbiter.

Article 20. The Equality of the Parties

The hearing of cases in the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service is carried out on the basis of the equality of enterprises and organizations before the law and the arbitration service, regardless of the form of ownership, location, subordination and other circumstances.

Article 21. Glasnost in the Arbitration Process

The hearing of cases is open, with the exception of cases in which this would be contrary to the interests of protecting state or commercial secrets, or there is a well-founded objection by one of the parties.

Article 22. The Review of Decisions of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service Through Oversight Procedures

An arbitration decision service in a case may be reviewed through oversight procedures on the basis of an appeal by one of the parties or a procurator's protest, or at the initiative of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service.

Section 4. The Prevention of Violations of Legality, the Improvement of Legislation and of the Explanation of Arbitration

Article 23. The Prevention by the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service of Violations of Legality in Economic Activities

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service carries out work to prevent violations of legality in economic activities.

To this end, the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service:

1) performs the analysis of information and materials characterizing the reasons for the violation of legality in economic activity, and draws up and, within the limits of its authority, implements measures to eliminate those causes;

2) hears cases that are of great social importance directly at enterprises and in organizations;

3) publicizes economic legislation;

4) according to procedures established in the Moldovan SSR Code of Arbitration Proceedings, directs information concerning identified violations of legality to enterprises and organizations, bodies of state authority and state administration, and cooperative, public and other agencies.

Article 24. The Drafting of Proposals for the Improvement of Legislation

On the basis of the study and generalization of the practice of the application of legislation, the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service drafts and, according to established procedures, submits proposals for improvement of the legal regulation of the activities of enterprises and organizations in the economic sphere, as well as improvement of the arbitration service's performance.

Article 25. The Authority of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service in the Coordination of Normative Acts

Normative acts pertaining to the conclusion and fulfillment of economic contracts that are promulgated by Moldovan SSR ministries and state departments are binding on other ministries and state departments, enterprises and organizations, and are subject to mandatory coordination with the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service.

Article 26. Explanations Regarding the Application of Moldovan SSR Legislation

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service issues explanations regarding the application of Moldovan SSR legislation that regulates relations in the economic sphere and the procedures for the hearing of economic disputes.

The explanations of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are binding on ministries, state departments, enterprises, organizations and officials applying the legislation for which an explanation has been given.

Section 5. Other Questions Pertaining to the Organization and Activities of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service

Article 27. Statistical Record Keeping

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service keeps arbitration statistics according to established procedures.

Article 28. International Relations

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service conducts international relations according to established procedures.

Article 29. Internship in the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service

The beginning of service as an arbiter in the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service is preceded by a one-year internship for the purpose of practical training for the arbiter's future work. The procedures and conditions for the internship are defined by the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter.

Article 30. Certification

Arbiters, officials and specialists of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are subject to periodic certification in accordance with legislation. Regulations concerning the certification procedures are approved by the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter.

Article 31. Publication

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service publishes the magazine ZAKON I ZHIZN jointly with other Moldovan SSR agencies.

Article 32. Seal of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service has a seal bearing the image of the Moldovan SSR coat of arms and the name of the arbitration service in the state language.

Draft Law Analyzed

91UN0731B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA
in Russian 16 Dec 90 p 4

[Article by V. Chenusha, legal specialist: "We Will Dispute. But How?"]

[Text] The draft law that has been published can be adopted as a basis on the condition that certain fairly serious shortcomings in it are eliminated.

For example, Article 4 of the draft speaks of the principle of glasnost in the arbitration process. However, the draft does not state just what that principle consists of. Moreover, the second part of Article 14 of the draft indicates that the mass media do not have the right in their published items to prejudice the results of arbitration proceedings in a specific case. Can it be that glasnost consists in banning glasnost? Why can't a journalist express his viewpoint on a dispute that has arisen between organizations, or subject an arbitration decision to justifiable criticism? In practice there have been cases in which a judicial decision was rescinded by higher judicial bodies after it had been criticized in the press. Naturally, the judicial bodies were not ecstatic over that! Let us hope that legislators will correctly assess the arbitration service's desire to place its actions beyond the range of criticism in the mass media, and will delete the second part of Article 14 as contrary to the principle of glasnost embodied in Article 4 of the draft!

In my opinion, the principle of glasnost should be incorporated in a prohibition against the arbitration service's adopting decisions in the absence of the parties or their representatives (except for cases of a failure to appear for an arbitration session without valid cause). A corresponding addition should be made in Article 4 in order to prevent violations of organizations' rights. Such an addition would have fundamental practical significance, since cases are sometimes encountered in which decisions are issued in the absence of the parties to a dispute. In this connection the hearing of a dispute in such cases is permitted in the second part of Article 70 of the Regulations for the Hearing of Economic Disputes as ratified by the 5 June 1980 Decree No 440 of the USSR Council of Ministers (in the 16 April 1988 version of the decree). A prohibition against the hearing of disputes in the absence of the parties would eliminate conditions contributing to the violation of organizations' rights.

Article 5 of the draft stipulates the right of the arbitration service to issue explanations concerning the application of legislation regulating economic activities and the procedures for the hearing of economic disputes. I consider this an extremely flagrant violation of the principle of the separation of powers, that is, a matter of granting legislative powers to the arbitration service in veiled form. Explanations concerning the application of a law, that is, its official interpretation, are the right of the legislative body, and not the body that applies the law. Experience indicates that explanations issued by agencies applying the laws often substantially distort the meaning of the laws that are being explained. Therefore, I deem it necessary to amend Article 5 and eliminate the first part of Article 26 of the draft, where the arbitration service's right to issue explanations concerning the application of legislation is stipulated.

The meaning of Article 7 of the draft, which states that the arbitration service carries out its activities under the guidance of the Supreme Soviet, is incomprehensible. This general sentence binds no one to anything. Shouldn't Article 7 be eliminated? Article 20 of the draft, which speaks in general terms of the equality of the parties, is not needed, either. Article 21 arouses great

doubts. It speaks about the open hearing of cases with the exception of cases in which this would be contrary to the interests of protecting state or commercial secrets, or there is a well-founded objection by one of the parties. However, the right of the arbitration service to conduct the closed hearing of a dispute where a well-founded objection against the open hearing of the case has been made by one of the sides may create favorable conditions for abuses by arbiters, since they alone (and no one else!) will determine whether such an objection is well-founded. I believe that the hearing of cases should be open. It is also necessary to change the wording of Article 22 of the draft, in accordance with which an arbitration decision in a case may be reviewed through oversight procedures on the basis of an appeal by a party or a procurator's protest, or at the initiative of the arbitration service.

In accordance with the Regulations for the Hearing of Economic Disputes (so far there is no other normative act regulating these matters), arbitration decisions are subject to mandatory review on the basis of an appeal by the parties submitted in good time. Therefore Article 22 should be amended to indicate that arbitration decisions are reviewed on the basis of appeals by the parties or procurator's protests, and may be reviewed at the initiative of the chief arbiter or his deputy. Article 22 should be amended by adding the indication that the submission of an appeal for the review of an arbitration decision suspends implementation of the decision until a decree has been issued by the chief arbiter. The mandatory implementation of a decision that has been appealed by the parties to a case, which is stipulated in the Regulations for the Hearing of Economic Disputes, seems incorrect. Point 4 of Article 23 of the draft contains a reference to the Moldovan SSR Code of Arbitration Proceedings, but it does not state who will adopt this code and what the arbitration service will be guided by until it is adopted. I consider it necessary to add to Article 23 the stipulation that the Code of Arbitration Proceedings is adopted by the Supreme Soviet, and that until it is adopted the arbitration service is guided by the Regulations for the Hearing of Economic Disputes with due regard for the specific provisions of this law.

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